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This PhD thesis looks at some aspects of the Italian home front during World
War Two in the predominantly rural, northeastern province of Udine. It also
examines the immediate aftermath of the war, the first few months of the
Reconstruction period. I have quite deliberately devoted more attention to the early
part of the war because, in the case of the Italy, it is the least studied period of the
conflict. The vast majority of the research that has been published on Italy in the
Second World War has focused on the history of the Resistance 1943-45 and also,
albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, the military aspects of the conflict.
There is no doubt that the Resistance was a very important phenomenon in
Italian history. Historians have often argued that the anti-Fascist movement
effectively removed the 'stain' of Fascism and paved the way for a new democratic
Italy based on the values of this anti-Fascist movement. This made it possible to
disclaim Fascism as the basis for the political system of the new Italian Republic.
Therefore, the Resistance experience was viewed as a defining moment in recent
history, which cleansed Italy of its Fascist past and of its war guilt.
Until recently, the Resistance was used by successive generations of
politicians to legitimate their political aims and most post-war political parties
claimed to be its heirs. The Resistance, however, took place almost entirely in the
last three years of the conflict, which in part explains the relative dearth of research
into the early war years 1940-1943. Another reason why the Resistance has received
such a large amount of scholarly attention is that it made an important contribution to
Allied victory. Partisans fought the Germans behind the lines, as it were, and
hampered communications between Nazi Germany and the battlefront during the
Italian Campaign. In some places there were even pitched battles against the Nazi
troops, especially in the final weeks of the war. Moreover, the Resistance was a
movement far wider than the numbers of actual combatants would suggest: there
were also large numbers of other people involved, women, children and older men,
in communications or support roles.1 Given this context, I decided not to recount or
analyse in detail the history of the local Resistance. Many other historians before me
have devoted themselves to this task.
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Instead, the thesis attempts to explore, through a local case study, some
aspects of the home front, part of Italy's experience during the Second World War
that is far less well-known. It is my contention that the shortcomings of the
organisation of the home front and civil defence were not simply due to the cultural
failings of Italian society, as some historians have suggested. In discussing why
Fascist Italy, a great power of sorts, failed to live up even to its performance in the
previous World War, historians have tended to concentrate on Mussolini's goals and
policies, but there has been little research into how provincial Italians responded
locally to the demands of the regime in Rome. This PhD thesis is also intended as a
contribution to the history of the province of Udine itself. The historiography on the
war period in this area has hitherto been very sparse and therefore a chief aim of the
thesis is to try to investigate and analyse what happened in the province, especially
between the years of 1940-43.
Much of the PhD thesis derives from research carried out at the State
Archives in Udine (Archivio di Stato di Udine), an institution which was itself
created by the Fascist regime in 1941 to hold all the documents of state bureaucracies
and to keep most of the town council archive. One of the most important sources on
local preparations for war is the Prefect's papers in these State Archives (Gabinetto
della Prefettura) which include correspondence between the local Prefect and the
various government ministries, especially the Interior Ministry and the War Ministry,
which were both responsible for the organisation of vital aspects of the home front.
In addition, this archive contains correspondence between the Prefect and local
officials regarding the war demands of the regime.
The State Archives in Udine also have important material in the archive of
the Comitato provinciate protezione antiaerea (1939-1950). This archive has a
remarkably rich documentation relating to air defence organisations and air raid
precautions in the province. Not only does it contain important ministerial circulars,
copies of which can be found in most provincial archives, but unlike many other
provincial archives, it also has detailed local reports and correspondence which shed
light on the extent to which national orders were actually carried out in the province.
To date, no historical research has been done on the activities of the national
air defence organisation, the Unione Nazionale protezione antiaerea (UNPA) or on
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the work of the provincial air defence committees, the Comitati provinciali
protezione antiaerea (CCPPA). Most studies of aerial warfare by scholars like Luigi
Ganapini, Achille Rastelli and Giovanni de Luna,2 among others, have tended to
focus on civil defence in industrial and port areas. By contrast, Udine was a
predominantly rural province and thus offers a different perspective. Moreover,
Udine's civil defence precautions provide an insight into the kind of war Italians
expected to fight.
For this reason, I have devoted two whole chapters of the PhD thesis to an
exploration of early preparations for the air war including shelter building, the
blackout, factory defence and evacuation. The provincial capital was a bombing
target from 1943 onwards because it was a major hub for railway lines from Nazi
Germany to central and southern Italy and was particularly hard and repeatedly hit
during the last winter of the war.
A further aim of this PhD thesis is to investigate how civil defence was
organised at provincial level. Although Italy's disastrous military performance of
1940-1943 has been much debated, historians have not been particularly interested in
Italian civil defence organisations, perhaps because it is tacitly assumed that
Fascism's military failures on the battlefront suggest that the regime was unable to
prepare for a modern war on the home front. MacGregor Knox, for example, has
argued that incompetence and cultural deficiencies within the military and within
society more broadly, prevented the Fascists from imagining, much less preparing
for a modern war. As a result, they failed to mobilise properly what limited resources
did exist. He has also suggested that the contribution to failure of the dictator himself
and the Fascist regime was great. Knox has maintained that all these factors made a
decisive contribution to Italy's catastrophic defeat.
The archives of the High Court in Udine (Tribunale di Udine), part of the
State Archives ofUdine, are also potentially a very useful source for an investigation
of the extent to which wartime infringements were punished by the local judiciary.
Unfortunately, however, the State Archives for the period 1940-1945 are incomplete
and my research has naturally been shaped to some extent by those archives which
have survived the conflict; towards the end of the war, many documents from the
Gabinetto di Prefettura were systematically destroyed by Fascists, who removed
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incriminating evidence in an effort to cover their tracks. However, it is not
necessarily the case that making use of this detailed but fragmentary material will
undermine the usefulness ofmy case study. Instead, it has tended to dictate the focus
ofmy research. The surviving documentation rendered it impossible to attempt an
exhaustive treatment of all aspects of the home front in this area. I have opted,
therefore, to focus in particular on a series of important and interesting themes, on
which good documentation can be found.
The scope ofmy research has been much enriched by the fact that a mass of
new primary sources have recently been added to the State Archives in Udine,
including the Archive of the Court of Assize (Corte di assise di Udine) and some
reports from the Chief of Police for 1940-1945. After obtaining special permission
from the Prefect ofUdine, I was able to consult the papers of post-war trials of
Fascists and collaborators, in the State Archive.
Unlike other aspects of the period 1940-1945, the documents in the State
Archives ofUdine tell us almost nothing about the province's experience of Allied
Military Government (AMG), after the ending of the war. The reason for this is that
the Allies did not leave any archives behind in the province, but took their records
with them when the period ofmilitary government ended in September 1947.
Therefore, I had to carry out research in the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA) in Washington, DC (Archives I), which houses a huge
amount of documentation relating to World War II. In particular, I made use of the
Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II (Record
Group 331) and the Records of AMG Udine. I have used a range of AMG
documents, including those of the Office of the Provincial Commissioner, 1945-46;
Civil Affairs, 1945-46; Legal, 1944-47; Public Safety, 1945-47; and miscellaneous
administrative records, 1944-46. These archives kept in Washington are a
particularly rich source of information for my purposes as they, perhaps surprisingly,
do not consist merely of Allied documents, but also include copies of many Italian
files on public safety and civil affairs taken from the Prefettura and the Questura.
The originals of these documents are not yet available for public consultation in the
State Archives of Udine because of state restrictions or because the archivists at the
Prefettura and the Questura have not handed them over yet to the state archive.
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This PhD thesis consists of eight chapters plus an introduction. Chapter One
is devoted to a brief introductory sketch of the social and economic structure of
Udine and its history from 1871 to 1940, the year Mussolini brought Italy into the
Second World War, as well as providing a brief outline of the military events of Italy
1940-43. Chapter Two starts with an examination of propaganda and the
representation of the war in the province's local newspaper, II Popolo del Friuli.
This chapter focuses in particular on the extent to which it was possible, despite the
powers of dictatorial censorship, for people to learn from local reports and press
stories about the kind ofwar the regime expected to fight. This chapter then goes on
to discuss the local Fascist Party's attempts to organise the mobilisation of women
and children. This section of the chapter is based primarily on the PNF files in the
Archivio Centrale dello Stato.
Chapters Three and Four both focus on the question of air defence
organisations and air raid precautions in the province using archival sources from the
Comitato provinciate protezione antiaerea (1939-1950). This section looks at how
the local authorities protected non-combatants in the province and what sort ofwar
they expected Italy to wage. Chapter Three examines air raid precautions in a period
in which the regime was expecting a short and victorious war. By contrast, Chapter
Four discusses air raid precautions in 1942 and 1943 in a period when bombs were
not yet falling, but when the war was clearly set to continue, and to widen. These
chapters try to answer the fundamental question of why the local authorities proved
so unprepared for the heavy Allied raids of 1944-45.
Chapter Five shifts the analysis of the home front to food policy and the
ammassi campaign. As this chapter shows, agricultural communities were subject to
increasing state control during wartime and this chapter examines the response of
Udine's peasant-farmers and rural state officials to the regime's wartime regulations.
The regime could not wage war without the willing co-operation of agricultural
communities, and Fascist circulars were very clear about what rural communities had
to do for the war effort. I have chosen to examine this topic because there is much
useful material in the State Archives of Udine on the responses of peasants and local
officials to the regime's campaign to get them to hand food over to the ammassi. Of
course, in a society of unreliable and incomplete literacy, peasant families left few, if
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any, written records of their contribution to the war effort on the home front, but the
correspondence between the Prefect and local officials in rural communities sheds
some light on how the peasantry responded to the war demands placed on them by
Mussolini.
Chapter Six uses post-war trial evidence of detailed information about the
brutality and violence of the period to describe and analyse the RSI under German
occupation. Much has been written about the German atrocities in Italy, but
historians have been less interested in writing about the involvement of Italians in
violence which was organized by Nazis, but perpetrated by locals. In many ways, a
discussion of the violence perpetrated by Italians against rural communities in their
own province confirms that there was much resistance in rural areas to Nazi efforts
to make Italians useful to the German war effort in 1943-1945. This is one reason the
Nazis resorted to such intimidation and reprisals.
The last two chapters, Seven and Eight, examine the beginning of the
Reconstruction period. Chapter Seven explores how the province was run straight
after the Germans had left, through an examination of the role of Civil Affairs
Officers. For this section, I have used primarily Allied Military Government
documents to discuss the role those British officials had in shaping post-war society.
Chapter Eight, the final chapter, deals with the punishment of collaborators and
Fascists who were responsible for some of the violence and murder described in
Chapter Six. For this chapter I have been able to make use of the archives ofAMG
which have enabled me to examine a number of post-war trials to illustrate the
attitudes of the judiciary and Allied Military authorities to questions ofwar guilt, and
individual and collective responsibility.
The PhD thesis ends in the final months of 1945, although some of the post¬
war trial evidence does, by necessity, come from the early months of 1946, in the
period before the amnesty of June 1946.
It remains for me to acknowledge the authorities to which I am indebted. I
could not have done the PhD research in Udine, Rome and Washington without a
grant from the Student Award Agency for Scotland which is gratefully
acknowledged.
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various libraries and archives, particularly the University Library at Edinburgh, the
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Civica di Trieste, the Archivio Centrale dello Stato, and the Archivio di Stato di
Udine. I also thank Alberto Buvoli and Favio Fabbroni at the Istituto friulano per la
storia del movimento di liberazione who have helped me in Udine.
I would like to record my thanks to Steven Shafer for his valuable assistance
at the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, and to Jill
Stephenson for many valuable suggestions and corrections. I also acknowledge the
advice, support and encouragement of my PhD supervisor, Perry Willson, to whom I
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contemporanea, 195 (1995), 309-42, and Giovanni De Luna 'Torino in guerra: la ricerca di
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THE SETTING: THE PROVINCE OF UDINE, 1871-1940
Italy is today one of the world's most prosperous and advanced industrial
nations, but during the Fascist period much of the country was poor, backward and
agrarian. In the period 1935-1938, per capita income was roughly a quarter of that in
Britain and half that in France.1 Furthermore, Italy was thirty to fifty years behind
Germany in becoming an industrial society and illiteracy embraced perhaps a third of
the population in 1940.2
In the years following the unification of Italy, the province of Udine was a
relatively unknown region on the periphery of the Kingdom. The province is also
known as Friuli3 and is geographically defined as the Isonzo basin situated in the
northeast corner of Italy between the Alps and the Adriatic Sea. Its geographical
borders are natural barriers: the River Isonzo marks the eastern border of the
province and, to the west, the River Livenza separates it from the province of
Venezia. In the north, the Alps divide the region from Austria and to the south lies
the Adriatic Sea. Although the landscape is remarkably varied, there are three
distinct areas: the Alps {la montagna), the hilly terrain {la collina) and the plain {la
pianura). Half the region is mountainous terrain and, until the marshes were drained
recently, the coastal areas were boggy and malarial.
The government of the new Kingdom of Italy felt an urgent need to know the
economic condition of the country and many censuses were carried out in the
immediate aftermath of unification. In terms of population density, it was found that
the province of Udine was sparsely inhabited (74 persons per square kilometre) in
comparison with many other regions, particularly the neighbouring provinces of
Treviso (145 persons) and Venezia (154 persons). The only Italian provinces that
were less densely populated than Udine were the mountainous regions of Sondrio (34
persons) and Belluno (53 persons). In the province of Udine, the number of
inhabitants per square kilometre was low because of the mountainous area of Carnia.
However, Udine's plains were much less densely populated than those of Venezia,
for example.
The percentage of the local population who were illiterate is a good
indication of the poverty and the backwardness of the province. Statistics for the year
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1871 show that Udine was not too far from the national average and far better than
some other provinces such as Rovigo. What is striking about the statistics is the high
percentage of women who were illiterate in Friuli— 27.88%. In no other
province—and there were sixty-nine provinces at the time—did the results of the
census show such a gap in literacy between men and women. In practical terms, even
in the most prosperous town, the provincial capital, only one woman in four could
read and write. Many children, especially girls, had no formal schooling and about a
third of all children were unable to attend classes because the local school was too
distant to reach on foot.4
Another striking aspect of the province of Udine in the immediate aftermath
of the Unification was the high number of peasant proprietors. Many Friulian
farmers owned land, tools and animals. However, this did not mean that Udine's
farmers were better off than the average Italian peasant. The holdings in Udine were
fragmented because of the tradition of partible inheritance, which was prevalent
throughout the province, with the exception of Tarvisio on the Austrian border where
property was transmitted to a single heir. Moreover, some thirty per cent of peasant
proprietors owned less than one hectare of land, normally a small plot in or near the
village, which could not support the average rural family. Farming conditions varied
greatly depending on the physical landscape; for example, according to the results of
the 1931 census, smallholdings of one hectare were most common on the plains
(53% of farms) and hilly areas (31% of farms), but less prevalent in the mountainous
region of Carnia (18% of farms).5 It has been suggested that the big disadvantage of
partible inheritance was that the sheer number of proprietors with tiny holdings
prevented the emergence of large-scale commercial farming typical of more modern
European countries.6 It did, however, mean that there were no great estates in the
province.
Of course, the economy of Udine was heavily dependent on the province's
capacity to move goods to markets with relative ease and industrial growth was
naturally stunted in this border province because of the absence of branch lines to the
major centres of the region and other parts of Italy. Significant railway development
only occurred at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1874, the Pontebbana railway
running north to south was begun so that the province could transport its goods and
13
people throughout Europe. At about this time, Udine became an important railway
hub when the town was connected to Sacile and Latisana (through the towns of
Palmanova and San Giorgio di Nogaro), Cormons, Cividale and Pontebba. A tram
service linked Udine to San Daniele, and Casarsa and Portoguaro were linked with
branch lines. This meant that the province's railway lines were connected to the
Veneto and the national network, and to the Austrian network. As a result, the
province had a better economic infrastructure and the movement of goods,
previously restricted, was now unfettered.
In the province, local political elections from the Unification to the First
World War were dominated by the Liberals. The Catholic vote aligned itself with the
Liberals and, although the Catholics did not participate fully in national elections
until 1904, they were involved in local government elections (elezioni
amministrative). In 1895, the majority of elected members of parliament in the
province were deeply conservative Liberals. In 1900, the first Catholic politician in
the province was elected to the national parliament. However, it was not until the
elections of 1904 that the Catholics participated fully in the national elections in the
four seats of Udine, San Daniele, Tolmezzo and Gemona. It should be noted that the
Catholics agreed to give their votes to government candidates in return for state
support of the Church's local interests. That said, election results were problematic
for the Catholics during this period because three of the four seats in the Diocese of
Udine were firmly in the hands of Jewish politicians—a situation that was denounced
by the local Catholic broadsheet, II Crociato. During the years 1900-1914, there was
a steady increase in the number of Catholic local councillors (consiglieri) and
Catholic mayors in Udine. By 1913, Udine had two Catholic members of parliament,
but it was not until after the First World War that the Catholic political movement
began to make much real impact in the province.
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
The war of 1915-1918 effectively completed the unification of Italy through
the conquest of Trento, the Brenner Frontier, Trieste and Austrian Friuli, but the
fighting had profound and devastating consequences for Udine. In these turbulent
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years, the border province suffered much more from the direct effects of the battles
than almost any other in Italy. Friulians retained bitter memories of the First World
War, in particular the Austrian occupation of 1917, which represented a catastrophe
for the population and the economy. Victory was bought very dearly in Friuli; some
50,000 children under the age of ten died as a result ofmalnutrition and disease
caused by the war. Moreover, 15,165 civilians were killed during the battles and
skirmishes on Friulian soil, and more than 130,000 local people were forced to flee
from the region following the Austrian breakthrough at Caporetto.7
The First World War also imposed severe pressures on Friulian agriculture.
Both the Italian and Austrian armies' consumption contributed to shortages as troops
on both sides were detailed to requisition food and draught animals from the
peasantry. Virtually all the farm animals in the province were either slaughtered by
the armies or requisitioned during the Austrian occupation of 1917-1918. Of 194,835
cattle recorded by the 1908 censor more than 180,000 were requisitioned. Of the
22,691 horses in the province before the conflict less than 2,500 survived the war.
The results of the 1919 census show that of the 64,460 pigs previously kept in the
province only some 6,000 were left after the Austrian occupation.8 In the aftermath
of the war, the full gravity of the problems facing the province emerged from a
survey by local government officials into war-related crimes committed by the
Austrian army against the civilian population of Friuli.9 However, it should be noted
that the Italian occupation of the region was also characterised by brutality and
oppressive rule; for example, between November 1918 and July 1919, the Italian
army interned some 150,000 people in an attempt to Italianize the region by
suppressing Slovene and Croatian nationalism and pre-empting rebellion.10
As in the rest of Italy, the immediate post-war period was marked by
persistent unrest. Local politics were dominated by two parties, the Partito socialista
and the Catholic Partito popolare. In Eastern Friuli, which had been under Hapsburg
rule, the Italian victory flattened the Liberals who had both been pro-Austrian before
the war. The Catholic organisations of the Consorzi agrari and the Casse rurali were
also destroyed by the war because the local clergy had also supported Austria and
many parish priests were exiled by the new Italian authorities as a result. By contrast,
the Socialists, who had emerged from the war as a relatively minor force, were able
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to re-establish their organizations (the Camere del Lavoro, the Case del popolo, the
Cooperative operate and the Casse Ammalati). The Partito socialista which intended
to play a major role in the reconstruction of Eastern Friuli, was quick to organise
peasant land occupations and strikes. Giuseppe Tuntar, director of the Cassa
Ammalati di Gorizia and a member of the national party leadership was the main
Socialist leader in Friuli. Despite, or because of, the military occupation of Eastern
Friuli by the Italian army, the Socialists gained popularity in the province. This was
mainly due to the creation of workers' organisations, the Cooperative operate, which
were able to offer food at the official price and the Casse Ammalati which were able
to provide a sort of health insurance for peasants and workers. After the land
occupations and strikes, which took place in many parts of Friuli between 1919-
1920, the agricultural workers' organisation (Federazione provinciale dei lavoratori
della terra) managed to secure a contract for field hands (patto bracciante) which
forced their employers to recognise the Socialist unions.11 The authorities and
landowners had shown themselves willing to make concessions, probably because
peasant activism in Udine had taken them by surprise. In any case, the events of
1919-1920 were an indication of a new political awareness among the peasantry. The
local peasant movement, however, had little real power and the peasants were neither
united nor effectively organised in the province.
THE RISE OF FASCISM IN THE PROVINCE OF UDINE
The reconstruction of early Fascism in Friuli has been made difficult by the
regime itself which re-wrote the early history of the party for propaganda displays in
the 1932 National Exhibition (the Mostra della rivoluzione fascista). There was of
course a national dimension to the rise of Fascism in Friuli and hence there are only a
few significant differences between local and national trends in this period.
Early Fascism in Friuli was heavily influenced by D'Annunzio's remarkable
rebellion in Fiume and the flamboyant style of his nationalist politics. In fact, the
first meeting place of local Fascists in Udine was the offices of the nationalist
organisation which represented Italian interests in Istria, La Rappresentanza per il
Friuli della Reggenza italiana del Carnaro.'2 A local branch of the Fasci di
16
Combattimento was founded 26 October 1920 by Ugo Ravazzolo, a railway worker
and Giuseppe Castelletti, editor of the newspapers II Friuli Fascista (1921-22) and II
Popolo Friuliano (1924-25). Among the prominent local supporters of early Fascism
were Gino Covre, an accountant, and Pier Arrigo Barnaba, a landowner, who, by
1924, was a member of parliament and a member of the Fascist Grand Council.
Barnaba, who displayed skill and opportunism in holding the movement together,
was also the Podesta of Udine during most of the Second World War
By 1921, the Udine PNF had some sixty members including many nationalist
students and veterans of trench warfare, according to the party's official
documentation. It should be noted that the local branch of the PNF in Udine worked
very independently in the early period and there was little formal correspondence
with the party headquarters in Milan. In the Fascist propaganda exhibition, the
Mostra della rivoluzione fascista, the lack of early co-ordination was attributed to the
presence of Bolshevik saboteurs in the post and telegraph office who had supposedly
intercepted PNF mail. In May 1921, to broaden the struggle against Socialism, a
group ofwomen headed by Lia Dorta established a local section of the Fasci
femminili to assist with PNF propaganda and 'support the war veterans of yesterday
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and today and defend the victory, sacrifice and the honour of the dead'. According
to the Udine PNF, by May 1921 there were some 500 Fascists in the provincial
capital (Fascio udinese) and some 1,000 members in other parts of the province.14
Despite the relatively tiny number of Fascists, the movement had a significant
impact on the 1921 elections mainly due to the tactics of local Fascists who used
trucks of armed Fascists from nearby towns to foment street violence in the city of
Udine. The first of a series of paramilitary assaults in the province occurred on 20
February 1921.15 The armed gangs of Fascists, who were anti-ecclesiastical, defaced
churches with PNF slogans and attacked members of the Catholic youth
organisation, Gioventu cattolica, which presented itself as leaning to the left. On the
evening of 16 May, the Fascists, sensing that the police were less of a threat than had
at first seemed the case, petrol-bombed the offices of two broadsheets, II Friuli and
La Bandiera Bianca which belonged to the Catholic Partito popolare. When Gino
Covre and Giuseppe Castelli were arrested the next day, Udine was invaded by gangs
of Fascist thugs from Veneto and Trieste, who occupied the town from 18 to 20 May
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and their actions were condoned, even supported, by important members of the
police and civil authorities. At about this time a group of the more left-leaning Udine
Fascists wrote to Mussolini to protest about the hardcore elements in the party whose
violent tactics were alienating some of Fascism's right-wing support.16 During this
period, the Socialists and Catholics accused the Prefect and the representatives of
'law and order' of supporting the Fascists; for example, the Fascist candidate, Ugo
Ravazzolo, had a police escort of officers from the Questura and carabinieri.17 The
Fascist movement in Friuli was still relatively small when, in 1922, the King asked
Mussolini to form a government.
The rise of Fascism in the province ofUdine was helped not only by the fear
of socialism but also anti-Slavism. In fact, during the period 1922-26, the Fascist
movement organised a campaign for an enlargement of the province of Udine to
include the borderlands of Gorizia. The initiative was designed to reduce the
importance of the Slav population in the relatively small province of Gorizia by
absorbing this ethnic minority into the much larger and more Italian province of
Udine. Thus Fascism in Friuli was somewhat different from that in other parts of
Italy due to this ethnic dimension.
There was friction between the Catholic Church and the regime over the
education of children which the Fascists tried to monopolise. Furthermore, some
parish priests were actively opposed to Fascism; for example, in 1927 five local
priests were sent into internal exile (confino) by the judicial authorities. However,
there can be little doubt that one reason for the success of Fascism was that many
Catholic supporters transferred their allegiance to the PNF in the years after 1922.
The Church and prominent local Fascists collaborated on a morality campaign in
1929. Among other things, the campaign criticised women who rode bicycles,
especially men's bicycles. Furthermore, the Archbishop of Udine, Giuseppe Nogara,
appealed to Friulians to vote in the regime's elections of 1930 that were completely
undemocratic.18
Also characteristic of the Fascist system in the 1930s were the PNF affiliated
organisations designed to build consensus for the regime. The Opera nazionale
dopolavoro (OND) was created in 1925 and was controlled by the PNF from 1927.
There were no alternative organisations for people because Udine's Fascist gangs
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had destroyed the socialist organisations (le case del popolo, le cooperative, le
societa di mutuo soccorso socialiste) during and after Mussolini's rise to power.
Friulian industry, however, was fragmentary and backward and therefore the OND in
Friuli was different from that in some more industrialized areas because it was
mainly organised by municipalities and urban districts rather than in factories. In
fact, in 1936 there were only four OND sections established in local factories. By
contrast, there were 457 dopolavoro comunali and dopolavoro rionali, 34 brass
bands, 47 theatre companies, 19 orchestras and 60 sports fields, and 37 libraries.19
Nevertheless, the OND was one of the most important institutions for building
consensus in the province. In 1929-30, the number of OND members increased from
16,000 to 19,000, whilst PNF membership increased from 11,000 to 12,000. The
Udine section of the Opera nazionale balilla (ONB) was created in 1926 for children
and rapidly grew reaching some 106,182 members by 1936. In 1937 the organisation
became the Gioventu italiana del littorio.
During the period 1911-31 the local population increased by some 90,000. In
1911, according to official figures, for every 100 inhabitants, 11 were employed in
industry. In 1916, for every 100 inhabitants, 16 were employed in industry.
However, the censuses of the industrial workforce in 1927 (42,329) and 1939
(63,188) showed that local industries developed very slowly during the Fascist
period20 and it was not until the 1950s that the province experienced intensive
industrialisation.
In 1936, the Fascists decided to strengthen state control of agriculture by
introducing new laws requiring farmers to hand over certain kinds of produce to state
collection depots for a fixed price. For example, all cocoons (for silk), grain,
rapeseed, and castor oil plants were to be handed in at the depots.21 The new Fascist
laws caused some resentment among farmers who expected to be able to trade freely
and directly with consumers. Moreover, this drive for autarchy meant more state
involvement in the economy,22 which irked many rural communities.
The social problems of the province did not go away during the Fascist
period. In fact, unemployment and under-employment were rife not least because of
rural over-population. Many families received annual remittances and savings from
male relatives living abroad, which alleviated some of the worst poverty. The 1931
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census recorded between 40,000 and 50,000 people unemployed out of a population
of 787,59s.23 According to an article in II Popolo del Friuli, the local industrial
sector remained stagnant in the period 1911-27 in terms of its structure and work
force.24 Such problems only got worse after the world economic depression from
1929 onwards.
One notable social problem, according to the historian Annamaria Vinci, was
the high levels of crime among women, another sign of the poverty and social
deprivation in the region. The courts never referred to the work of the Fasci
femminili which appeared to be unable to reach out to the rebellious women, accused
of abortion, infanticide, assault, theft from fields, and smuggling. In 1932, 2,997
women were put on trial in Friuli-Venezia Giulia and 5,112 appeared before judges
in 1933. The trials offered a very different image of women's lives from that
conveyed in Fascist propaganda and in the teachings of the Catholic Church.25
During the first half of the 1930s, the regime similarly appeared to be concerned
about juvenile delinquency, but was unable to resolve the problem. Minor theft was
common and usually blamed on hunger. In 1928, for example, there were so many
malnourished children in the region that those under eight years of age were not
allowed to take part in PNF parades.26
In the 1930s most of the inhabitants of the province could be described as
contadini (peasants), a very varied group which was united by its general poverty
and low social status. In Fascist Italy the term contadini embraced a broad range of
different figures that included small landowners as well as sharecroppers, landless
field hands and temporary labour or braccianti. The term contadini was also used to
refer to commuting workers who lived in rural areas and who farmed a few fields to
reduce food costs and to sell small amounts of vegetables, salami or sausages to
supplement the family income. Contadine (female peasants) had a large role in
farming despite the fact that they were sometimes referred to as housewives. When
the term contadini was used to refer to landowners, it normally meant small farmers
with a family-sized holding. By contrast, big farmers were not referred to as
contadini but agrari. They had a very different social status and income.
Most Friulian peasants worked the fields by hand or with draught animals.
The peasants' cooperatives (cooperazione agricola) helped farmers acquire machines
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together as it was known that mechanised farming could reduce the overall costs
from about 400 lira to 210 lira per hectare.27
Table 1.1. The Working Population of the Province of Udine, according to the 1936
Census.
Agriculture Industry Others Total
Mountains 33,222 18,409 8,304 59,935
55.43% 30.71% 13.85%
Hills 46,177 25,886 12,106 84,169
54.86% 30.75% 14.38 %
Plains 103,020 51,966 37,193 19,2179
53.6% 27.04% 19.35%
Province 182,419 96,261 57,603 336,283
54.24% 28.62% 17.1%
Source: Lorena Vanello, 'L'agricoltura friulana tra le due guerre mondiali' Storia
contemporanea in Friuli 9 (1978), 92.
During the Fascist period, the province of Udine was divided up into 172
administrative districts known as comuni (communes), some of which were towns,
while most were relatively small rural communities, the basic unit of Friulian
society. The comuni were for the most part self-governing and were able to pass
bylaws (leggi comunali), collect local taxes, and adjudicate in matters relating to
local property and land disputes. An important measure which particularly affected
rural areas was the abolition, by the laws of 4 February and 3 September 1926, of
local elected councils, headed by a mayor or sindaco and their replacement by a
Podesta. The Podesta was appointed by Rome on the nomination of the local prefect
and assisted by a small advisory council of Fascist Party members. The figure of the
Podesta, which was consistent with the heavily centralising and anti-democratic
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principles of Fascism, put many of the villages back in the hands of the nobility and
large landowners.
ITALY'S WAR
The Second World War was the challenge the regime had supposedly been
preparing for since taking over power and was to provide a crucial testing-time for
Fascism. The First World War had clearly demonstrated how vital mass mobilisation
was to successfully wage war, but during the course of the Second World War there
was no all-out armaments programme, still less a general mobilisation of the nation's
economic and social resources.
Mussolini was not immediately sympathetic to the Nazi rise to power in
Germany and Hitler was initially viewed with much suspicion. Mussolini sent troops
to the Brenner Pass when the President of Austria, Dolfuss, was assassinated on 25
July 1934. But Fascist Italy was drawn to Nazi Germany after the invasion of
Ethiopia and the Rome-Berlin Axis was established on 24 October 1936. Italy
abandoned the United Nations on 11 December 1937 and participated in the Spanish
Civil War on the side of General Franco (1936-1939). On 12 March 1938, Mussolini
sanctioned the annexation of Austria to Nazi Germany.
Most of the causes of Italy's humiliation in the war have been explained by
historians through the presentation of the economic realities. The Axis coalition of
Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan possessed half the economic power
of its enemies,28 and, once the war was set to continue and to widen, this imbalance
could only result in destruction, defeat and disaster for the Axis powers. Moreover,
within the Axis coalition, Italy was by far the weakest partner and, unlike Nazi
Germany or Imperial Japan, could not subsidise its war effort by plundering the
economic resources of occupied territories.
In reality, the Italian Divisions were not that much inferior to those of other
belligerent nations and it was only after the Blitzkrieg of 1940 that the importance of
mechanised warfare emerged. The real problem was that Italy's war aims were
beyond the capabilities of its armed forces; for example, the Fascists demanded the
French territories of Savoy, Nice, Corsica, Tunis and Djibouti but only Djibouti
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made sense since it was an important port for Ethiopia, whilst the other territorial
claims were clearly designed to humiliate France and were of no strategic importance
in the war.
Moreover, one of Italy's war aims, the expansion of an African Empire,
including Egypt and Suez and the Sudan could only have been possible with the
defeat of the British Empire. Another important aim, expansion in the Balkans, was
highly implausible given that Nazi Germany fully intended to control this region. By
contrast, Mussolini failed to launch attacks against the British naval bases at
Alexandria and Gibraltar or the island of Malta, relatively easy targets which should
have been military priorities for the regime. Indeed, it was from the military bases in
Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria that the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force were
able to control the skies and decimate Axis shipping on sea routes between Italy and
North Africa. Suez and Gibraltar became choke points that reduced Italian imports.
It was not merely strategic failure which doomed Italy's war. Early
interpretations blamed the personal nature of Mussolini's rule for the regime's
inability to organise and direct the war effort, but more recently historians have laid
emphasis on the cultural and organisational failings of Italian society, especially the
armed forces which lacked a military culture.29 It has been argued that the
imperviousness of much of Italian society to modernity, the prevalence of illiteracy
or semi-illiteracy and a weak sense of nation state were crucial cultural factors which
severely limited Italy's ability to wage war. On the outbreak of war, Mussolini
assumed the office of Minister of War and the Commandership in Chief of the
Armed Forces, a position constitutionally held by the monarch. Thus important
military decisions were made by the Duce alone. The absence of a properly co¬
ordinated machinery of military and political consultation was fatal to the conduct of
the war. Worst still, there was no conceptual or organizational framework for inter-
service co-operation until 1941-42.
In Fascist propaganda, at least, the regime was a totalitarian one and the
conflict was a revolutionary war of internal as well external conquest. The
constitutional anomalies of the regime, however, made it impossible for the regime
to ever really be totalitarian. Unlike Hitler whose power was virtually unqualified,
Mussolini was head of government and head of the party in power, the PNF, but the
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King remained head of state and the regime was based on precarious compromises
between Fascism and the monarchy, and the constitutionally separate army, the
Regio esercito, which owed its allegiance to the king.
Germany's easy victories in Norway, the Low Countries and France in the
late spring and early summer of 1940 led many Italians to believe that the war would
be a short one. Moreover, the apparent superiority of Italy's armed forces had been
hammered into Italians by pre-war media and poster propaganda and during the war
this line was continued and embellished with the regime's progress reports of the
Axis powers' military successes. Although it is true that most, perhaps all, Italians
entered the war reluctantly, the regime's propaganda twisted reality in a plausible
fashion and convinced the majority of Italians that the regime could win the war
quickly and easily and that victory was just around the corner. It must be
remembered, however, that distortions of the truth were built into the regime's whole
communication system at every level, most of all within its upper echelons; this
meant that ministries and local government authorities became themselves the
foremost believers of the regime's own propaganda. In short, the authorities as well
as ordinary people had a totally unrealistic impression of the war.
Mussolini abandoned his status as 'non-belligerent' ally of Germany and
brought Italy into the war on 10 June 1940. On 21 June Italy invaded France. The
nominal military offensive against France from 21 to 24 June was particularly
ignoble given that France had already fallen to the German armed forces and was, at
this stage, waiting for the armistice. The French Armee des Alpes in fortified
positions fought well and Italian losses amounted to 1,258 dead and 2,631 wounded
in comparison with only 20 French dead and 84 wounded.30 Moreover, Hitler refused
to let Italy settle the historic claims of Nice, Corsica and Tunis which had in part
brought Italy into the war. In fact there was no Axis occupation of Tunis in French
North Africa.
It is worthwhile remembering that Italy was effectively at war from 1935 to
1945. It participated in the Ethiopian War 1935-41, the Spanish Civil War 1936-39
and the Second World War 1940-45. However, it was only the Second World War
that revealed the extent to which the regime was unprepared for a major conflict. The
Italian forces were deficient in equipment, especially anti-aircraft defence guns, and
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mechanised transport. They possessed no modern artillery and tanks and they had
lost equipment and war material in the Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War,
material which had not been replaced by 1940. Only nineteen divisions of the army
out of seventy-three were at full strength. In a war without fixed fronts, machines
were low on the army's list of priorities. In particular, there was a shortage of
effective medium tanks and the 'armoured divisions' were not armoured in any
accepted sense. Army air reconnaissance units were initially equipped with biplanes
which were no match for modern fighters like the Spitfire and the Hurricane.
There was no full-scale mobilisation in 1940. Instead, men were called up in
stages and the actual number of men in the army varied from about 1,300,000 to
1,800,000. In fact, in October-November 1940, 600,000 men were demobilised. In
theory, local military headquarters were responsible for the mobilisation of men
between 19 and 70 and the PNF was responsible for the mobilisation of boys
between 14 and 18 and women between 14 and 70. In practice, however, only a
small number of unemployed Italians were mobilised by the Fascist Party because
the regime assumed that the war would be a short one and that mass mobilisation
was wholly unnecessary. Women were never properly mobilised at all. As De Felice
has noted, at this point, the PNF was already beginning to discuss problems
associated with the end of a victorious conflict and 'demobilisation.'31
In 1940, Italy expected that the invasion of Great Britain, Operation 'Sea-
Lion', was imminent. Mussolini wanted the Italian armed forces to participate in the
invasion of Britain and sent 75 BR.20 bombers to enter the fray. Technical problems,
however, meant that four aircraft were lost during the flight from Italy to Belgium.32
The failure to defeat Britain in September 1940 began to undermine the myth of an
invincible Germany.
On 28 October Italy attacked Greece. Only eight small divisions, which were
deficient in equipment, took part in the offensive. Of the 140,000 troops in Albania
only 80,000 actually participated in the war. This was because Mussolini and the
army general staff expected little opposition from the Metaxas dictatorship. The
Greek army, however, rallied and checked the Italian invasion force in difficult
mountain terrain and deteriorating weather. On 14 November, the Greeks mounted a
counter-offensive and defeated the bulk of the Italian forces and captured a quarter of
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Albania. The catastrophic defeat of the Italian armed forces in Greece and the
inglorious stalemate in Albania seriously damaged the regime's prestige and
threatened its internal stability. The failure to defeat Greece and the steady retreat
into Albania produced a rapid decline in public morale and brought an end to the
illusion of a short war. Hitler came to Mussolini's rescue and overran Greece and
Yugoslavia in April 1941, but it meant that Italy's strategic independence, the so-
called parallel war, was irretrievably lost. From this point on, Italy was not only
totally subordinate to its ally but also the regime was now increasingly dependent on
Nazi Germany for its survival.
Meanwhile, the Italian navy still hoped to dominate the central
Mediterranean, despite the fact that a third of the Italian merchant fleet, 1,216,000
tonnes out of 3,300,000, had been lost with the declaration of war on Great Britain
and France.33 Britain was determined to hold the Mediterranean however, and the
seizure of Suez and Gibraltar would have depended on the performance of the army
not the navy. In any case, the navy had to rely on forces beyond its control for oil
supplies, and once the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar were closed, Italy
became totally dependent on Nazi Germany for the import of industrial raw
materials.
Meanwhile the British struck the Italian fleet at Taranto on the night of 11-12
November from Swordfish torpedo-bombers from the carrier Illustrious and sunk
half the regime's capital ships at anchor, Littorio, Duilio, and Cavour. The ships had
no anti-torpedo nets because the navy thought the water level in harbour was too low
for torpedo-bombers. Italy suffered another naval disaster when British
Mediterranean forces under Admiral Cunningham destroyed three heavy cruisers,
Pola, Fiume, and Zara in night action off Cape Matapan on 28-29 March 1941. The
battleship Vittorio Veneto was also badly damaged with an aerial torpedo in this
engagement.
Mussolini now hoped that an operation on the Libyan border against British
forces in Egypt would secure a position at the armistice negotiations with a defeated
Britain. In September 1940, the Italian army invaded Egypt with seven infantry
divisions but halted at Sidi Barrani and dug into positions some 80 kilometres inside
the border. In December 1940-February 1941, the British counter-offensive
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recaptured Cyrenaica and took 130,000 Italian prisoners. 1300 guns and 400 tanks
were captured or destroyed. In terms of propaganda value, it was the most disastrous
military defeat for the Italians as the columns of prisoners, who were filmed and
shown in British newsreels, confirmed the stereotype of the Italian soldiers as
cowardly, demoralised and ready to capitulate. Mussolini's obstinacy in fighting his
own 'parallel war' led to the rejection, on more than one occasion, of German
armoured reinforcements. In the spring of 1941, the Italians lost Eritrea, Somalia and
Ethiopia. Fascist Italy's East African Empire was no more.
Air raids on Turin and Milan (June 1940) and the naval bombardment of
Genoa (9 February 1941) revealed the regime's inability to defend even its own
domestic territory. Intensive Allied bombardment of Italian cities and the problems
of evacuation of damaged areas and of rationing added to the war weariness of the
population and began to produce sharp pervasive criticism of the regime. The entry
of the United States into the war threatened a massive Allied intervention in the
Western Mediterranean and on the Atlantic coast of French West Africa.
After the Allied landing in French Northwest Africa in 1942, the war came
even closer to Italy. Soon afterwards, the rulers of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria
began to contact Rome about the possibility of negotiating a separate peace with the
United States and Great Britain. The invasion of Sicily in July 1943 marked the end
of the Fascist regime which had in any case already lost most of its popular support.
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MOBILISATION AND PROPAGANDA: EARLY PREPARATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS,
SUMMER TO WINTER 1940
This chapter focuses on aspects of the situation in Udine during the first
months of the war. It starts by looking at what people learned about Italy's readiness
for war through local newspaper articles which appeared before the Italian army in
Greece suffered catastrophic defeat in the winter of 1940-41. This first section deals
with how the war situation was portrayed in the local press and focuses specifically
on the most detailed source of information about the war, II Popolo del Friuli
(usually referred to as II Popolo) which was the most important daily broadsheet
printed and published in the province during the Fascist period. Like most local
newspapers in Italy at the time, II Popolo was far more widely read in the province
than national newspapers. The civic library in Udine has a complete run of II Popolo
for the war period, as the collection in the Biblioteca Civica survived the heavy air
raids of 1944-45. The historian Luigi Ganapini has argued that broadsheets are a
problematic source of information about Italy's war in that the editorials of
newspapers were controlled by the regime.1 This is, of course, true but the press is
useful in trying to understand what Italians at the time knew about the war.
The second part of this chapter examines the local Fascist Party's attempts to
mobilise women and children for the war effort. The First World War had set a
precedent of a very important kind. It had shown that mobilising civilian workers
was crucial to the manufacture ofweapons and other military hardware. Yet there
were no banner headlines in II Popolo about a general mobilisation in 1940. Even
though historians have been puzzled by the lack of full-scale mobilisation in Italy,
there has been little research into local efforts by the PNF to mobilise Italians.
In the absence of written records, it is impossible to do justice to other
important sources of information in Udine about the war, including foreign radio
broadcasts and the dramatic accounts circulated by soldiers on leave. Also, there
were other equally important forms of propaganda, notably local radio broadcasts,
cinema newsreels and PNF pamphleteering, and articles in other national and
regional newspapers which were also to be found on sale, in particular II Gazzettino
and II Popolo di Trieste. But I have browsed through many issues of other
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contemporary broadsheets in Trieste's civic library and they are invariably little more
than a different selection and arrangement of the same official material from the
Ministry of Popular Culture or Minculpop.2 It therefore seems plausible to argue that
although the fact that a number of different newspapers were on sale may have given
some the impression that people could read more than one version of the war, in
reality, this was totally untrue.
Also, local entertainment in the form of opera, theatre, and concerts was an
important part of Fascist propaganda as it alleviated the stress ofwar and sustained
morale on the home front. A recent article on Fascist censorship claimed that cultural
issues were secondary to the regime's political concerns in the early years of the
Fascist regime. This may indeed be the case. However, it is also true that the
distinction between political and cultural issues was less clear-cut during the war
because entertainment frequently contained a political message or served a political
purpose.
It is, of course, very difficult to know the extent to which Italians really
believed all they read in the press. One factor which may have increased the apparent
reliability of papers like II Popolo, however, was the fact that although,
unquestionably, Fascist propaganda manipulated the truth, Minculpop had to provide
some facts and figures to maintain credibility, especially when discussing the
organisation of the home front. In addition, Minculpop was sometimes forced to
publish detailed, and more or less accurate, information about the war, for example
after the first RAF bombardment of Turin on the night of 11-12 June, because it was
reacting to popular rumours and scaremongering. Therefore, II Popolo often
contained sections of relatively truthful information blended in with bogus claims.
■IL POPOLO'
II Popolo was a typical provincial daily paper. It had front-page, banner
headlines of national or international news, and a local two-page section inside which
frequently reported on preparations for war, including the activities of the local
section of the Fascist Party. Udine's coffee-houses, taverns and social clubs usually
provided a copy of the broadsheet for customers to browse through and so the paper
reached out to far more people than its circulation figures alone suggest. However,
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the newspaper's influence was clearly far greater in urban areas than in the
countryside due to high levels of illiteracy among the peasantry.
One obvious reason why some historians have been dismissive of Fascist
propaganda in comparison to Nazi propaganda is that the wars of Fascism and
Nazism were very different. Whilst Nazi Germany fought three world powers to the
bitter end and only suffered invasion in the last year of the conflict, the Italian war
effort disintegrated after early and catastrophic military defeats. Cultural differences,
moreover, have shaped the judgement of some non-Italian historians who have
written about this. Adrian Lyttleton and MacGregor Knox, among others, have
argued that Italy in the 1930s was about forty years behind Germany in becoming an
industrial society. Much of the early historical writing on the Fascist press contained
the quasi-racist Anglo-Saxon assumption that Italian propaganda was really too
farcical to do much harm. However, I believe that, although of course, it would be
wrong to argue that the broadsheet produced fanatical loyalty, this does not
necessarily mean that Italian journalism was unimportant as an instrument of
coercion and consent.
Similarly, it has long been a common-place among Italian historians that
Fascist propaganda was cruder and less effective than Nazi propaganda.4 The
suggestion here is that propaganda had less impact on Italians who were,
consequently, less committed to the war. Other historians have drawn attention to the
fact that Nazi Germany provided the Italian press with propaganda material,3 and
while this research is important, such studies ultimately serve to diminish Italy's own
responsibility in the war and thus side step questions about national war guilt. II
Popolo was, however, far from simply a mouthpiece for Nazi propaganda. The fact,
for example, that Udine's paper did not have a strong anti-Semitic tone in the early
part of the war, suggests that the Fascists did not by any means simply publish all the
material syndicated from Berlin, but selected appropriate topics before reprinting
German articles. Moreover, it is worth noting that English newspapers, notably The
Times, were also filleted by the Italian press for material which could be re-written as
Fascist propaganda. One example of this is the fact that II Popolo reprinted Royal Air
Force and Royal Navy official losses which had first been published in The Times.
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Ironically, The Times was arguably a much better source of information for
Fascist propaganda than German broadsheets because of the relatively detailed and
free debate in the English-language press about the conduct of Britain's war. In July,
for example, II Popolo reported that the British were preparing to combat an invasion
and had even bought a few aeroplanes from the United States, according to The
Times. This article in II Popolo, written before the Land-Lease agreement between
the British and Americans had been reached, correctly pointed out that Britain was
under-equipped to defeat Nazi Germany, and went on to suggest that the British
government was in an increasingly desperate situation. The Times, according to II
Popolo, had recently suggested in its editorial that the war situation was much more
serious than the British government had previously claimed.6 Fascist propaganda,
therefore, was often a re-writing of information from other press sources, but with
editorial cuts that gave articles a very different slant. Superficially, the articles must
have seemed similar to the columns of short notices sent by 'our special
correspondent' (nostra correspondenza particolare) from abroad which had hitherto
been a prominent feature of Italian journalism. It follows that the cleverly re-written
articles may have created the illusion that Italians could read other foreign press
sources about events, sources which appeared to confirm the regime's version of the
war.
The summer of 1940 was a period in which the vast majority of the local
population only experienced the war in the pages of Fascist broadsheets or newsreels.
It was also the period of Germany's stunning victories in the west; victories which
meant that there was little need for Fascist Italy to fabricate the military successes of
the Axis powers. In the summer of 1940 people could read about how, in a matter of
days, the German Panzers had swept through Luxembourg, Belgium and northern
France. Dunkirk was gleefully but accurately reported in II Popolo as a sensational
military defeat for Britain. Moreover, people in Udine could read that the fighting
was gradually becoming more distant from Italy. By July the front-line was in the
southeast of England.
In early August, the Italian army invaded British Somaliland and captured the
outposts of Karora, Gallabat, Kurmak and Kassala. II Popolo wrote that 285 British
aircraft had been lost in the defence of British Somaliland, the first colony to fall to
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the Axis forces. By mid-August the broadsheet was reporting that the British forces
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had been defeated and were evacuating by sea. The invasion of British Somaliland
was described as a decisive blow against the British Empire 'which had been unable
to prevent the earlier conquest of Ethiopia, and was now unable to prevent further
expansion of the Italian Empire'.9 In many ways, articles like these that appeared in
11 Popolo conveyed rather accurately just how tenuous Britain's position was in
1940. Moreover, the easy invasion of Somaliland and the crossing into Egypt
suggested that Britain was not a formidable enemy and this was the kind ofwar most
people in Udine expected to fight. Clearly, these military events gave no forewarning
of how tough the war against Britain was going to be for Italians.
It should also be remembered that the war Italy waged in the first six months
of the conflict was very different from that fought by the Italian army in Greece in
the winter of 1940-41. In the early period of the war, the Italian soldiers did not fight
in a land campaign in Europe. In practice, Italy's German ally did all the fighting in
the West and it was natural that people in Udine would be less concerned about the
war because Italian troops were obviously not required. Hence many aspects of
people's daily routine were unaffected by the pressures of the conflict that were
being experienced in other belligerent nations. This explains why the Podesta of
Udine decided that it was still possible to put on a season of opera at the Odeon
theatre, and there were no changes to the programme. The local Fascist organisation
for University students (Gruppi universitari fascisti or GUF)10 staged some of the
plays of Luigi Pirandello, in whose theatre truth is by nature contradictory,
unfathomable, and in part constructed by the actors themselves. This Pirandellian
theatre, including the one-act piece Lumle di Sicilia (Sicilian Limes), was written
before the Fascists seized power, but the notion that truth was inaccessible no doubt
served the purposes of Fascist propaganda.11
Nor did Europe's descent into barbarism cast a baleful shadow over the local
football fixtures; young men continued to play well-attended matches and received
enthusiastic press coverage. In August, while Italian forces invaded British
Somaliland, the local football association (Associazione Calcio) announced that the
1940-41 season would go ahead as usual and then published the much anticipated
changes to the local team, Udinese, in II Popolo. The only really disappointing news
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for readers was that two popular players, Degano and Tabanelli, were to leave the
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side, but they had not been drafted, merely transferred to another team, Fiorentina.
Once the season began, beneath an article about the Duce's much publicised tour of
reserve armoured units in Friuli, there appeared a large photograph of an exciting
moment during the match between Udinese and Brescia in which the Brescia
goalkeeper warded off an attack by Mian, Rossi and D'Odorico. The brief article
concluded that the Udine team had been 'unjustly beaten 1-0'.13 This apparent
normality no doubt reinforced public perception that many aspects of life would
continue to remain untouched by the war.
It could also be argued that even wartime football was a form of propaganda
in that it reassured people that the regime's war of foreign conquest would not cause
turbulence in many aspects of people's lives. Moreover, in the pages of II Popolo the
football field was only apparently in contradiction with the battlefield since much of
the press, in typical Fascist style, described the war in sporting terms as a
confrontation involving attack and defence, competitiveness, and strength in
adversity—all vivid, healthy emotions, according to the Fascists. More to the point,
football was entertainment, which the regime considered an important form of
propaganda in that it sustained civilian morale.
Another feature of the regime's propaganda should be noted. Newspaper
articles often more or less truthfully reported facts but deliberately confused cause
with effect. Thus a correspondent for II Popolo, who was apparently reporting from
France and Belgium, wrote that the Nazi organisations there were providing
medicines, food and clothing, thus preventing refugees from starving to death. The
picture of German invasion in the local Fascist broadsheet was one of a benevolent
conquest.14 In particular, the Technische Nothilfe (TN) was cited as an example of
how the German armed forces were reconstructing France. This article misleadingly
described repair and reconstruction as humanitarian aid when in fact the TN was part
of the German police services (Ordungspolizei) and had a military not civil role in
the occupation of France.13 In typical fashion, this article presented the destruction
caused by aerial warfare against the civilian population as the result of futile
resistance rather than Nazi aggression. In this way, resistance was a sufficient
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explanation for the bombing of Amsterdam and Warsaw, and was to be blamed on its
inhabitants who had refused to capitulate.
Three days after Italy entered the war, II Popolo reported that Turin had been
bombed on the night of 12-13 June. This was the first article in II Popolo which
provided people in Udine with some evidence that Italy was vulnerable to air attack.
The newspaper reproduced verbatim the military dispatch from the army high
command which stated that the Italian air force had been in action in Ethiopia;
bombers had attacked a British airfield at Biserta and Italian fighters had shot down
six enemy aircraft without losses, and that British bombers had attacked Turin, which
was described as an open city (pitta aperta), a meaningless term implying that a city
with war-related industries had somehow been mutually recognised as a non¬
belligerent or demilitarised zone. The broadsheet reported that during the two-hour
raid, British bombers had dropped about thirty bombs from a height of 6,000 metres,
destroying houses and a market place. Fourteen civilians were reported to have been
killed. According to II Popolo, this long and supposedly accurate report on the
bombing of Turin demonstrated the regime's desire to be as honest as possible about
the war situation.16
It is possible, however, to hazard a different explanation for this apparent
honesty if this particular RAF raid on Turin is contextualised. The aerial
bombardment of Italy's largest industrial city occurred on the same day that German
troops in France breached the Maginot Line while other motorised units entered
Paris—and Fascist broadsheets triumphantly reported the blitzkrieg breakthrough
and encirclement the next day with sensational headlines and genuine euphoria. De
Felice is probably correct in noting that, after these events, many Italians who had
been sceptical about Mussolini's decision now believed that the Axis powers had
more or less won the war.17 II Popolo continued to publish Royal Air Force and
Royal Navy official losses and quoted both The Times and Deutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung to give the impression of a balanced account of the war between Britain and
Germany. II Popolo left readers in little doubt that Britain was losing the war and
that the British Empire's power, based on military supremacy, was visibly
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disintegrating. A few bombs dropped on distant Turin, in this context, seemed little
to worry about for the readers of II Popolo.
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During the war the local section of the Fascist Party was not supposed to
make statements about air defence including evacuation. It should be noted that it
was the Prefect, not the PNF, who submitted important articles and announcements
to II Popolo that informed the public about local air defence matters and other
aspects of the home front on a need-to-know basis. If party hierarchs had been
allowed to organise evacuation and air defence or publish stories about evacuation as
propaganda, it would have given the PNF a much more significant role on the home
front, but, as it was, the War Ministry insisted that only the Prefect could make
statements in the press.19 Thus, the job of making important announcements about
the home front was kept firmly in the hands of the War Ministry and the Interior
Ministry. PNF officials were relegated to the role ofmere technical consultants who
provided people with advice on how best to implement ministerial air raid
precautions and other regulations. By October 1940, the Prefect was already severely
criticising the party's role in air defence, especially its inadequate efforts to inform
people about wartime regulations, including the all-important shelter obligations,
• • • • i 20which led him to insist that the party's role in air defence should be very limited.
Mario Isnenghi has suggested that Fascist propaganda was in the realm of
fairytales and that the war which emerged from the pages of PNF broadsheets like II
Popolo was an imaginary war without realism.21 Similarly Aurelio Lepre has
maintained that the regime claimed that its anti-aircraft guns represented an almost
impossible barrier for enemy aircraft.22 II Popolo did indeed sketch this sort of
picture on the front-page, but long articles on the inside pages frequently conveyed a
far more accurate impression of the nation's war preparations. For example, people
could read about the technological poverty of Italian artillery pieces on the home
front. The newspaper quite candidly admitted that the anti-aircraft guns in use in
Udine remained those of 1915-18 and were to be fired by local volunteers, veterans
of the First World War, who were too old for the draft (the oldest volunteer serving
on an anti-aircraft gun crew in Udine had previously seen action in the Libyan
campaign of 1911). Even though the anti-aircraft gunners were blackshirts {camicie
nere) it was not an elite force in any accepted sense. In fact, the broadsheet even
went on to suggest that the anti-aircraft batteries which had seen action in three wars,
would most probably be ripped to shreds when the first anti-aircraft salvos gave their
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positions away to enemy bombers, 'sending the gun crews to meet their Maker' (//
manda al Creatore).22 The point is that the local press made a virtue of these
deficiencies by writing that Fascism's best men and artillery pieces had been
deployed on the battlefront. Hence, 1915-18 equipment and soldiers on the home
front were to be seen as a sign of the regime's total commitment to the battlefield
rather than its lack of preparation for war. To see the war in this way was to assume
that, in a war of foreign conquest, Italy did not need a heavily guarded home front.
Mario Isnenghi has also argued that discussion about the technology required
to fight a modern war was wholly absent from the Fascist press, but this does not
seem to be the case in Udine. Editorials in the local PNF broadsheet discussed at
length technical aspects of the war. For example, in the columns of II Popolo it was
quite clearly admitted that the regime could not use aviation against night attacks; the
Italian air force had no fighters to intercept enemy aircraft flying at night and had to
rely on heavy searchlights to locate bombers. Readers could surmise that Italy had no
integrated air defence system because bomber detection was in the hands of the army
and the militia, not the air force. The broadsheet also provided 1915-18 statistics to
point to the limitations of modern artillery weapons; for example, in July 1940 the
newspaper explained that it had been necessary during the First World War to fire
between 5,000 and 7,000 rounds to shoot down a single aircraft. The article
effectively dismissed the notion that the air force and anti-aircraft guns offered a real
barrier against aerial bombing. In short, the ballistics of aerial warfare were
complicated, and to illustrate this point, the writer tried to explain why anti-aircraft
batteries normally failed to hit moving targets and, worst still, why anti-aircraft
salvos occasionally exploded on the ground rather than in the air. To simplify his
argument, the writer provided an analogy, towards the end of the second column, for
readers whose concentration was slipping: 'when a small boy throws a stone at a bird
in a tree, the bird usually flies away unharmed, but the stone may well rebound onto
the boy's head.'24 The fact that II Popolo could openly state that Italy did not have
the technical means to build a defensive shield against enemy attack, clearly does
seem to suggest that the newspaper had absorbed Fascist notions about a short war
and, consequently, the irrelevance of effective civil defence measures.
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One striking feature of II Popolo in this period is the space devoted to
photographs of warplanes or military hardware. Photojournalism emphasised the
apparent beauty of Italy's weapons.25 There were articles about the organisation of
the regime's civil defence installations and its antiaircraft defence system. People
could read how lookout posts (posti di avvistamento, PA) passed on warnings to
centres which processed the information (centri di raccolta notizie, CRN) and
transmitted it to the local branch for air defence (Comando di Difesa Aerea
Territoriale or DICAT) and how with telephones and teleprinters, it became an air
raid warning.26 Besides the official reports, II Popolo ran a series of articles by first-
person narrators who appeared to be privileged observers ofwar and who gave
energetic accounts of the fighting, including much technical detail. In one report,
supposedly written onboard a destroyer in the Mediterranean, the writer discussed
the complex calculations needed to sink an enemy ship and demonstrated how
dependent modern warfare was on the rule of technology and machines which 'had
made warfare much less humanised, and reduced killing to abstract mathematical
parameters and formulas. The deadly instruments of modern warfare resemble
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children's toys'. These accounts suggest that wartime propaganda owed much to
the ideas of Futurist intellectuals. In any case, the war correspondent's reports
conveyed the idea that the Royal Navy was no longer committed to controlling the
Mediterranean and that all British ships had been assigned to Britain's own defence,
which was not, in fact, the case.
In the mid-1990s there was a brief flurry of interest in the importance of
photography in World War Two partly inspired by the release from the United States
national archives of new images of the war in Italy made by Army Film and
Photographic Units. These images caused considerable public debate when the
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graphic reels were aired by RAI television stations for the first time. The renewed
interest in images from the war did not, however, lead to new research into images
made by the Fascists on the home front. Public interest and debate revolved around
the question of how accurately the Americans had portrayed the war in Italy, but not
of how accurately Italians had portrayed themselves or their war.
The historian Aurelio Lepre has written that, between 1939 and 1940, the
memory of trench warfare of 1914-1918 was still very much present in the public
38
mind and overshadowed popular notions about how the Second World War would be
fought, notions that denied the primacy of technology and science in modern
9Q
warfare. This is perhaps true, but, once the fighting commenced, II Popolo
circulated dramatic images and text that suggested that the new war was of a very
different nature. Firstly, the PNF newspaper emphasised that it was a three
dimensional conflict in that combat involved the deployment of warplanes and
submarines as well as tanks and battleships. Photographs of German warplanes in
particular conveyed the importance of technology and military hardware and
appeared to confirm that the Axis powers had superior weapons. Numerous images
of the 'Stuka' dive-bombers sweeping the skies clear of opposition were used to
illustrate the close teamwork ofwarplanes and Panzer columns in the so-called
Blitzkrieg. Similarly, the newspaper feature 'The Air Superiority of Italy and
Germany' {La superiority aerea dell'Italia e della Germania) 30 was typical of a
series of repetitive articles which aimed to inculcate the notion that the air forces of
the Axis Powers dominated the skies of Europe. With freedom from enemy
interception, Heinkel Ill's were roaming over England in daytime causing
unprecedented destruction on a massive scale. This article was illustrated with an
aerial photograph of Eleinkels in flight 'heading towards London on a bombing
mission'.31 To summarise, then, it is significant that a succession of articles in II
Popolo described German and Italian arms in almost mythical terms.
In a sense II Popolo placed too much emphasis on the difference between the
First World War and the new conflict. While it is certainly true that Italy was not a
world military power, in reality other combatants had 1914-1918 equipment, too.
The German army of 1940 still relied on some horse-drawn gun carriages as well as
motorised units during the so-called Blitzkrieg, and, in an essay on the British Field
Force in France and Belgium in 1939-1940, Brian Bond has pointed out that British
infantrymen, in their holes in Flanders, had been equipped and trained not for a fast-
moving European war but for a war not so very different from that of 1914-1918.
Consequently they were unable to delay the German advance. Thus the disparity
between the First World War and the new war was not yet properly apparent in the
summer of 1940. Of course II Popolo emphasised the crucial differences between the
two wars to convince readers that the Second World War would be a much easier
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victory. This explains why many articles, in the summer of 1940, lamented that,
because the home front was remote from the battlefront, civilian volunteers were
essentially 'missing out on the euphoria of battle and victory.'33
There were also bogus claims reprinted from German newspapers, the
Volkischer Beobachter and the Miinchner Neueste Nachrichtung, alleging that the
Nazi war correspondents had been impressed with the expertise of the Italian
frigates. Thus, people learned that British domination in the Mediterranean had
effectively ended in mid-July 1940, and with it the spectre of a British Navy
blockade, and that Italy had gained operational superiority in a situation similar to
that which had recently occurred in Norway. This article suggested that the invasion
of Britain was now even more probable.34
When discussing Britain, like most Italians at the time, the editorial staff
made no real distinction between Britain and England. There were articles about the
war in Scotland and Wales, but Fascist propaganda reserved its peculiar invective for
the elite sections ofEnglish society, people who had very little in common with
ordinary Italians. Thus, Lord Halifax was portrayed as the embodiment of Britain's
elite governing classes whose pursuit ofwar was not to defend liberty in Europe but
to protect financial investments and subordinate the working-class which had been
subjugated since the industrial revolution. In other words, the Fascist press suggested
that the war was the fault of Britain's aristocrats who were using the conflict to stem
a revolutionary tide.35 But more important still, such articles suggested that the
British Empire was incompatible with Italian territorial expansion.36 From historical
precedents cited in the columns of II Popolo, for instance imperialism, colonialism
and British involvement in Ireland, a Fascist reading ofBritish history demonstrated
that expansion and conflict in Europe were inevitable. The inevitability of the
conflict was a crucial argument in support of the regime and its war.
An article which appeared on 7 July 1940 discussed the treatment of Friulian
emigrants in Britain arrested on 10 June or the morning of 11 June after Mussolini
had declared war on Britain. The article described how, although the British police
had been fair, military police had mistreated the Italians and had torn up PNF
membership cards and personal papers. Some had been interned in 'concentration
camps' while one group had been sent from London to Glasgow, packed into a
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prison ship under armed guard and had endured a terrifying journey to Lisbon during
which the vessel was attacked several times by German bombers. The article
concluded by reporting eye-witness accounts of the British home front, in particular
public opinion about Dunkirk, which suggested that there was panic in Britain and
confirmed what the broadsheet had been saying all along: the British public had lost
its nerve after Fascist Italy had entered the war.37
People were probably shocked by the treatment of the emigrant Italians
because, of course, II Popolo made no mention of Fascist measures against
foreigners in Italy. In fact, when Italy entered the war in 1940, Fascist concern about
foreigners and ethnic groups in the border province of Udine rapidly intensified.
Police harassment, arrest, and detention of individuals who were foreigners or not
'pure' Italians increased.38 The Interior Ministry now considered foreign prostitutes,
who worked in legalised brothels or from home, a security risk. There was a newly
found hatred of 'gypsies' too, a term which indiscriminately lumped together
Romany, Sinti, pedlars and vagrants, people who were perceived as social outsiders,
and considered a potential threat to the community at war. They were to be watched,
perhaps searched, and if necessary, sent to concentration camps. This order followed
rumours and reports that gypsy caravans driven by foreigners, notably Yugoslavs,
were approaching people and, with the excuse of selling items, spreading anti-Italian
propaganda. Records of prisoners in transit during this period show that Jews, who
had escaped from persecution in Nazi Germany and Poland, were often arrested in
Udine, or elsewhere in Italy, and handed over to the German authorities in Tarvisio,
on the Austrian border.40 Unsurprisingly, II Popolo concealed this sinister
information from its readers.
Articles about the British Empire, which were principally written to augment
Anglophobia, worked best by careful selection and arrangement of material. One
common method used in II Popolo was to write about how illustrious Englishmen
had criticised British imperialism, and was much more powerful as propaganda than
just quoting local Fascist speeches ad nauseam. One article entitled Confessioni
inglesi quoted Herbert Spencer's criticisms of the British invasion of Sudan and
discussed British Catholic Bishops' sharp criticisms of the government's policy
towards Ireland.41 As can be seen from this the broadsheet frequently used comments
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which had been made a long time ago and, in a very different context, to illustrate
historical precedent.
MOBILISATION
Historians are generally agreed that the regime's mobilisation was
remarkably limited. Massimo Legnani has convincingly argued that Italy's
mobilisation was 'low key' (sotto tono) because the regime was convinced it would
be a short war (una guerra breve) similar to previous Fascist wars.42 MacGregor
Knox has suggested that the regime's failure to decree general mobilisation in 1940,
as its Liberal predecessor had done in 1915, was characteristic of a war effort that
feared offending powerful interest groups.43
However, the lack of full-scale mobilisation during the war has meant that
scholars have devoted little attention to the regime's efforts to mobilise Italians. A
lone exception is an essay by Paola Ferrazza 'La mobilitazione civile in Italia 1940-
1943' published in the journal Italia contemporanea. Ferrazza argues that Fascist
mobilisation was only in part shaped by the course of the war, and is better
understood in terms of a coherent but concealed policy to discriminate against certain
sections of society.44 This essay, which suggests that mobilisation was of real
significance to the regime, attempts to discredit De Felice's version of the war which
saw Fascism's efforts to mobilise the nation as of little or no importance.45
In Udine's case, it was possible for people to read between the lines and
understand that nothing had been done in June 1940 in terms of a general
mobilisation for the war and that consequently there were no results to publish. The
Federazione Provinciale dei Fasci di Combattimento which was supposed to
organise the mobilisation of civilians through its Centro Mobilitazione Civile (MC)
was given the task of creating a register of the province's labour resource to replace
the millions ofworking men who were to be conscripted into the armed forces. The
PNF was made responsible for the mobilisation of boys and girls between 14 and 18
years old and women between 18 to 60 years old who did not have to care for
children. There was a division of labour—adult men who had been exempted from
military conscription were instead mobilised by the Consiglio Provinciale delle
Corporazioni, not the local Fascist Party.
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Italy's mobilisation orders were self-consciously racist: 'non-Ayrans' were
barred from conscription, air defence and war-related industries. Jewish men in
particular were not to be drafted into the armed forces. Paola Ferrazza has suggested
that, ironically, this was in many ways a privilege rather than a punishment.46 This,
however, was only superficially true for it can be argued that this Fascist policy sent
a powerful message to society; Jewish men, women and children were thus classified
as worthless to the nation and not part of the community at war. Moreover, the fact
that this group of people was excluded from the war effort, undoubtedly paved the
way for further discrimination and persecution later in the conflict. After all, many
Jewish communities had high-achievers who would certainly have been shamed by
fellow Italians about not getting involved in the war or the home front. It should be
also mentioned that Romany and other groups in society classified as 'gypsies' were
similarly excluded from the province's labour pool.
In many respects, it was misleading of the local branch of the PNF to call
their work mobilisation; the party's mobilisation office did not conscript and deploy
boys and girls in industry or channel them into agriculture. Nor did it draft women in
gender specific occupations like secretarial work and nursing into the armed forces.
Rather, the small group of volunteers filled in forms with personal details (scheda
personale) and compiled a provincial register of people who were not in regular, paid
employment outside the home and who therefore could be recruited to fill gaps on
the home front. Thus mobilitazione is a misleading term in Fascist Italy. It should be
made clear that wartime mobilisation was not labour conscription at all; rather it was
a national census of the labour pool. Some historians have used the term lazily, but
mobilisation was a misnomer because it was intended, initially at least, to involve no
more than paperwork—the compulsory registration of civilians at the local
mobilisation office.
Lack of funds in part explains the limited nature of Udine's mobilisation, for
the regime had scarcely budgeted for its plans. In the month Italy entered the war, the
local branch of the PNF mobilisation office estimated that it had received only about
a twelfth of the money it needed to fund its information-gathering activities. Paola
Ferrazza states that the PNF obtained generous funding for the mobilisation of
women and teenagers,47 but the evidence from the files of the PNF in Udine suggests
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that hardly any of this money actually reached Friuli. PNF correspondence from
Udine shows that the regime supplied the empty forms and call up papers, but the
local branch of the Fascist Party had to fund all other aspects ofmobilisation,
including the all-important propaganda, which was a very costly activity. The local
Fascist official responsible for civilian mobilisation, Aldo Fantini, wrote in the days
before Italy entered the war that the PNF in Udine needed at least six regular paid
clerical workers to cope with the extra paperwork for mobilisation. Fie estimated that
the Udine section would have to complete more than 100,000 forms. Flowever,
because of a lack of funds, the mobilisation centre was eventually staffed by just a
few volunteers.
By November 1940 Fantini admitted that progress had been very slow, and
blamed the regime for its reluctance to finance or support mobilisation in Udine.
According to Fantini, the regime had failed to anticipate the sheer numbers and had
only sent about 54,500 mobilisation forms, far from enough. According to PNF
records, the number of girls, boys and women in the province who were supposed to
have forms was over 240,000 (about 210,000 women and 32,000 children) of whom
only 150,000 had had their details collected by the local branch.
Worse still, the administrator responsible for the office claimed that
completed schede personali were not categorized or filed in cabinets, but, as late as
May 1941, lay scattered in boxes on the office floor or on tabletops. Documents
show that with minimal funding and no encouragement from Rome, the Mobilisation
Centre became an embarrassment to the party and was eventually shifted from its
headquarters to 'a room in a private apartment which the PNF rented from a local
woman'.48 This suggests that local Fascists themselves believed the information-
gathering organisation was of no real value to Italy's war preparations and that the
nation would not actually ever need the services of the 210,000 women and 32,000
children. Evidence from the Mobilisation Centre in Udine suggests that the lack of
mobilisation was not due to cultural or organisational failings, but rather to the
notion that mobilitazione really only had a propaganda value.
In this period, nonetheless, the local Fasci femminili did organise training
courses to prepare and educate women about the demands of the home front and
these courses were as much publicised as the actual mobilisation. The 1915-18 war
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had shown that ordinary civilians would have to make sacrifices as part of the
national war effort, and courses were designed to teach wartime cooking and house
keeping and to serve the policy of autarchy by teaching women efficiency and thrift.
For example, women who attended a Domestic Science course learned how to cook
rabbit, liver and giblets as a substitute for red meat and to bake cakes without sugar.
Courses taught women from affluent households to view renouncing red meat as a
wartime necessity. To intensify the war on waste, women learned to repair shoes and
make slippers with material which had been salvaged. Women's courses also
involved some indoctrination, as well as 'preparation for the colonial life' should
Italy's territorial conquests provide a new role for them in the Empire.49
But numbers were tiny. The local women's organisation has left little record
of its courses, and we need more study of this aspect ofmobilisation, but it is clear
from the articles in II Popolo that very few women actually attended the Fasci
femminili evening classes. The courses tended to idealise the role ofwomen on the
home front. Women would have to give up the luxury of city life and become thrifty
housewives cooking rural dishes and making do with existing clothing. For urban
women, the war would be nothing more than a brief descent into the idealized and
self-sufficient world of the peasantry with its traditional values so much admired by
Fascism.
Paradoxically, the local Fasci femminili were saying that all housewives
would have to make the same limited sacrifices on the home front, but, in reality, the
courses demonstrated that the true meaning of domestic sacrifices was entirely
subjective and heavily dependent on social position. It is clear from newspaper
reports that the women who attended the courses were party cardholders from the
urban elite and therefore neither typical nor representative of the majority of Udine's
population. The very content of the courses, too genteel for the vast majority of
working-class women who viewed red meat and new shoes as rare luxuries even in
peacetime, detracted from any popular appeal and were thus of little or no value.
Moreover, what the Udine Fasci femminili were saying was a contradiction in
terms. That living standards in the province could improve through sacrifices and
warfare, was clearly at odds with Fasci femminili appeals to women who were
already affluent to become thrifty-homemakers. True, the PNF organised evening
45
courses in schools for the future needs of the war, including teaching women to
operate civil communications equipment and drive trams, but again numbers who
attended were tiny. One report in II Popolo stated that twenty members of the Fasci
femminili were attending the part-time course in Udine designed to prepare women
for the demands of modern warfare. Moreover, the broadsheet's statement that 'the
public would have to wait to read the results of this enterprise', could be interpreted
as meaning that nothing of importance had been achieved to date.50
In a sense, mobilisation orders appeared unnecessary in Udine because whole
sections of society were ostensibly already mobilised in that they participated in the
PNF which was the party in power and at war. Furthermore, people probably
believed that active involvement in the political and organisational life of the local
PNF demonstrated a readiness to obey orders from the party leadership, including a
general mobilisation.
Thus the statement that mobilisation in 1940 was remarkably limited should
be qualified. After all, how could the PNF suggest that there were large numbers of
people who were not already in the party or the armed forces or in war-related
industries and therefore available to be mobilised? One can conclude that wartime
mobilisation was a very sensitive matter for a party which tried hard to convince
people that Fascists were in a permanent state of readiness for war. This explains
why mobilisation was presented as nothing more than compiling lists of children and
housewives. It did not signify immobility since the nation was supposedly already
mobilised for war, as it were. Moreover, II Popolo claimed that general mobilisation
was unnecessary because so many 1915-18 war veterans had come forward, without
coercion, to free young men for redeployment on the battlefront that fewer unwilling
and inexperienced Italians were needed. In early July, the local branch of the Fascist
youth section (Gioventu Italiana del Littorio or GIL) was actively discouraging boys
from joining its newly formed battalion. Although the GIL stated that it appreciated
the enthusiasm of the town's young Fascists, the battalion did not want to accept
more volunteers.51 People were therefore encouraged to think that it was not as
important to mobilise civilians for the present conflict as it had been during the 1915-
18 war. It is worth making a further point: although on paper many 'housewives' in
rural areas had no regular income outside the home and could therefore be mobilised,
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in reality they were constantly occupied. They had to do a considerable amount of
farmwork as well as looking after children and frail relatives. In peasant households,
moreover, children of both sexes were also expected to do farmwork in the time
before and after they attended school. Thus much of the peasantry was in fact exempt
(iesentati) from civil mobilisation orders because it was clear to the party that, in the
case ofUdine, in practice, the vast majority of rural women and children had no
spare time (non possono disporre delproprio tempo) to contribute to the Fascist war
effort.52
In addition, in discussing the lack of mobilisation, it is worthwhile
remembering the fact that thousands of Italian peasants were mobilised to work in
Nazi Germany during the early phase of the war. Italians with farming experience
were billeted on German farms to replace German agricultural workers who had been
drafted into the army or into war industry. Here the story was different. Police
reports show that special trains with hundreds of Italian workers passed through
Udine every day on their way to Nazi Germany throughout the period 1940-42.
Evidence from the Questura reports suggests that the voluntary recruitment of
Italians was highly organised, and the campaign, which received publicity in II
Popolo, undoubtedly contributed directly to the Axis war effort since Germany was
short of labour. In practice, the Italian peasantry freed German agricultural workers
for the draft/3 This is an aspect ofmobilisation which is easily overlooked.
In conclusion, it is best to recall that Italy did not initiate, or even take part in,
any major land battles in Europe in the first six months of the war. Newspaper
propaganda in Udine conveyed a triumphant, euphoric mood about the course of the
war that must have convinced many people that preparations on the home front were
scarcely relevant, especially full-scale mobilisation. The strength of this propaganda
owes much to Nazi Germany's easy victories and something to Italy's invasion of
British Somaliland. When a full view of the early war is taken, in a period when even
Churchill was suggesting that a German invasion ofBritain was by no means
inconceivable, then full-scale civilian mobilisation must have seemed wholly
unnecessary for an apparently short war. Also, it made little sense to have full-scale
mobilisation whilst the Italian army, which was not fighting a major land campaign
in Europe, remained inactive. It is, therefore, quite plausible to argue that the
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preparations for mobilisation which occurred in Udine were sufficient for the kind of
war Italy expected to fight in the period 1940-41, a war that actually lived up to
Fascist propaganda. This point is easily overlooked because the regime was so
overwhelmed by later military events. The example of Udine suggests that we should
treat with caution arguments of those like MacGregor Knox, who suggest that the
absence of preparations and mobilisation should be attributed primarily to the
cultural and organisational failings of Italian society at large or to a weak sense of
nation state.54
Endnotes to Chapter Two
1 Ganapini, Una citta, la guerra: Milano 1939-1941, 14.
2 The Ministero della Cultura Popolare (abbreviated to Minculpop) was established in 1937 to exercise
much greater control over the press, particularly in terms of foreign news, Fascist culture and
propaganda. Minculpop replaced the Ministry of Press and Propaganda (Ministero per la Stampa e la
Propaganda) which had been founded in 1935. Previously, the Prefetturas had acted as local press
censors.
3 Guido Bonsaver,'Fascist Censorship on Literature and the Case of Elio Vittorini', in Modern Italy 8
(2), (2003), 165.
4 However, in 1991, at an important conference in Parma on Italy's war, some Italian historians
disagreed with the central argument of a paper given by Paola Olivetti Tl Linguaggio dei cinegiornali:
Germania e Italia' that Nazi propaganda was much more sophisticated. See Roberto Botta, Tl
Novecento degli Istituti. Ricerche sulla partecipazione dell 'Italia alia seconda guerra mondiale', in
Italia contemporanea, 185 (1991), 702.
5 See for example Jens Peterson,'L'organizzazione della propaganda tedesca in Italia 1939-1943', in
L'ltalia in guerra 1940-1943: Annali della fondazione Luigi Micheletti, 5, 681-708.
6 'Come Churchill giustifica il bombardamento delle popolazioni civili', PdF, 26 July 1940.
7 'II confine della Somalia Britannica varcato in diversi punti delle nostre colonie', PdF, 8 August
1940.
8 'Gli inglesi in rota cercano scampo sulle navi', PdF, 20 August 1940.
9 'La fulminea avanzata italiana in Somalia e le sue ripercussioni sul destino dell'impero inglese',
PdF, 10 August 1940.
10 The Gruppi universitari fascisti, founded in 1921, was the first local Fascist youth organisation. The
GUF was supposed to be a cultural organisation for an elite group of young people who would
provide Italy with future leaders. The town of Udine did not have a university during the Fascist
period, therefore young people attended the Universities of Trieste or Padua.
11 'Teatro GUF: Pirandello', PdF, 13 December 1940.
12 'Udinese 1940-41', PdF, 8 August 1940.
13 'L'incontro Udinese-Brescia', PdF, 9 October 1940.
14 'L'opera di assistenza nazionalsocialista dei Paesi occcupati', PdF, 30 July 1940.
15 Sometimes referred to as the Teno, the TN was a strike-breaking organisation founded in 1919 and
used for the repression of the working class. Later it was incorporated into the German police in 1937.
During the war, the organisation performed engineering functions for forward echelons of SS units.
16 'L'incursione aerea nemica su Torino', PdF, 14 June 1940.
17 Renzo De Felice, Mussolini I'alleato. /. L'ltalia in guerra 1940-1943. 2. Crisi e agonia del regime
(Turin: Einaudi, 1990), 683.
48
18 'Come Churchill giustifica il bombardamento delle popolazioni civili', PdF, 26 July 1940.
19 Circular on the evacuation of the urban population from II sottosegretario di Stato (undersecretary
for war), General Ubaldo Soddu, to all ministries, the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, and the
PNF, 27 May 1940, ASU, Gab. Pref., CPPAA, b. 14.
20 Prefect to the Interior Ministry, October 1940, Report on UNPA of Udine, ASU, Gab. Pref.,
CPPAA, b.12.
21 Mario Isnenghi, Adolfo Mignemi, Daniele Mor, Pier Paolo Poggio, Gianni Sciola (eds), L'ltalia in
guerra 1940-43. Immagini e temi della propaganda Fascista (Brescia: Fondazione Luigi Micheletti,
1989), 9.
22 Aurelio Lepre, Le Illusioni, la paura, la rabbia. II fronte interno italiano 1940-1943 (Rome:
Edizioni Scientifiche italiane, 1989), 58.
23 'La Milizia Artiglieria Contraerea: Uomini e cannoni per la difesa del Paese', PdF, 12 July 1940.
24 'Canoni contro aeroplani', PdF, 19 July 1940.
25 'Offrire un libro ai soldati che combattono', PdF, 13 December 1940.
26 'La Milizia Artiglieria Contraerea: Uomini e cannoni per la difesa del Paese'
27 'I cannonieri della nave', PdF, 18 August 1940.
28 See for example Paolo Ferrari and Achille Rastrelli,'Immagini della seconda guerra mondiale', in
Italia contemporanea, 201 (1995), 715-729.
29
Lepre, Le Illusioni, la paura, la rabbia. II fronte interno italiano 1940-1943, 5.
30 'La superiorita aerea dell'Italia e della Germania', PdF, 8 August 1940.
31 'Le aquile del Reich all'assalto di Londra', PdF, 8 August 1940.
32 Brian Bond,'The British Field Force in France and Belgium, 1939-40', in Paul Addison and Angus
Calder (eds), A Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience of War in the West, 1939-1945 (London:
Pimlico, 1997), 41.
33 'L'alto elogio del Duce alia Milizia Artiglieria Controaerei', PdF, 2 August 1940.
34 'La fine di un mito', PdF, 18 July 1940.
35 'Perche si batte la Gran Bretagna', PdF, 12 September 1940.
36 Tmperialismo britannico e Impero italiano', PdF, 20 August 1940.
37 'Le angherie britanniche nei racconti dei friulani tornati ieri dall'Inghilterra', PdF, 7 July 1940.
38 The level of wartime arrest and detention of individuals in Udine also depended on the amount of
prison space available and, of course, the danger to the public. Moreover, detention of foreigners
affected only 18 to 60 year olds, and foreign members of the clergy were allowed to leave Italy
without hindrance.
39TUC, P, 1940 (45), 10/13 June, ACS, MI.
40 Udine Prison Register for 1940, Carcere Giudizarie di Via Spalato. The enormous register for 1940
can be read from 2 March onwards. The first part, including January and February, has been damaged
by water and is illegible.
41 'Confessioni inglesi', PdF, 31 July 1940.
42 Massimo Legnani,'Guerra e governo delle risorse. Strategic economiche e sociali nell'Italia 1940-
1943', in Italia contemporanea, 179 (1990), 229-261.
43
MacGregor Knox,'The Italian Army at War, 1940-43: a study in combat effectiveness', in
MacGregor Knox, Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 149.
44 Paola Ferrazza,'La mobilitazione civile in Italia 1940-1943', in Italia contemporanea, 214 (1999),
22. Although Ferrazza discusses the impact of Axis defeats on Italian mobilisation she does not
explore the equally important impact of the early victories on the regime's plans for a general draft.
45 See Renzo De Felice, Mussolini L'alleato. I. L'ltalia in guerra 1940-1943. I. Dalla guerra «breve»
alia guerra lunga (Turin: Einaudi, 1990), 557.
46 Ferrazza,'La mobilitazione civile in Italia 1940-1943', 35.
47 Ibid, 26.
48 Aldo Fantini to Giovanni Montefusco, 8 June 1940, 21 June 1940, 6 November 1940, 1 May 1941,
on civil mobilisation, ACS, PNF, Direttorio Nazionale, serie II, b.1644, f. Provvedimenti
Mobilitazione civile.
49 PdF, 14 August 1940.
50 'Mobilitazione civile', PdF, 12 July 1940.
51 'GIL, Domande arruolamento volontari', PdF, 11 July 1940.
49
52 'La disciplina dei cittadini in tempo di guerra', PdF, 11 June 1940.
53 See for example the numerous daily reports in ASU, Gab. Pref., b.30, f.123, Questura di Udine,
Relazione mattinale, 1942-3.
54 Knox, Hitler's Italian Allies, 2.
50
CHAPTER THREE
AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS 1:
UNPA, URBAN AND RURAL DEFENCE, JUNE 1940 TO MAY 1941
This chapter, together with the next one, focuses on civil defence preparations
in Udine, in particular the work of the air defence organisation Unione Nazionale
protezione antiaerea or UNPA.
On the few occasions when air raid precautions have received scholarly
attention, studies have mostly tended to focus on how the Italians were largely
unprepared for the big raids of 1942-45. There is also some research looking at
civilian attitudes and behaviour in air-raid shelters as part of a wider discussion on
the level of consensus for the regime and the war.1 We still know little, however,
about how Italians organised themselves for civil defence. There is some limited
historiography in Italian such as a brief section in journalist Miram Mafai's book
Pane Nero published in 1987,2 and in Aurelio Lepre.3 None of these, admittedly few,
works, go into the history ofUNPA in any depth and nothing whatsoever has been
written on civil defence in Udine. This chapter attempts to begin filling in the gap by
exploring what was done in Udine in the early period of the war.
In Udine, the Prefettura turned its attention to the question of air defence
immediately, by publishing a detailed list of air raid precautions in II Popolo only a
day after Mussolini brought Italy into the war. These measures, however, had only a
limited impact, mostly because the blackout precautions were introduced in
midsummer when businesses, including shops, normally closed long before
sundown. Anyway, it was not a draconian code and some war regulations, for
example a new rule that private motorcars had to slow down in urban areas, affected
only a tiny number of affluent people. The real importance accorded to these
measures can, moreover, be seen in the fact that a ministerial circular which appeared
in II Popolo went on to suggest that masking tape on window panes could be quite
decorative if applied in an imaginative fashion. This frivolous remark that trivialised
the importance of air defence demonstrates that the local authorities were not much
concerned with the danger of aerial warfare at this point in the war.4
In this they were not wrong. In practice there was little danger of air raids in
Udine in 1940-1. The few raids that took place were quite minor and certainly were
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less destructive than they were to become in late 1942. In the early period, the Royal
Air Force had to fly over immense spaces and geographical barriers to bomb the
'industrial triangle' of northern Italy, and the technological difficulties of finding and
marking an inland target meant that few RAF aircraft reached the target during night
bombing.5 Moreover, the early air raids (incursioni) were not really air raids at all;
rather, they were, in the contemporary language of the Royal Air Force, 'sorties' by
one or two lone aircraft flying at night. The big RAF raids of the Second World War
started in the spring of 1942 with the incendiary attacks on the German cities of
Liibeck and Rostock6 and most of the devastation unleashed by large formations of
Allied bombers occurred after the defeat and division of Italy in September 1943. In
many ways, then, the protection offered to non-combatants in Udine was, in fact,
more than adequate to meet the threat posed by the Royal Air Force in 1940-1. This
was far less true for the later period of the war, as shown in the next chapter.
AIR DEFENCE ORGANISATIONS
The organisation responsible for manning the antiaircraft batteries, which
were supposed to act as a deterrent against air attacks, was the Milizia artiglieria
contraerea. This PNF organisation was founded in 1929 for antiaircraft defence but
usually went under the name of DICAT (difesa contraerea territoriale). In Udine, as
elsewhere in Italy, gun teams were composed ofMilitia Blackshirts (Camicie nere
delta X"Legione), though it should be noted that militia volunteers were ordinary
middle-aged men, mostly veterans of colonial wars,7 who were neither an elite
military force within the Fascist Party nor a political section as the term Milizia
might suggest. In fact, the Milizia had nothing to do with the blackshirted Fascist
gangs which took part in the 'March on Rome'. Moreover, although the organisation
was theoretically part of the Milizia volontariaper la sicurezza nazionale (MVSN),
the Milizia artiglieria contraerea was subordinated to the Ministry ofWar during the
conflict.
At provincial level, air defence was organised by a committee (Comitato
provinciate protezione antiaerea, or CCPPA), a mixture of technical experts from the
army, fire brigade, and important state officials, including the Prefect, the Chief of
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Police, the Head ofRailways, and the Director of Postal and Telegraph Services. The
Podesta of Udine was a conspicuous member of the Committee because he
represented local government in Udine, and the Committee's membership also
included the leader of the provincial PNF Federation, the Federale, Mario Gino and a
representative (collaboratrice) from the women's section (Fascifemminili).
The Prefect was President of the CPPAA and regularly received circulars
from the Ministry ofWar and national orders from Mussolini on matters of air
defence. That said, civil defence was organised essentially along military lines and
the Committee was in fact subordinate to the local headquarters of the Italian
territorial army (,Stato Maggiore per la difesa del Territorio). Hence the most
important figure on the CPPAA was an army officer, the inspector of provincial air
defence (ispettore provinciale antiaereo), whose job it was to act as a liaison officer
for DICAT and the CPPAA and to prepare air defence precautions according to army
instructions. Although there was a CPPAA, a ministerial circular from May 1940
stated that prefects were supposed to place air defence firmly in the hands of the
army officers on this Committee rather than allow Fascist Party members and local
government officials to make important decisions. Therefore, in practice the
inspector ofprovincial air defence and the secretary of the CPPAA had a more
prominent role than the other members of the Committee, especially the
representatives of the Fascist Party, who lacked the required skills.8 It should be clear
that civil defence really depended on the bureaucracies and technical skills of the
territorial army not the Prefettura. The case ofUdine shows that civil defence
depended heavily on the commitment of reserve army officers to air raid precautions.
In fact, the inspector of provincial air defence was always and inevitably a
high-ranking officer from one of the armed forces; the army (Regio esercito) the
navy (Regia marina), the air force (Regia aeronautica), the militia (MSVN) or the
militia for coastal defence {M.DICAT)9 Interestingly, the crucial role of the Italian
army in air defence is easy to neglect because army officers used Prefettura
letterheads for correspondence, though they were employed by the territorial army. It
is also worthwhile noting that the CPPAA's remit did not include the dissemination
of government regulations, which was the responsibility of a PNF organisation, the
Unione nazionale protezione antiaerea, or UNPA.
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L'UNIONE NAZIONALE PROTEZIONE ANTIAEREA (UNPA)
UNPA was the regime's organisation responsible for dealing with air raids.
Theoretically, UNPA was subordinate to the local section of the PNF10 and a PNF
inspector acted as a liaison between the Party and UNPA. At local level, there was an
UNPA member in all urban subsections or Gruppi rionali of the Fascist Party. In
each subsection there was an UNPA official who controlled the air raid wardens or
capi-fabbricato in his district. UNPA was the vital link between the various air
defence organisations of the regime and ordinary Italians, and its activities were
controlled by the CPPAA and the Fascist Party.
The Udine branch ofUNPA established its first section in 1937, but, like
many other Fascist Party organisations, it suffered from a lack of funding which
limited its pre-war activities to little more than propaganda. As Aurelio Lepre has
noted, the lack of government finance also prevented the organisation from
expanding and improving national air defence precautions in the crucial period
before the war.11
UNPA was structured into two sections: the rescue parties (gruppi di primo
intervento) who dealt with the aftermath of air raids, and the wardens or capi-
fabbricato who were usually responsible for seeing that the public and important
buildings were protected during an air raid. Although the capi-fabbricato were
effectively the lowest rung of air defence, the pea-green membership card of the
Gruppi rionali gave them a sense of importance as neighbourhood PNF officials.
Compared with certain other Fascist organisations in Udine, for example the
the Massaie Rurali or the GIL party youth organisation, membership figures for
UNPA were tiny given that it had such an important role on the home front. The
province of Udine had only fifteen rescue squads; 391 members who were
supervised by seventeen reserve army officers who had been discharged as regular
officers, but who had been subsequently retained or recalled for civil defence duties.
According to II Popolo, four squads were supervised by women. In addition, the
province had about 500 capi-fabbricato at the start of the war.12
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There is only fragmentary evidence about the social origins ofUNPA
members. The procedure for selecting recruits appears to have been ad hoc, but it is
probable that most men who filled the technical jobs in air defence were selected
from the building trades; they were carpenters, demolition experts, builders,
plumbers, or similar figures with a working-class background. There is evidence that
in a predominantly rural region like Friuli, rescue parties that protected urban areas
also included agricultural workers. For example, of the nineteen members ofUNPA
rescue party protecting the town of Cervignano in a flatland area ofFriuli, there were
five builders, four workers, two joiners, two field hands (braccianti), one farmer
(agricoltore), one artisan (fabbro) and two mechanics (manovali).u It is probable
that most men were selected on the basis that they were already adept at their
technical roles and we can assume that training for air defence was minimal. Some
UNPA recruits, who were unemployed when they joined the organisation, were later
lured away from civil defence by the promise ofwork, but most of its members had
full-time jobs and were expected to stay on for the duration of the war.14
Although some women were included in air defence, UNPA recruited mostly
male volunteers of 40 to 48 years of age, who had no liability to military service and
who would probably not be conscripted into the armed forces.15 UNPA was allowed
to recruit a small number ofmales of 40 to 45 years of age, but in practice the
territorial army was absorbing as many men as possible, and invariably refused to let
men under forty-five serve in the air defence organisation. It should be remembered
that UNPA belonged to the PNF and was not part of the armed forces and therefore
its members were officially non-combatants and liable to be drafted during the war.16
This explains why, in the competing claims on wartime manpower, the Prefect often
had to persuade the military authorities to release UNPA members who had been
conscripted into the territorial army17 or mobilised for employment in industry.18
Another problem related to the selection of suitable civilians for air defence
in a backward rural province like Udine was that UNPA could not find local men
with the standard entry level education required by Fascist wartime regulations. On
many occasions, men who had professional experience for a technical role in air
defence, lacked the minimum level of schooling which was a prerequisite for UNPA
organisers. The result was that Cesare Miani, the local leader ofUNPA, could not
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find enough candidates and the organisation was inadequately officered throughout
the war.
To add to this, there was a further problem that confronted the UNPA
authorities and one that was again linked to the selection of 'politically reliable men
and women' for air defence. About half the volunteers appointed by the Committee
to take part in the Fascist air defence organisation were in fact 'non-Fascists' who
had no existing connection with the party.19 For example, in March 1941, eleven of
the twenty-two nominations for wardens in Udine were not PNF members, including
all three women on the list.20 This was a perceived problem for the local section of
the PNF because the air defence organisation that emerged from the pages of II
Popolo was Fascist and had the resources and the authority of the Party behind it. In
addition, as Emilio Gentile has pointed out, the PNF was trying hard to make Italian
society more Fascist.21 In theory, the district leader (il Fiducario rionale) of the
Gruppi rionali vetted applicants for UNPA and could therefore prevent the selection
of non-Fascists, but, in practice, it was impossible to find UNPA volunteers
exclusively from the ranks of the PNF, depleted as it was by army
conscription—unsurprisingly all the young, militant Fascists who had been so
prominent in the local PNF before the war were now on active service. In fact
circulars from the Ministry ofWar show that, especially in predominantly rural
provinces, it was becoming increasingly difficult for the regime to find enough male
volunteers for UNPA.22
Moreover, the political significance of Fascist membership had been
progressively diluted by the Party leadership's policy ofmass enlistment into the
PNF in the 1930s. The Fascist Federation in Udine had remarkably high membership
levels at the start of the war: a 298,763-strong local section out of a total provincial
population of 726,384, according to official PNF figures.23 However, as De Felice
has written, the Fascist reverence for numbers meant that there was no sifting of
candidates by the local section and PNF membership was almost meaningless. This
explains why the Prefect and UNPA leader Cesare Miani always relied on the
traditional police services of the carabinieri and the Questura to run checks on the
political backgrounds of all local UNPA men and women rather than use the records
of the PNF to vet individuals.24
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It is worth suggesting that PNF membership was less important in air defence
than in other party organisations because unlike, for example, the militia, UNPA was
not explicitly Fascist in tone; nor was it overtly political. The purpose of the tiny
organisation was not to mobilise the masses, but rather to bring 'propaganda' into the
homes of ordinary Italians; and the term 'propaganda' was strictly used to denote the
dissemination ofwartime shelter regulations and technical advice on air raid
precautions. In any case, UNPA records suggest that those who signed up for air
defence duties displayed enthusiasm for a job which offered the excitement of taking
part in the war and no doubt gave people a sense of importance and worth in a time
of national emergency. For example, one 1940 telegram reported that UNPA recruits
occasionally turned out to help the local fire brigade fight fires which were clearly
not the result of enemy raids.25
In the town ofUdine, UNPA was organised into the four districts of the
gruppi rionali which covered the historic centre and public buildings. A striking
aspect of the Udine's air defence is that it did not extend much beyond the historic
centre of town. Udine had eight electromechanical air raid sirens connected by
telephone to a civil defence command room in a building by the railway station, but
on busy market days even the inhabitants of the town centre had difficulty hearing
the alarm in some streets. A detailed inspection of local air raid precautions in March
1940 suggested that UNPA should improve the power of its sirens and place them
further apart, presumably so that people living in housing on the outskirts could also
hear the alarm.26 There is evidence that the council authorities did not build public
shelters in the most crowded urban areas, the working-class districts; rather, some
shelters were placed in important districts of town where one could expect the
professional classes to live and work. This suggests that the Fascist authorities
recognised that antagonising them was potentially more dangerous for the regime.
Evidence from early air raid warnings, however, shows that these council shelters
were not used because the inhabitants of those districts preferred to use their own
basements. Fascism was supposed to be 'going to the people' with a combination of
propaganda and mass organisations, but it is possible to argue that in terms of
protecting non-combatants, a disproportionate number of public shelters were built
for the professional classes.
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In the first month of the war, the town council built thirteen public shelters
(.ricoveri di circostanza) and dug two uncovered slit trenches (ricoveri di trincee
scoperte)21; but, to put this in context, the shelters offered very modest protection to
only 3,500 people28 out of a population ofmore than 50,000.29 Evidence from other
studies suggests that the picture was similar in other parts of Italy. For example,
Giovanni De Luna has noted that Turin was very ill prepared for the air war and even
by 1943, this industrial city could shelter only about 25,000 people out of a
population of some 600,000.30
The largest public shelters in Udine were built with timber, brick and
concrete. A timber canopy was supported by brick pillars and walls. Some shelters
were reinforced by covering the roof pavement and walls with concrete slabs. Tubes
made of asbestos cement going up through the roof as much as six metres in height
above ground level provided ventilation. There was a tap for drinking water and
wooden benches fixed to the walls provided simple seating, and a small electricity
generator kept the shelters illuminated. There was always at least one emergency
escape exit from the shelter.31 Shelters, however, had no washing facilities or bunks,
and not all of Udine's shelters were equipped with first aid boxes and generators for
emergency lighting. Shelters were very expensive to build and the council could not
afford to spend vast sums on them. Moreover, a Ministry ofWar circular ofMay
1940 recommended that local government authorities should only build shelters if
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they had the labour, materials, and equipment required.
Right from the start, in fact, the amount of shelter the council could provide
was heavily reduced by several factors. A ministerial circular pointed out that, at a
national level, air defence suffered from poor finance, a shortage of building
materials, and inadequate legislation and therefore the council relied heavily on the
good will (buona volonta) of ordinary Italians who were expected to fulfil the
regime's wartime demands.33 In another revealing letter to the War Ministry in April
1940, the Prefect wrote that the greatest obstacle to proper air defence precautions
was the amount ofmoney required to implement the regime's regulations. Perhaps
not surprisingly, as a result Udine had few public bomb shelters and this led the
CPPAA to use what could be found locally and to convert the town's private
basements and cellars rather than construct public shelters from scratch.34
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This meant shelter ultimately depended on the quality of the buildings that
people lived in. Moreover, because people could not realistically shelter in a room
above ground-level those who lived in the crowded tenements ofworking-class
districts had no real protection. Certainly most of the palazzi in the historic centre
had very strong basements and solid walls. Invariably, the buildings ofmore wealthy
people provided much better protection from air raids than the housing of the
proletariat. In the affluent area of Via Bonaldo Stringer, for example, a typical
palazzo had a basement four metres under the courtyard with a solid staircase leading
down to the cellar which, according to an UNPA inspection, provided excellent
bomb shelter in the event of an air raid.33 In the case of the town ofUdine, the
basements ofmiddle class homes very often provided at least as much protection
from air raids as did the public shelters.
THE BLACKOUT
The capi-fabbricato had the important role of policing the blackout in town
which the Fascist Party divided into PNF districts or gruppi rionali. The first reports
written by Fascist Party capi-fabbricato have survived the war and throw some light
on popular attitudes towards the blackout and towards Fascist Party officials who
were supposed to enforce the air raid precautions. For example, on the night of 13-14
June 1940, a group of capi-fabbricato, the IV Gruppo Rionale, patrolled the town
and recorded blackout infringements in their own neighbourhood. On this particular
evening, most of the civilian population apparently followed the regulations. By
contrast, the army authorities appear to have ignored the air raid precautions that had
been published by the Prefettura. For example, at the Armoured Corps barracks in
Via Gaeta, two doors were left open and lights were burning in the courtyard. Other
important state institutions left lights on; for example, there was a powerful red light
on the railway station signal tower and there was a light on in the industrial college
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in Via Manzoni.
The first few reports from the gruppi rionali draw attention to the attitudes of
the officers and men of the Italian army. UNPA observers, who grew increasingly
critical of the Italian army's wartime attitude, revealed that in sharp contrast to
civilians who, with few exceptions, obeyed regulations, the town's military had
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committed numerous infringements of the blackout since the outbreak ofwar with
the result that the Prefect found it increasingly difficult to convince civilians that air
raid precautions were important.
As the Questore commented as late as 1942, even army officers from the
Infantry Regiment Headquarters were in the habit of circulating with unmasked
lights during the blackout. In reality, however, there was little to prevent officers
ignoring the regulations because members of the armed forces could not be fined or
prosecuted by the police services of the Questura. Cesare Miani suggested that the
reason soldiers and civilians ignored wartime regulations was because the carabinieri
and police officers from the Questura, who had dealt with transgressors in the first
weeks ofwar, were no longer policing the blackout by August 1940. That the Interior
Ministry decided carabinieri and other officers should not police the blackout
suggests the authorities were tolerant of infringements because air raid precautions
were not perceived as being important in Udine. In fact the job was given to UNPA
but early accounts of the blackout patrols by local capi-fabbricato suggest that this
PNF organisation lacked the authority of the carabinieri because capi-fabbricato
were not granted police powers. Cesare Miani went on to argue that the UNPA
patrols could perhaps wear Fascist uniforms38 to improve their standing in the
community.39 It may also be that UNPA had less authority than the carabinieri
because the capi-fabbricato were unarmed, unlike municipal police officers (vigili
urbani) who carried Beretta pistols during air raids.40 In any case, UNPA officials
could not arrest people, and the Fascist Party was doubtless seen as being remarkably
tolerant of infringements.
Another solution Cesare Miani suggested was to publish all blackout
infringements, including the names of transgressors, in II Popolo so that people
would be shamed into following the regulations41 but the military chiefs of the
territorial army refused to allow UNPA to publish details of infringements committed
by army personnel.42 Because transgressors could not be punished, UNPA had to
devote an enormous amount of energy to distributing pamphlets and posters in an
effort to convince people of the importance of air raid precautions. During the first
UNPA patrols, UNPA also recorded blackout infringements by police and Fascist
officials. For example, the Fascist official responsible for listening into local
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telephone calls left his office light on, though he managed to have the report
suppressed before it reached the higher authorities.43 In any event, the Prefect simply
republished the air raid precautions in II Popolo to remind civilians of their duties in
44
wartime.
Ordinary people in Udine, however, noticed the double standards. One
contemporary observer, Palmiro Leskovic, who denounced infringements of the
blackout in a letter to the local section ofUNPA, wrote:
I was walking with a friend over the bridge which leads to Piazzale Palmanova when
I saw an amazing sight: hundreds of yellow lights on the railway track, east of the
station.
I don't think that these lights are absolutely necessary for trains which, in any case,
run less frequently now. A few years ago, trains travelled with only a few oil lamps
to guide them. There is little point in us civilians making an effort to cover up holes
in windows when those who should set an example show a total lack of interest [in
blackout precautions].45
Comments like this show that there was some anger that the armed forces and the
military were not following air raid precautions, and ultimately encouraged people to
be less responsible.
The Prefect's reports about public mood for the summer of 1940, for
example, show that the vast majority of Friulians were patiently 'waiting for the
defeat of Britain, a defeat that would mean victory for Italy'.46 According to the
Prefect's reports, the vast majority of Friulians, especially in rural areas, were not
critical ofUNPA's preparations for aerial warfare in 1940. In fact the regime's
decision that air raid precautions were a very low priority in the province of Udine
does seems to have been fully justified in the light of subsequent events in the period
1940-1942.
Furthermore, there was a deluge of propaganda in the pages of II Popolo of
the kind already discussed in the previous chapter which conveyed the notion that
Italy's war was won and this was no doubt the attitude of the Fascist authorities in
Udine. According to II Popolo, Germany's air force was supposed to have destroyed
Britain's air power and won air superiority over England. All the indications as
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reported in II Popolo showed that Britain was in a hopeless position.47 In any case,
the British army had little prospect of re-entering Continental Europe and
establishing bases for its bomber force. Meanwhile the Italians realised that Bomber
Command, the striking-arm of the Royal Air Force, could not reach very far into
southern Europe.
This propaganda partly explains the small scale ofUdine's air raid
precautions, and why inspections by UNPA commanders in the summer of 1940
found that various authorities in Udine were not taking air raid precautions seriously;
for example, many municipal fire extinguishers were not working or had not been
inspected for years. The local prison was under equipped to deal with an air
raid—the prison wardens had no boots, helmets, or picks.48 The chief librarian had
ignored Mussolini's circular and still had all the old newspapers and books in the
loft49 and even though the elite girls' boarding school, Educandato Femminile
Uccellis, had a fire-fighting squad, the schoolgirls clearly did not know about their
air raid duties when questioned by UNPA's inspectorate.50 It is perhaps unsurprising
that the regime had made little effort to protect prison inmates, but both the library
and the middle-class girls' school received poor reports too, even though it would
have taken very little effort and organisation to meet the UNPA standards. The
library had only to clear the loft of old newspapers and books, and the school had
only to devote one lesson to what pupils were to do in the event of an air raid. It is
clear that provincial sources of authority refused to comply with even the most basic
war regulations, measures which had often been decreed by Mussolini himself. It
would be too much to claim that this amounted to a form of anti-Fascist resistance;
rather, it suggests unwillingness to change one's ways and comply with the
organisation of the home front. Of course part of the reluctance to obey orders can be
found in local political intrigues. For example, there were no doubt power games
between the Podesta, a prominent Fascist who embodied the municipal authority, and
the directors of important state institutions at provincial level, who owed their real
allegiances to Roman bureaucracies. Therefore, the real motive for reporting
infringements ofwar regulations was sometimes to be found in internecine quarrels
between 'good Fascists' and bureaucrats rather than in a genuine conflict between
people who thought air defence was important and those who did not.
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In any case, reports show that UNPA inspectors tended to view infringements
of air raid precautions as a form of 'bourgeois passivity' rather than as criminal
behaviour. There is no evidence in the provincial archives or prison records that the
municipal police or carabinieri enforced air defence regulations by confining those
responsible for disobedience to a concentration camp or detaining them temporarily
in jail: preventative measures which the regime was not squeamish about using
against political enemies of the state who were involved in non-violent forms of
resistance. Despite the no-nonsense talk in the press about the seriousness ofwar
regulations, there was no heavy sentencing or other stiff penalties for law-breakers;
in other words the police did not criminalise infringements of air defence regulations.
The state police, a force with enormous powers in wartime Italy, failed to play a
significant role in preventing infringements or punishing people, and reports about
the extent of dereliction which reached the Prefect's desk resulted in the Prefect
issuing angry warnings but no dismissals for culprits.
This had ramifications on the home front because nothing came of a failure to
conform to war regulations for air defence. There is, however, another point to make:
police were comparatively thin on the ground in wartime Italy and many arrests were
the result of tip-offs received from informants, usually PNF cardholders, who
perceived that serious crimes were being committed. From archival evidence, it
seems that the rate of denunciations of infringements concerning air defence was
significantly lower than that for other wartime infringements such as black market
activities, defeatist remarks, insulting the Duce or listening to foreign radio
broadcasts—all crimes which normally resulted in a custodial sentence or a period of
internal exile known as confino.51 It seems that, in the early phase of the war, air
defence precautions were comparatively exempt from this form of public and party
control. This was not due to police ineptitude. The prison register of 1940 dispels any
stereotypical notions that the carabinieri were benevolent and simply too easy-going
to effectively police the home front. In 1940, a number of Friulian men and women
were incarcerated by the police, sometimes for a number ofweeks, on no specific
charge other than being a perceived threat to public safety (motivo di Pubblica
sicurezza, MPS). Whenever there are wartime regulations there are inevitably
transgressors, but the point is that in Udine the Prefettura, the army and, to an extent,
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the PNF were remarkably tolerant of infringements of air raid precautions. This
suggests that the local Fascist authorities did not perceive air defence to be
particularly important even in urban areas.
AIR RAID PRECUATIONS IN RURAL AREAS
During the war, the regime prioritized industrial and port areas which meant
that town councils in areas of secondary importance were expected to scale-down
plans for public shelters, presumably so that the regime could redirect its resources
and concentrate its efforts on protecting the most likely targets.52 Thus, Italy's air
defence precautions were really meant for large urban areas and industrial cities, but
paradoxically rural provinces were expected to follow national orders too. Many
local government officials in Friuli probably recognised that air defence was much
less important in their region. Despite this, at the outbreak of the war the CPPAA
established air raid precautions in fourteen comuni: Udine, Pordenone, Sacile,
Casarsa, Codroipo, Cividale, Palmanova, Cervignano, Latisana, Tolmezzo, Gemona,
Pontebba, Tarvisio, and Spilimbergo. There were no air defence precautions in the
small towns which were 'rural in character and without any important buildings or
organisations'.53
National orders were that small communities which did not have the
technology to be warned about imminent air raids had to adopt a permanent blackout
as part of the province's air raid precautions. This was because the state telephone
company, Telve, did not employ operators at rural telephone exchanges to connect
calls made during the night, and therefore some rural comuni could not be warned
about an air raid after a certain hour.34 As mentioned above, Italy entered the war in
the summertime, which heavily reduced the impact of the blackout on civilians, but
by November 1940 most workers in areas affected by a permanent blackout were
travelling to and from work in total darkness. For example, shift workers in
Torreviscosa who cycled to work had to undertake a perilous journey along a road
which was very busy during the night and at least one fatal accident resulted from
blackout precautions near the factory.55According to the Podesta ofUdine, without
street lighting, a few people drowned in canals in the rural districts of Rizzi and
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Cussignacco on the outskirts of town56 and this led to calls from local government
officials to lift the blackout, a precaution perceived by many Podestas as being
wholly unnecessary for the rural population. In Gemona, a small town situated in the
foothills of the Alps, a total blackout made travel on steep curving mountain gravel
or dirt roads with no barriers a perilous journey. The Podesta commented that alpine
bends could lead travellers without lights into an abyss.57
Also, in rural towns which did adopt air raid precautions, for example,
Cividale, air defence consisted of little more than an air raid siren mounted on the
cathedral roof. Palmanova had no air raid precautions at all, not even a siren, and
Casarsa, which was an important railway hub, had no UNPA section and relied on
the local fire brigade to deal with the possibility of air raids. San Giorgio di Nogaro
had no fire brigade so it was impossible to train rural UNPA organisers, the capi-
fabbricato, with the particular skills needed to deal with incendiaries. Rural areas
were not, however, entirely inactive; but reports show that local government officials
adopted only very limited measures. In most cases, the UNPA sections in smaller
towns were created only to protect important buildings, such as the town hall
(palazzo municipale) and were never implemented to safeguard rural households
from incendiary attacks. Thus the true purpose of rural air defence was to protect the
infrastructure of local government, as it were, rather than rural inhabitants.
In any case, the evidence seems to lend weight to the UNPA Inspectorate's
view that many comuni had deliberately ignored circulars from the Prefettura with
orders to implement air raid precautions and it undoubtedly undermined Fascist
authority in matters of civil defence. Many of the UNPA Inspectorate reports from
1940-41 offered a facile optimism and gave formal assurances that air defence
problems were now slowly being resolved, but, reading between the lines, it is clear
that they had discovered the province's small towns were ill-prepared for air
defence—contrary to Fascist decrees and provincial orders from the Prefettura.
UNPA records show that most municipalities were reluctant to enforce basic
war regulations. In Tolmezzo, the real priority was the building ofmilitary
fortifications along Italy's frontier with Nazi Germany, and the ambivalent nature of
these war preparations suggests that the Fascists were more concerned about keeping
out the Wehrmacht. The German Immigration Office in Tarvisio protested that the
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Italian army was requisitioning ethnic Germans' land to build defensive fortifications
against the Third Reich.59 In any event, so many local men were involved in
fortifying the frontier region that the Podesta of Tolmezzo, who had done nothing to
implement air raid precuations, claimed he would have to employ women or boys
from the youth section of the PNF to build public shelters.60 Here in Tolmezzo we
find some confirmation ofDe Felice's thesis that although Mussolini entered the war
as Germany's ally, even after June 1940 he was still undecided about who Italy's real
enemy was.61
In Casarsa, designated as a major railway hub with five branch lines to
Gemona, Udine, Veneto, Portoguaro, and Motta, and with a military airfield about a
mile from the station, it made sense to provide public shelter, but even here the
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municipal authorities had only built three slit trenches by August 1940. One was
filled in after it partially collapsed in December 1942, and the remaining two
trenches were considered far too dangerous to be used. Thus municipal authorities
themselves gave people the impression that air defence was of little or no
importance.
Fascist laws of 1936 stated that all new housing in towns of a certain size had
to provide the inhabitants with bomb shelters, but the legislation proved to be
unpopular for it obviously meant much greater expense and planning. When the air
war escalated in late 1941, and air raid precautions became very important, UNPA
was supposed to nominate new wardens in the communes to police infringements of
Fascist building laws in the comuni,63 However, when UNPA asked the comuni to
nominate air defence representatives on the committees, the Commissioni Edilizie
Comunali, local government officials showed no sign of being willing or able to find
people who had the proper qualifications, were exempt from the draft, and who
wanted to do the job. The Prefect ordered Podestas to nominate air defence
representatives, but local officials, who probably resented increasing state
intervention, were somewhat reluctant to appoint UNPA members to housing
committees. Both the towns of Pontebba and Casarsa, for example, did not comply
with national orders and argued that there were no engineers, architects or army
engineers available to implement the wartime regulations. Tolmezzo did not even
reply to Prefettura requests while Cervignano suggested nominating a lawyer, who
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later declared that he was unwilling to do the job. Clearly, architects and engineers in
small towns resented the idea of a representative from UNPA advising council
committees about shelter obligations for new buildings.64 It suggests that there was
particular resentment in rural areas towards air raid precautions which were
perceived to be unnecessary. Clearly the interests of the communities were
paramount and local loyalties meant people were extremely reluctant to take on the
job ofmaking sure that the community followed Fascist wartime regulations.6:> The
result was that very few air raid shelters were built in rural areas.
Air raid precautions had particular relevance for rural borderlands in the
province of Udine after Italy unilaterally and deliberately started a war with its
eastern neighbour, Yugoslavia, in April 1941. As the Italian 2nd Army advanced
from Trieste into Slovenia and began military operations in the region, it is not
surprising that the CPPAA began to take rural air raid precautions much more
seriously. The crucial importance of the situation in Yugoslavia, and the new
urgency in surveying air raid precautions can be read in a letter the Prefect himself
wrote in April 1941.66 Developments in Yugoslavia also coloured the propaganda in
II Popolo which insisted that the conflict was not a war to expand Italy's horizons
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with foreign conquest, but a Darwinian struggle for national survival.
As a result, rural inhabitants in the province, who had hitherto been little
affected by air raid precautions, were prompted by the CPPAA into organising
themselves for air defence. UNPA did not have a dominant role in rural air raid
precautions because villages did not have the key figure of the capo-fabbricato.
Parish priests and schoolteachers were therefore seen as being particularly important
in educating the public about air defence given their influence within farming
communities and their role as transmitters of information, including the potential
danger of enemy air raids. Although in theory the Fascist authorities in farming
communities formed air defence committees which included the Podesta,
Commissario del Fascio, Fiducario degli Agricoltori, Fiducario dei Lavoratori
Agricoli, Segretaria del Fascio Femminili and the Fiduciaria delle Massaie rurali, the
Comandante del GIL and Centro Premilitare, in practical terms it was the parish
priest and primary school teachers who had the dominant role in the organisation of
air raid precautions, although in some places peasants themselves arranged meetings
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to discuss the dangers of aerial attack. In the village of Zoppola, in the lowlands of
Friuli, farmers held meetings about air defence and both the parish priest and the
schoolteachers informed villagers about the dangers of enemy raids.68 In the village
ofGrimacco, the elders and the heads of peasant households were told about air raid
precautions, and it was they who were supposed to make sure that villagers came to
fight fires with the proper equipment.69
An obvious problem in rural areas was how wartime regulations were to be
communicated to remote peasant households in which there was usually no
newspaper or radio. One of the ways of reaching rural inhabitants during wartime
was to place colourful government posters on buildings where peasants would see
them: the offices of the farmers' consortium (Consorzio agrario), dairies, taverns and
churches. In one village, Rivignano, the CPPAA placed posters about air raid
precautions at the entrance to the parish church so that peasants coming to mass
could read about the dangers of aerial attack. The parish priest ofRivignano made
full use of the congregation to give people information about air defence. For
70
example, on one particular occasion, he explained what an incendiary device was.
The priest in Rivignano was almost certainly reading the safety leaflet published by
the Udine CPPAA, La piastrina incendaria. This pamphlet was a detailed description
of the British incendiary device, a fire-raising weapon dropped on targets to inflict
the maximum amount of destruction. This pamphlet pointed out that incendiaries
were particularly dangerous for small children who often found them scattered on the
ground. It was stated quite explicitly that playing with the devices could make the
phosphorous explode. Because incendiaries would not explode if the gauze was
damp, the CPPAA advised people to throw water on unexploded devices.71
It is important to note that organisers of air defence in rural areas were not
necessarily Fascist officials. In fact circulars written by the CPPAA show that the
Committee realized priests in particular could play an important role in rural areas,
speaking from the pulpit (parlando dalpergamo) after mass and during religious
festivals.72 Priests were able to use their position of authority to convey important
Fascist regulations. Not only did parish priests warn about the dangers of air attack
but they often disseminated a little political propaganda on behalf of the Fascist
authorities, warning villagers, for example, to be alert to the possibility of subversive
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elements within their own farming communities—probably a reference to the
presence of communist cells, real or imagined, in rural areas—who 'may have been
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recruited by the enemy to destroy crops'. In this way, priests contributed to the
persecution of individuals whose political conduct transgressed Fascist law.
Letters between the Podestas of farming communities and the Prefect suggest
there was much propaganda in the villages, but no evidence of technology or training
being used in rural areas as part of village air raid precautions. Peasants were
expected to change traditional farming practices; for example, to dig long trenches
between crops to limit the destructive power of incendiaries. It should be noted,
however, that the activities of the CPPAA in rural areas rarely introduced new air
defence technology.
For example, none of the small rural communities had air raid sirens. In
Vivaro, as in other villages, the church bells were rung in a very distinctive way,
with a hammer tone (a martello) or continuously for about a minute (a storno per un
minuto) so that people would not confuse an air raid warning with religious services.
Here, the village schoolteacher dedicated whole lessons to air raid precautions and
the parish priest told children about the dangers of air raids during catechism lessons
(Vinsegnamento della dottrina). Organisers of rural air defence tried hard to enhance
a strong feeling of local identity; for example, villagers overcame deficiencies in fire
engines and fire-fighting equipment by arranging for the whole community to turn
out with buckets and shovels in the event of bombers dropping fire-raising
incendiaries. Squads of teenagers, who had volunteered to fight fires, were expected
to be the first on the scene.74 An UNPA circular from Rome shows that a
stereotypical view of farming communities was that rural people were fully equipped
to deal with incendiary attacks because peasants had some experience of fighting
fires.73
Most rural Podestas were of course keen to show the Prefettura that their
communities were organised for air defence and were obeying national orders; but on
the other hand, some saw things differently and expressed grave doubts about the
real threat of incendiary attacks. The Podesta of Sauris, for example, pointed out that
CPPAA propaganda was almost irrelevant to his remote village since there were no
cereals grown in the area and so air raid precautions amounted to little more than
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protecting Alpine forest. He wrote 'The forest is immersed in dampness and peaks
and north-facing slopes are still covered in snow which fell in May. If, as I hope,
summer comes this year, we will turn our attention to the possibility of air raids.'76
Records show that the CPPAA printed and distributed an immense amount of
publicity material in rural areas between June 1940 and May 1941: according to its
own records, the CPPAA produced about 1,000 circulars, 7,000 instruction leaflets
and some 60,000 posters on air raid precautions for rural communities.77 Precisely
how many people actually read the CPPAA propaganda is impossible to determine,
but a considerable effort was made to inculcate rural inhabitants with the notion that
air raid precautions were important to them too.
That said, documents also show that CPPAA army officials rarely visited
small towns and villages to see for themselves the extent of air raid precautions.
UNPA's problem was that its resources, in terms of petrol and vehicles, were already
overstretched in urban areas. In September 1941, the increasingly difficult economic
situation meant that UNPA units had an allowance of only one litre of petrol a month
with which drivers were also expected to run the engines of their lorries weekly in
accordance with the rules of vehicle maintenance. Fuel was so short that the War
Ministry adamantly refused to authorise a greater allowance for UNPA which was
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supposed to economise on petrol consumption even during air raids. UNPA made
regular but futile requests for more petrol for the local section; for example, in April
1941 UNPA requested another twenty litres of petrol to train a few male members to
7Q
drive its vehicles. The requests for petrol suggest, at least at local level, that UNPA
leaders were unaware that supplies were desperately short or at times entirely
lacking. The Ministry ofWar pointed out to UNPA organisers that Mussolini himself
had imposed big restrictions on the use of petrol on the home front, but circulars
mentioned nothing about the real extent of shortages which effectively immobilised
air defence.80
But petrol shortages alone do not tell the full story. UNPA was not a
mechanised force because the organisation simply did not have enough vehicles for
air defence. Records show that UNPA had only four serviceable lorries for the whole
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province. Rural areas had no vehicles at all and local aircraft 'spotters' were
expected to give advance warning of enemy bombers approaching by cycling to the
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nearest village that had a telephone. In April 1941, UNPA had two vehicles in Udine,
one in Pordenone and one in Cervignano. One vehicle was hardly adequate for
Pordenone, an industrial town with more than 20,000 inhabitants, and the UNPA
section in Tarvisio had no transport at all. The Comando Generate ofUNPA issued
national orders in October 1940 urging provincial organisations to find more
transport, but there were no funds to requisition vehicles of any sort. This situation
led to a bizarre arrangement for the local section in Udine; for a nominal fee a local
hotel proprietor, a certain Beltrame, who clearly had access to supplies of petrol,
used his private bus during the day but, just before dark, parked it outside the UNPA
headquarters where the bus could be used by the rescue squads in the event of a raid.
All that was needed was permission from the Prefect for the Hotel Italia bus to
circulate after dark and during air raids.82
As for the CPPAA in this period, the Committee did not have any vehicles for
the inspection of air raid precautions in Friuli, the largest province in Italy, with the
result that the Provincial Inspector had to rely on public transport, trains, buses or
trams, to view air raid precautions in the towns and villages. The Ministry ofWar
sent UNPA a monthly allowance of 1 OOlire so that the CPPAA could hire a car to
visit the many villages without public transport, but, as vehicle rentals cost at least
751ire a day,83 this meant that the Committee was unable to carry out many
inspections.
In fact, records of visits (giornate di missione) by the Inspectorate of the
CPPAA, Colonel Arnaldo Colla, show that he assessed air raid precautions on
average in only two or three comuni a month in 1941 and four or five comuni a
month in 1942, a pathetically small number of inspections in a province which had
172 comuni. Arnaldo Colla was normally the only CPPAA member to inspect air
raid precautions although, another CPPAA organiser, Captain Antonio Vidoni, seems
to have assessed air raid precautions too, though only for about 4-5 days a month. In
July 1941, Arnaldo Colla inspected the factory at Torviscosa, and the towns of
Tolmezzo, Trevisio, Tarvisio, Cordenons and Pordenone, Cividale and Codriopo. In
the important towns, he stayed over night to visit shelters, but in smaller towns visits
rarely lasted more than a few hours.84 Buffarini insisted that Prefects or Fascist
officials were to inspect air raid precautions in order to be aware of the extent to
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which regulations were being followed and to prove that the authorities were in fact
or
taking an interest in public safety during a critical period for morale. In reality,
however, the organisers of air defence rarely visited villages to investigate rural air
raid precautions. That UNPA and CPPAA officials could not even take transport for
granted suggests that Italy's lack of raw materials such as oil was a crucial factor in
determining the scale of Italy's air raid precautions.
In conclusion, the remarkably small scale of Udine's air raid precautions
suggests that the regime and the territorial army did not think civil defence was an
important priority in 1940-41. It is possible to argue that by placing air raid
precautions firmly in the hands of the territorial army rather than the PNF
organisation UNPA, the regime did not want the Party to have a major role in civil
defence. As I have shown, the PNF was utterly subordinate to the territorial army in
matters of civil defence.
The case of Udine demonstrates that the regime was able to mobilise
effectively what resources existed in rural areas for civil defence, for example the
fire brigades and farm equipment, but the efforts of poverty-stricken villages and
market towns to comply with air raid precautions were inevitably feeble. This meant
that the province was largely unprepared for the air raids of 1943-1945. MacGregor
Knox has argued that incompetence and cultural deficiencies within the military
prevented the Fascists from preparing for a modern war, but evidence from Udine
suggests that just as important was the fact that the territorial army authorities were
not particularly concerned with the threat posed by aerial attack in the early part of
the war. That said, as Knox has argued, the Second World War was characterized by
mechanised warfare and evidence from Udine suggests that Italian society was bereft
of some of the modern technology and machines required to prepare for the kind of
war being waged by Germany.
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CHAPTER FOUR
AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS 2:
EVACUATION, FACTORY DEFENCE AND THE ESCALATING AIR WAR
JUNE 1940 TO MAY 1943
The first part of this chapter looks at evacuation, arguably the most effective
air raid precaution of the Second World War. Udine's wartime plans for evacuation
within the province did not start from scratch. During the late 1930s, the Prefettura
prepared detailed evacuation orders to be carried out in the event of a major war in
Europe. In theory, Udine, a predominantly rural province, was supposed to be ready
to absorb urban Italians from industrial and port areas, but the reality ofwartime was
very different.
The second part of this chapter explores factory defence. Important factories
were expected to adopt air raid precautions to protect workers and to minimise the
disruptive effects of air raids on industrial production, and although the province was
rural, the process of industrialization which started here in the late nineteenth century
meant Udine had some key sectors of industry, including mechanical engineering,
ceramics and textiles, which were important to the national war effort.
The last section of this chapter explores civil air raid precautions in 1942-
1943 and focuses on how Italians organised themselves for civil defence in a period
in which it became clear that the war was set to continue, and to intensify. In the case
ofMilan, Luigi Ganapini has suggested that, in this crucial period, the regime's
failure to implement air raid precautions did much to undermine the credibility of
Fascism and contributed greatly to the disintegration of the home front.1 The home
front in Udine, however, was of a very different nature from that in the large urban
agglomerations like Naples, Milan, Turin and Genoa.
EVACUATION
In Fascist Italy, as in other belligerent nations, it was feared that the start of
the war would bring mass bombing attacks that would flatten Rome, Milan, Turin
and other important cities. It was therefore natural that a predominantly rural
province like Udine should become a reception area for evacuees from the industrial
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and major port areas of northern Italy during the war. Aware of the possibility of
aerial bombardment, in the summer of 1940 some three thousand urban Italians,
including many children, arrived in Friuli hoping to find a temporary home for
themselves. This section deals with them.
Although the regime had planned to protect non-combatants in time ofwar
with organisations like UNPA and the Milizia controaerea, mass evacuation was
problematic because it conveyed the notion that Italy was vulnerable to aerial
bombardment—something which Fascist propaganda flatly denied—and hence the
press never openly encouraged or discussed flight from the densely populated cities.
This explains why it was not until Autumn 1942, when ever-greater weights of
bombs were being dropped on industrial areas and ports, that Mussolini consented to
municipal authorities evacuating children from Milan, Turin and other cities. In April
1940, Mussolini had issued directives preventing local officials from organising a
forced displacement ofwomen and children from urban areas, and had advised
prefects to organise overnight evacuations to the outskirts of cities (sfollamento
2 • *3
notturno) to avoid large population movements between provinces. Italy thus
entered the war with no national orders to evacuate children from port and industrial
areas. However, the absence of a national plan of any kind did not prevent ordinary
Italians from organising evacuation themselves.
In numerical terms, the number of people who evacuated to Friuli in the
summer of 1940 was tiny, and the vast majority of evacuees who arrived in the
province were women and children from Turin or Milan. Wartime mobilisation
orders prevented males between fifteen and sixty-five from leaving their homes4
because the regime believed that evacuation could do a great deal of harm to the
draft. By contrast, the regime published wartime regulations which stated that
women who looked after small children would not be mobilised for the war.3
Mobilisation orders restricting the movement ofmen meant that evacuation always
and inevitably involved splitting up families which made it a more difficult decision
for women. Perhaps this explains why relatively few families from Udine who were
living in Tobruk, Tripoli and Bengasi actually decided to return home in the first
months of the war, despite the possibility ofmilitary operations against the Italian
colonies.6
77
Evacuation to and within the province ofUdine was further restricted in June
1940 when the regime introduced a prohibited area east of the demarcation line
Zumula-Tolmezzo to Carso del Tagliamento near the border with Yugoslavia. This
decision, clearly taken in the light of Mussolini's plans to bring Yugoslavia into the
war, meant that the Prefettura in Udine, which had promised to accept about 19,000
evacuees from other provinces said that it could now take less than 6,000.8 There is
evidence that the military decision to invade Yugoslavia prevented some women and
children from evacuating to Friuli. For example, in July 1940 fifty-three people in
Turin who had wanted to evacuate to villages near the Yugoslav frontier were
prevented from travelling to the borderlands by the wartime restrictions.9 In addition,
evacuees were not allowed to settle in the large towns of Udine and Pordenone or
any of the comuni north of the Gemona-Claut line, near the border with Nazi
Germany.10 It is also worth noting that the Italian army had occupied Italy's
borderlands after the outbreak ofwar with the result that there was much less
accommodation for evacuees in frontier provinces like Udine."
Another factor that prevented many Italians from leaving urban areas was the
regime's decision not to provide transport for evacuees as had been previously
planned. Because evacuees had to pay their own travel expenses, impoverished
Italians, who could ill-afford the cost of a long train journey, were effectively
immobilised by the new orders. That the Fascist authorities refused to sponsor
wartime evacuation, suggests the regime wanted to prevent large numbers of the
urban working class from evacuating the big cities like Milan, Turin, Rome and
Naples. Mussolini no doubt supposed that such an exodus would damage his prestige
and perhaps even destabilise the regime.
Even with relatively small numbers of evacuees, documents show that
initially at least confusion reigned in many of the rural authorities when evacuees
started arriving in local reception areas. Disorganised aspects of evacuation can be
explained by the fact that at various times the Interior Ministry, the War Ministry, the
Italian army and the Fascist Party all had an important role in evacuation.12 For
example, applications for voluntary evacuation were supposed to be authorised by
the Interior Ministry, but some women who had decided to evacuate, claimed that
their local PNF section had given them perfunctory instructions to travel to Udine,
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••13without any sort of documentation for the Prefettura in the reception area. The case
ofUdine demonstrates that evacuation between provinces was ad hoc and that rural
communities were completely unprepared to become reception areas despite the
Prefettura's plans during the period of Fascism's colonial wars.
It is worthwhile looking at Udine's pre-war proposals for evacuation which
were supposed to protect urban dwellers from an air raid. In 1936, as part of the
regime's preparations for a future European war, local authorities were ordered to
draw up extensive plans to evacuate the population of the capital Udine and relocate
them in rural areas. In theory, people were to be marshalled using letters, numbers or
perhaps colours, and transported in groups to avoid a sort of biblical exodus.
Mussolini had decided that even hospitals and institutions were to be relocated in
rural areas in the event of a major European war. Elowever, translating the Duce's
strategic plans to evacuate people into practical orders was no easy task for the
Prefettura. For example, the national orders to evacuate the city meant that some 260
children who had been taken into care by the Fascist maternal and infant welfare
agency, the Istituto Provinciale per la Maternita e Infanzia, would have to leave
Udine in the event ofwar. The Fascist authorities decided at least theoretically to
hand the children back to their mothers, if possible, who would receive state benefits
to care for them. Other urban children in care, whose families could not be traced,
were to be placed temporarily in cheap hotels in Tarcento.14 Flowever, many of the
directors of important Fascist welfare institutions doubted that the evacuation plans
would work. For example, the director of the Istituto Provinciale per la Maternita e
Infanzia, who had personally witnessed children die during the panic and evacuation
following the Austro-Hungarian offensive of October 1917, was less than happy
about the regime's plans. He believed that some infants in his care would probably
not survive evacuation on a similar scale to that which occurred during the First
World War.15
Also problematic was the transport of hospital patients. For example,
according to plans, the geriatric hospital (Casa di Invalidita e Vecchiaia) was
supposed to evacuate about 250 patients, most of whom were bedridden, to urban
granaries despite the fact that such buildings had no heating in winter. The plans did
not include transportation and so the director hoped that the territorial army would be
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able to provide lorries. In any case, such problems were real impediments to large-
scale evacuation and would inevitably mean a remarkably slow and cumbersome
operation. The regime liked to appear to be welfare-orientated, but the directors of
Fascist welfare institutes saw evacuation plans as a contradiction in terms in that
those in care would almost certainly suffer if they were dramatically relocated to the
countryside where rural authorities could not possibly offer people the same quality
ofwelfare assistance that patients had hitherto enjoyed in urban areas. Here in Udine,
the quality and extent of plans for evacuation left a lot to be desired. Udine
demonstrates that local officials often did not have the technical means to implement
evacuation proposals.
One factor above all helps to explain why the Fascist authorities were unable
to organise evacuation in Udine. The Prefettura's pre-war evacuation plans to move
people into rural areas were resisted by rural Podestas, who were themselves
reluctant to accept large numbers of urban dwellers in villages where there was little,
if any, surplus accommodation for the families of local inhabitants. Evacuation plans
were laid down by officials in the Prefettura, but correspondence shows that the
Prefect himself had little knowledge of living conditions in peasant households and
that Podestas had to explain to him simple truths about rural life. For example, in a
letter about the social reality of Friuli, the Podesta of San Giorgio di Nogaro revealed
that in this town, which still retained its rural character, it was not uncommon to find
'a group of peasants, including couples, their children and other relatives, sleeping
together in one large room.' The Podesta was clearly suggesting that cramped
housing, squalid living conditions, and Dickensian sleeping arrangements meant that
village communities could hardly be expected to welcome outsiders, especially urban
evacuees from a different social class, who pictured rural villages as being sheltered
and happy.
A report written in May 1939 suggests that, by this time, the Prefect was also
trying to convince the Fascist authorities in Rome that life on the land was quite
unsuitable for urban Italians probably because of the pressure from Podestas. In an
effort to discourage evacuation to the Friulian countryside, the Prefect wrote to the
Interior Ministry claiming that rural communities had a very different set ofmoral
values and were, in his words, 'more promiscuous than their urban counterparts.'16
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Comments like this reflect not only the Prefect's apparent concern about sending
large numbers of urban families into the countryside during the war, but also the
result of stubborn resistance from rural communities which were unwilling to
collaborate with the Prefettura in implementing national orders.
Despite all the restrictions on evacuation in 1940, many women from
industrial and port areas of northern Italy, who were aware of the danger of
remaining in the densely populated industrial cities, arrived in Friuli's peasant
villages. Some women had brought no clothes or funds with them and were
shepherding small children and carrying babies. In the reception areas, the role of the
local Fascist Party was primarily to assist evacuees as best they could. At the village
of Tarcento, a family of ten were accommodated in a spare room in the village
school and allocated army mattresses and beds. In the same village, a heavily
pregnant woman from a slum district of Turin, who was soon to give birth to her
sixth child, was provided with items and clothing for the new baby by the local PNF
17
section leader (,Segretario delfascio) of Tarcento. Records suggest that the women
and children from urban slums were probably living from hand to mouth, with little
or no possibility of making any sort of living on the land. In the village of Attimis, a
Milanese widow and daughter had to beg the local authorities for welfare assistance
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because they had not received a cheque that month from the widow's in-laws.
According to many municipal reports from Friuli, in practice, the great
majority of evacuees from Turin and Milan were in fact Friulian women who had
found employment in industrial areas before the war. Some fragmentary evidence
suggests that many of the women did not think of themselves as real evacuees, but
rather as temporary migrants who had decided to return to the villages of their
upbringing as a result of the war. In the village ofVarmo, for example, out of a total
of sixty-three evacuees, there were only three women who had no relatives in the
village and were truly outsiders. Some evacuees were tobacco-factory workers or
workers from other non-essential industries in Milan and Turin who had simply
decided that the city was no longer an attractive place to live in wartime.19
Not all the so-called evacuees had left the industrial areas as a measure of
self-preservation. In fact, many of the women had been compelled by circumstances
to return to their villages. Some domestic servants, who had found employment in
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affluent Milanese households before the war, were no longer required when their
employers moved into the countryside as a wartime precaution, leaving the women
with little choice but to return home to Friuli. In the village of Faedis, for example,
five domestic servants, who had recently arrived from Milan, were hoping to leave
Friuli as soon as the affluent families which had employed them returned to the
90 • • • •
city. There is also evidence that most evacuees did not expect to stay in Friuli for a
long period of time and were impatient to return to the city, doubtless recognising
that the scale of enemy air raids was much smaller than they had expected. For
example, after residing in the village of Zoppola for less than a month, a group of
women and children from Rome began to ask the Podesta if it was safe enough to
return to the capital.21 In the industrial town of Pordenone nearly all of the 138
evacuees were expected to leave, especially those from northern provinces whom the
local commissario prefettizio had advised to go home.22 Many of the problems
encountered by evacuees in the case of Udine reflect the squalor and poverty of rural
life in Fascist Italy which made even impressive evacuation plans unworkable in
practice.
Prefettura census figures show that in June 1940, 3,227 people voluntarily
evacuated to Friuli (1,164 from Turin, 928 Milan, 230 Genoa, 262 Trieste, 154
Venice, and 125 from Imperia).23 Less than one month later, II Popolo announced on
7 July that the local section of the Fascio femminile was arranging for the evacuees
to return to their cities; only 32 of the 385 evacuees who had arrived at the station in
Udine in June were still waiting to leave the province.24 Articles like this in II Popolo
suggest that one of the purposes of publicising an apparent drift back to the cities was
propaganda, though precisely how many people returned home of their own free will
is not easy to determine. There is evidence to suggest that some impoverished urban
families might have been coerced into leaving rural areas; a circular of 21 June 1940
from the Prefect to the Questore stated that evacuees who refused to return to their
homes would certainly be denied any form of state welfare in the future.23
In any case, by October 1940, evacuation from Milan, Turin, among other
cities had declined in importance to such an extent that the Ministry ofWar was no
• .... . . . 26
longer interested in receiving lists of new evacuees in the province of Udine. A
month later, according to the Prefect, there were no evacuees in Udine from other
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regions of Italy or its African Empire, other than three families from Libya and one
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from Rhodes. At this point in the war, one can see why officials in Udine did not
recognise any need to evacuate people to the countryside when the regime itselfwas
not committed to evacuation from the big cities.
It is difficult to discover more about the experience ofwomen and children
who came to Friuli as evacuees during the first summer ofwar because the press and
radio could only publish official announcements from the Prefettura or the Ministry
ofWar regarding the situation. Even the Fascist Party, which organised evacuation




In theory, Udine's factories should have been well-prepared for war because,
at least a year prior to June 1940, the Prefettura had been urging the bosses of
factories to take precautionary steps against aerial bombardment. In a typical letter to
the directors of a local factory, the Prefect outlined the regulations and insisted that
9Q
factory defence was vital to war production in the province.
Correspondence between managers and the CPPAA, however, reveals that
the vast majority of factories did not meet Fascist requirements for war and were
totally unprepared for air raids even though the Prefect had sent numerous copies of
ministerial circulars on the importance of air defence in industry. In 1939, important
firms were supposed to submit detailed plans showing that they had significantly
adapted their works to the demands of an industry at war. The Fascist authorities
insisted that shelters for the workforce were required and gasmasks had to be issued
to at least a third of the employees. Many factories, however, complied only very
slowly and tardily with wartime regulations and implemented limited air raid
precautions, probably designed to comply with the minimum requirements of Fascist
law rather than to protect the workforce and machinery.
In particular, Udine's factory bosses were sceptical about the possibility of air
raids and thus extremely reluctant to provide air raid precautions for their workers.
At the start of the war, many factories already had works' sirens which had hitherto
been used to announce the end of a shift, and were to be used in wartime only to
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warn the workforce of an imminent air raid. Letters from factory bosses to the
Prefect in the first weeks of the war, however, show that firms which had never used
the works' sirens were reluctant to purchase the devices simply for air defence;
rather, many bosses decided to rely on public air raid sirens to alert the workforce.
Furthermore, the Prefect noted that where factories were found, on paper at
least, to have apparently implemented blackout and fire-fighting precautions, they
had usually not provided workers with any sort of protection; in cases where factory
bosses had built air raid shelters, inspectors invariably found that they were not
31*
bomb-proof in any accepted sense. During the war, factories which were threatened
with closure because of shortages, were even less willing to provide bomb shelters
for workers while there was uncertainty over the future of production. Paradoxically,
bosses tended to explain the lack of air raid precautions as being due to inevitable
factory cutbacks in wartime. For example, the military clothing firm Giuseppe Bini,
which had not received any supplies of coal for over a month, decided not to provide
bomb shelters because there was a possibility that the factory's 250 workers might
have to be sent home during the war.32 Another factory near Maniago, which
produced cutlery, had decided to adopt the same defence plan as the local school; the
workforce was supposed to run into the nearby hills in the event of an air raid.33 The
tone of these letters suggests that Friulian factory bosses did not think that their
factories would be bombed.
By October 1940, most factories had done little more than cover lights with
blue paper (azzurramento) or apply blue paint to windows.34 One report on the
factories in the province of Udine suggested that most plants had not followed the
Fascist regulations on providing shelter for industrial workers. At the cotton mill,
Cotonificio Udinese, two miles from the town centre, workers were expected to
disperse into the countryside in the event of an air raid. One textile factory, Filatura
Makd, expected its 930 workers to hide in the basement or take shelter under the
trees surrounding the factory. Another factory had a shelter for the management, but
not the workers, who were supposed to go to the cellars of nearby houses. As regards
who was in charge of factory defence, the job of factory warden was usually given to
workers on the lowest rung, for example the security guards, who worked on
nightshift.
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Another detailed report on factories in Friuli, written by the UNPA Chief of
National Air Defence, Luigi Gambelli, noted two important points. Firstly, air raid
precautions in factories were not sponsored by the state and therefore industrialists
were unwilling to pay for air raid shelters out of company funds. A second, related
problem was that factory owners preferred to adopt air raid precautions, for example
fire extinguishers and communication between employers and workers, which
improved health and safety conditions rather than spend money on camouflage and
shelter building which were precautions of no benefit to peacetime industry.
Similarly, the report noted that factories that already used sirens and steam whistles
to announce the end of shifts employed the devices exclusively for air raid warnings,
whereas, factories without sirens were reluctant to install them and preferred to rely
on the public devices nearest to the factory.36 True, many of the factories in Friuli
were not war-related industries, but evidence shows that factories in war-related
industries did not prioritise air defence either. Ironically, the province's armaments
factories actually conformed to the regime's blackout regulations only because the
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plants normally shut down for the night once the late shift had gone home.
The case of the Torviscosa factory is emblematic in this respect. The factory,
one of the best-known plants in the province, had been inaugurated by Mussolini in
1939 and was supposed to play an important part in the campaign for autarky in the
textile industry: the plant was designed to replace significant quantities of wool and
10
cotton with fibres processed from wood pulp. In the CPPAA archive, there is a rare
glimpse of a visit in March 1940 to the Torviscosa plant by a national inspector of air
defence who was supposed to give technical assistance. There were more than 820
workers in the factory on any one shift, but its air raid precautions consisted of one
slit trench near the factory which could hold some 100 workers. The Inspectorate of
air defence wrote in his report that 'even though this important factory was built in
1939 with war in Europe imminent, the drawings did not include [building] air raid
precautions for workers or machinery.' The Inspector added that the building was
made of red brick and 'seems to have been constructed so as to make it as
conspicuous as possible from the air.' This same report noted that not only had its
planners made it vulnerable and difficult to protect, but that there were 'no bomb
shelters for the vast majority of the workforce of over 500 men and women. Nothing
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has been done to blackout the light coming from the factories many windows and
there is no fire protection for the stockpiles of paper in the factory yard.' When the
Inspector arrived, the holder of the directorship was absent from the factory and the
air defence inspector was met by two engineers who showed 'no interest in the
danger of air raids'. The air defence inspector left the factory without having
achieved much and later concluded that 'unless regulations about factory defence are
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enforced, there might be serious consequences for this factory in the event ofwar.'
By February 1941, the threat of air raids against the factory had become so serious
that the workers' families who lived in the purpose-built houses around the plant
were either accommodated in the factory building itself or evacuated from the site.40
In conclusion, the managers of large firms failed to adopt air raid precautions.
The management did not feel responsible for protecting the workforce. The
relationship between Fascism and class is complex and much debated, but it is worth
pointing out that the regime made little effort in practical terms to protect its workers.
PROPAGANDA
Propaganda in II Popolo tried hard to convince people that sufficient air raid
precautions were already in place to protect the province. One good example of this
is an article which claimed that in the mountains of Friuli there were hundreds of
militia soldiers (legionari della Controaerei) armed with artillery, fire control
equipment and automatic weapons, who were ready to repulse any enemy aerial
bombardment. The anti-aircraft battalions of the militia did not have radar, but
pictures appeared in the press showing them using horn sound detectors which the
writer suggested were sufficient to warn of approaching aircraft. This article, like
others published in II Popolo, stated quite clearly that people in Udine could sleep
soundly because the town was protected by the Milizia controaerea,41 It is therefore
important to note that this propaganda, based on empty rhetoric, nevertheless
rendered difficult the public perception of risk because people in Udine had no
means of knowing the truth about provincial anti-aircraft defences.
On the other hand, during 1940-42, Royal Air Force bomber crews were not
properly trained or equipped to carry out precision attacks against single, distant
86
targets inland at night. Routes to the target, take off times, and altitudes were decided
by individual aircraft captains. Bombing was usually wildly inaccurate not least
because of hazardous weather, low cloud or ground haze, the latter very common
over industrial areas. Even when bomber crews reported that they had successfully
located and hit the target, later reconnaissance photos often showed that nothing of
military value had been damaged. It is therefore unsurprising that there were no
aerial bombardments and few alarms in a rural province given the nature of current
technology.
This is one reason why, in the case of Udine, according to CPPAA officials,
the authorities had great difficulty in convincing most people that the war situation
had changed. The local UNPA leader, Cesare Miani, who carried out a series of
inspections of domestic shelters, probably as a result of aerial bombardments of other
large towns, said that most people were convinced that there would be no air raids in
the province. In fact, most people who had built a domestic shelter in June 1940,
were now using the space as a store cupboard because they believed it had no other
useful purpose.42 After receiving national orders from Rome about the renewed
importance of air raid precautions, the Prefect decided to begin another publicity
campaign in II Popolo about the danger of air raids. The articles in the broadsheet
tried to convince people that there was a risk of enemy attack even though there had
been no significant raids against Udine in almost three years ofwar. The information
was particularly aimed at the town's landlords, the vast majority of whom had done
nothing for the families who rented their apartments.43 The advice from the
Prefettura must have seemed like a contradiction in terms to the people of Udine
because a series of articles in II Popolo assured readers that the war was being won
and that Italy had the technical means to defend its cities.
For example, the propaganda tried hard to convince people that even if Italy
could not prevent every air raid, Fascism could nevertheless retaliate and defend its
own territory. II Popolo claimed that Mussolini, who apparently had visited a
torpedo-bombing squadron in a theatre of war, had inspected a powerful, new
aircraft—probably the Savoia Marchetti Sparviero—which had only recently gone
into service with the Italian air force. Mussolini, said the journalist, had instructed
the Italian armaments industry producing the aeroplane to achieve the maximum
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output of aircraft as 'humanly possible'.44 In other words, the regime wanted people
to place their faith in Fascism's new technical remedies to defend cities from aerial
bombardment. To sum up, Udine's war experience in 1940-42 was limited to a series
of false alarms which nevertheless suggested what needed to be done to improve air
raid precautions. Factory bosses failed to translate into practice the ministerial
circulars urging plants to protect workers and machines. The wailing of sirens had
become a matter of routine for the province's inhabitants and attitudes had obviously
changed as a result. Reports show that few people were particularly concerned with
the possibility of aerial bombardment and this was in no small measure due to the
fact that the province did not experience any significant raids in 1940-42. Many
failed to see that the lack of proper shelter would have perilous consequences later in
the war.
The Prefettura had evidence from statistics gathered by the Fascist authorities
after the first big aerial bombardments of the war that air raid shelters were
important. According to a memo from the Interior Ministry from November 1941,
which was certainly seen by the Prefect, no Italians had been killed in bomb shelters.
By contrast, deaths had occurred in circumstances where people had decided to
simply stay indoors.43 In addition, one of the most simple and effective weapons
against RAF incendiaries was a bucket of sand and UNPA encouraged the local
government to distribute sand to households in town.46 Therefore the Podesta
decided to issue free sand to people in Udine which was delivered by the Roads
Department of the local council, so that ordinary people could extinguish
incendiaries in their own homes.47
The historian Giovanni De Luna, among others, has noted that the damage
and victims even in Turin was relatively light until Autumn 1942 when the air war
dramatically escalated and Turin experienced the darkest period of the war and the
worst air raids to date on an Italian city. De Luna has suggested that the war situation
was very different after the devastating attacks on Italy's most industrial city.48 Luigi
Ganapini has argued that terror was the principle aim of Allied air raids during this
period where there is evidence of 'area bombing' against the morale of the Italian
people.49 However, the next section examines initial reports of air raid alarms in
1943 which suggest that both local government officials and ordinary people in
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Udine were not galvanised by the escalation of the air war against the big cities into
adopting air raid precautions because they still believed there was little possibility of
aerial bombardment in the province.
THE AIR WAR ESCALATES
On March 17 1943, Udine experienced its first air raid alert since December
1940. The attack occurred during a period of Allied raids against cities in northern
Italy, in particular Milan and Turin. The antiaircraft batteries warned the provincial
capital that bombers were flying towards the province. At this point in the war, there
was still no special telephone or telegraph circuit to give rural communities ample
warning of enemy bombers and so the air raid alert was passed on to the smaller
comuni by Telve, the local telephone company, which informed the government
authorities and the air defence organisation, UNPA. On this occasion, rumours
spread that the telephone company had knowledge of the raid, and its lines soon
became overloaded with people trying to find out important details. In one recorded
case, this prevented the phone company from alerting an electrical substation in
Udine about the imminent raid.50
Initial reports from the March raid suggest that there were circumstances in
which people carried on with what they were doing even after the siren had sounded.
There is also evidence to suggest that when people were enjoying themselves they
ignored the air raid alert. For example, as the enemy bombers flew over the province,
most people who were dining in the trattorias and restaurants remained at their tables
until they had finished their meals. It is also worth noting that a few Fascist
bureaucrats who had gone to take cover in shelters forgot to switch off the lights in
their offices, wartime infringements that were later reported by capi-fabbricato.
Voluntary firemen, who were supposed to be guarding important buildings failed to
report for duty51 and one capo-fabbricato, Luigi Mattiussi, was arrested during the
air raid alert and later court-martialled for drinking at a bar whilst he was supposed to
52 • • ...be on duty. The raid was an opportunity for the local Fascist leader, Mario Gino, to
see for himself the efficiency of the town's air defence precautions. Mario Gino
claimed that the warning system was inaudible on the evening of 17 March; for
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example, residents in the district of Sant'Osvaldo, near the railway station, had
received no alert, including patients at the psychiatric hospital and workers at an
important factory. Ironically, this was the same psychiatric hospital with about 850
patients which the Fascist authorities had wanted to evacuate in 1938 because they
were sure the building would be mistaken for a military barracks.
According to Mario Gino, in via Francesco Crispi, some soldiers from the
military bakery crowded into the public shelter which had been built for civilians,54
and none of the railway passengers who arrived on the 23.22 train from Trieste,
which pulled into the station during the alarm, were warned about the alert. Instead
of entering the railway shelter, the passengers walked out of the station and through
the deserted streets completely unaware that the vast majority of people were
expecting an air raid.55 This report from the Udine PNF is but one example of the
Fascist leader denouncing the authorities for apparent failure to carry out the
regime's wartime regulations. Flowever, in this case, the railway authorities
themselves denied that railway workers had not been alerted about the air raid. In
fact, according to the head of railway services in Trieste, the passengers had been
told to go to the railway shelter—one of the best air raid shelters in town—but not all
of them responded in the same way to the warnings: some decided to make their own
way home. In future, wrote the railway director, the station gates would be chained
shut to prevent further incidents of passengers leaving the station during a raid.56 In
cases like this, the PNF had a remarkably negative role in air defence by reporting
individuals in authority for some perceived failure.
In rural areas there was also confusion during the raid of 17 March 1943. In
the town ofGemona, the bells in the medieval castle were rung and the cotton mill
and paper mill sounded their works sirens, but the Podesta noted that the civilians
preferred not to go to the public shelters.57 Also, one important railway town,
Latisana, was never put on alert. The official words 'protezione alarme' were never
used to warn the soldiers who were at the siren post; rather, a voice said 'be vigilant,
Udine has been alerted!' Expecting to hear more details, the soldiers waited but
received no more news until 23.45 when another guard on duty at the public siren
received a phone call giving Latisana the 'all clear'. It was only then that soldiers
realised that there had been an air raid warning and no one in the town had known
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about it.58 Similarly, in the town of Codroipo the telephone caller did not use the
proper official code 'protezione alarme' so nothing was done about the air raid alert
that night.39 At Pontebba, technical problems with the line meant that the soldier on
duty, Gabriele Azzola, heard the phone ring but when he answered it saying 'pronto'
several times there was no reply. One hour later to his surprise he received the all
clear signal —'cessato alarme'.60 The telephone line between Tarvisio and Tolmezzo
was also malfunctioning at the time of the alarm and therefore it was impossible to
warn people in Tolmezzo.61 There were also technical problems with the air raid
sirens themselves. In theory, the people living in districts furthest from the town
centre were warned by a mobile siren mounted on a motorcycle which rode around
the streets, but in practice, many people never heard the mobile siren because it was
travelling too quickly.
Another air raid alarm on 24 May revealed particular problems with air raid
precautions in the provincial capital. Again, the local section of the PNF clearly used
a network of agents and informers to criticise the organisers of air raid precautions.
The CPPAA received a series of reports from UNPA volunteers, PNF members of
the Delegati rionali and capi-fabbricato who had observed that the air raid warning
sirens were hardly audible in the centre of town still less on the outskirts. It is
interesting to note that people were not all rushing to go to public shelters. According
to CPPAA reports, most inhabitants ofUdine had gone into the countryside and only
a tiny number of people had used the public shelters. Many people had tried to use
the slit trenches in town, but because the trenches had earth flooring rather than
cement paving, they were full of rainwater and mud.
In one public shelter, Rifugio Asquini in Via Manin, there were no oil lamps
and the candles had been stolen. Only a small amount of drinking water was
provided in unhygienic buckets. At another shelter, refugio Ferri in via Larga, the
doctor found that he had no syringes or any supplies of camphor and caffeine
injections, stimulants that were supposed to be in the shelter's medical cabinet.
People were assigned to a particular shelter, though not always the nearest one to
their home. For example, a certain E. Faioni, who actually lived in an apartment on
top of the public air raid shelter in via Rauscedo, had been assigned to the shelter in
via Percoto, some distance from his home. The most important fact that emerged
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from the air raid on 24 May was that there was no real discipline during the alarm.
Many people were casually riding around on bicycles and it was rare to find cyclists
who had actually bothered to mask their lights.62 After this particular raid, the
council authorities decided to put clay floors in all the slit trenches so that they could
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be used in wet weather.
According to the Prefect, the frequent air raids in the province kept the town
in a state of constant alarm and many civilians, writing to friends or relatives about
the situation in Udine, claimed that the public shelters were inadequate and offered
no guarantee of safety.64 The consequences of having had no raids for a long period
of time, are exemplified by the situation in Codroipo, a town in the lowlands of Friuli
where there had been no alarms in the first three years ofwar. On the night of 24
May 1943, the town was surprised by an air raid warning. Most of the town's
inhabitants did not rise from their beds as there was a curfew in place, but some
villagers went into the countryside and a few stayed in their cellars, though none
ventured into the municipal bomb shelters, basic slit trenches, which had been
specifically dug for air raid protection. There were no electric batteries for the
wardens' torches, so UNPA members could not see into the shadows, and although
the firemen rallied from their beds, they did not have sufficient equipment. The local
Fascist leader, il commissario del Fascio, had no permit to be out after the curfew.
One problem was that the capi-fabbricato really did not know their duties. In short,
there was much to be done in terms of air defence, wrote the Podesta.63 In another
report, the Prefect blamed the incompetence on the municipal police (vigili urbani)
and wrote that the fault lay not with the state but with the local Podesta, who would
have to do more to improve air defence.66
The problem was that in the spring 1943, Udine was still a province which
had not experienced heavy raids. In fact, in March, hundreds of children from the
bombed districts of Milan came to Udine as war evacuees and Fascist propaganda
tried hard to make their arrival appear to suggest that there was still much solidarity
on the home front. Mothers, fathers and relatives in Milan had seen the children onto
trains bound for Friuli where the youngsters were to be looked after by the youth
section of the Fascist Party, GIL, in a province which the Milanese believed to be
relatively safe. The fact that people in Milan were sending their children to the
92
province of Udine may also have convinced some that the region would avoid the
sort of bombardments experienced in Milan, but nevertheless it was clear that the air
war against major Italian cities was escalating.
In conclusion, it can be said that the province was largely unprepared for
evacuation even on a small scale. Although there was a housing problem, the case of
Udine demonstrates that rural communities were reluctant to be host to evacuees and
absorb urban Italians for the period of the war. Local government officials showed
little generosity or openness. Many of the problems encountered by evacuees in the
case ofUdine reflect the squalor and poverty of rural life in Fascist Italy which made
even impressive evacuation plans unworkable in practice. Also, the nature of
Fascism meant that the authorities were very concerned about internal migration and
in fact there was no large-scale evacuation in Italy during this period.
It must be said that the war on the home front from 1940-1943 in the province
ofUdine was not that different from the kind ofwar Fascist Italy had expected to
fight. Even when the deficiencies of air raid precautions were exposed by false
alarms or perhaps by lone aircraft flying over the province at night, the authorities
did little or nothing to remedy the problems. Most people showed an unwillingness
to commit resources and energy to air defence because there no longer appeared any
reason for protection.
The air war waged in late 1943 was very different, however; for example,
new scientific aids became available to bomber Command including ground-marking
and target-indicator bombs, which ejected brightly coloured pyrotechnics just above
the ground and marked the aiming point. In practical terms, Bomber Command could
now hit targets as small as individual synthetic oil plants or railway sheds, which
significantly increased the military value of the air war. Udine was probably never on
the target list of Bomber Command before the German occupation of the town in
September 1943—which explains why Udine did not experience one daylight raid
throughout the Fascist period of the war—but, given that the Allies were facing
fewer technical problems in 1944, the Royal Air Force was able to carry out more
accurate attacks on industrial sectors and civilian morale. From this point onwards,
the frequency and severity of air raids in the province rapidly increased.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE AMMASSICAMPAIGN: FOOD POLICY 1940-43
The regime idealised the lives of the peasantry, and tried hard to convey the
impression that Fascism placed great value on agricultural work, and on the
contribution of farming communities to the national community and the war effort.
For example, Mussolini remarked in a speech to peasants in January 1940 that
modern warfare was economic warfare and that a poor harvest was equivalent to a
battlefield defeat.1 In the pages of II Popolo, Fascist propaganda targeted peasants
very carefully: traditional rural events in the agricultural calendar were usually
commandeered by the Fascist Party. The PNF interfered in village gatherings by
organising and publicising the harvest festivals and other events of the rural calendar,
in a tone which was predominantly picturesque and at the same time patronising.
Rural communities were often assembled with much fanfare to meet representatives
of the Fascist Party or the Fascist agricultural workers' union (Unione provinciate
dei lavoratori dell'Agricoltura) and these orchestrated events always depicted
peasants as being orderly and obedient. For example, in II Popolo there were
sometimes descriptions of large rural parades, organised by the local section of the
PNF, where peasants even carried agricultural tools, such as hoes {la zappa) or
spades {la vanga), over their shoulders.2 The events of the war, however, showed a
quite different picture of peasant loyalty to the aims of the regime.
This chapter deals with how the peasantry in the province of Udine responded
to the ammassi campaign. The ammassi were the state-controlled collection depots
established by the Fascist authorities in the 1930s for pooling foodstuffs. During the
war they were used by the regime to supply the population and to control price
levels. They were, therefore, an important aspect of the Fascist war economy. Most
historians agree that the ammassi were from the beginning very unpopular with the
peasantry and that this had very serious consequences for the regime and for the war
effort as a whole.3 The situation in Udine was no exception to this.
The PNF issued national orders for inspectors, local party leaders {segretari
politici) and the rank-and-file of the party to police the amassing in rural areas.4
However, these orders were not always carried out. In some cases the PNF proved
itself incapable of doing this work effectively. Mussolini's former Chief ofPolice,
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Carmine Senise wrote in his memoirs Quando Ero Capo della Polizia 1940-1943
that, in his opinion, the PNF should have limited its activities to propaganda and
assistance but, because the party wanted to become involved in more aspects of the
home front, this inevitably meant taking over state responsibilities, including the
regulation of food prices, for which the party had no previous peacetime experience.5
Other historians have noted the ineptness of the party with regard to food policy. De
Felice, for example, has convincingly argued that the PNF failed to control food
prices during the war not least because party officials tended to do things on their
own initiative rather than collaborate with the Ministry ofAgriculture.6 According to
De Felice, moreover, the party's involvement in the rationing system resulted in an
increase in black market activities.7 A local study by Brunella dalla Casa has
demonstrated that in Bologna the PNF was unable to control food prices and
rationing, which ultimately discredited the local section of the party, seen as being
both inefficient and corrupt.8 The case of Udine is somewhat different. As Paola
Carucci has pointed out, the Fascist Party had an important role in food policy in
some provinces (although the carabinieri, were responsible for actually policing the
ammassi system). Whereas in other provinces the rationing system was firmly in the
hands of the Prefect and the Questore.9 This was, in fact, the case in Udine.
THE AMMASSI CAMPAIGN
Most peasant-farmers in Friuli were subject to orders to amass various kinds
of cereals, but, as the army was highly dependent for its transportation on horse-
drawn vehicles, the state authorities also tried to collect fodder in order to distribute
it to the armed forces, to local cattle-breeders and to dairy farmers. Amassing
primarily targeted cereals, fats and milk products and it is worth noting that fruit and
vegetables were never amassed or rationed during the war, but could be traded on the
open market, albeit supposedly at state-controlled prices.
During the war, the first ammassi section of the farmers' consortium
(Consorzio agrario) bought cereals from peasant-farmers, arranged for milling, and
delivered flour to local communities. It also kept records of the amount of grain and
flour stored in provincial mills. All this work was done under the direction of Sepral
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(Sezione Provinciale dell 'Alimentazione), the rationing authority, which was
controlled by both the Ministry ofAgriculture and the Ministry of Corporations.10 At
local level, Sepral was run by a committee, the Consiglio direttivo. This committee
was chaired by the Prefect,11 as the official with overall responsibility for the
distribution of food in the province.12 This meant that the ammassi were kept out of
the hands of actual Fascist Party officials.
Nevertheless, the ammassi system had a distinct ideological slant in that it
was supposed to mobilise peasant-farmers, whom the Fascists depicted as hitherto
excluded from the national community. Also, in its local broadsheet, the Udine PNF
claimed that amassing foodstuffs fulfilled some important aims of the Fascist
revolution in terms of increased state-control, and the drive for autarky. In this sense,
amassing foodstuffs was wholly consistent with the Fascist version of the war as a
perpetual, Darwinian struggle for life that would produce greater cohesion and
solidarity within the national community because it meant that all Italians would get
a fair share of the nation's food supply. According to them, amassing meant that
everyone would have to make the same limited sacrifices necessary to achieve
victory.13
In practical terms, the ammassi system forced peasant-farmers to hand over
all their produce to the state, although peasant families were allowed to retain some
grain for domestic consumption and for sowing. Udine forms a particularly important
case study in the history of wartime food policy since, despite the poverty of Friulian
agriculture, the food-producing province of Udine was nevertheless expected to
supply markets in the comparatively affluent city of Trieste, which received little
from its hinterland, the borderlands of Carso and Istria, especially during the war.14
The contribution of Friulian peasants to the war effort was, therefore, of far more
than simply local importance. In the first year of Italy's war, the categories of cereals
that were amassed by farmers were limited to wheat, maize and rice. The reason for
this was that, as Luigi Cavazzoli has argued, the regime was trying to interfere with
food supply as little as possible at this point, in the belief that the war would be only
a short conflict.13 It should be remembered that the ammassi campaign began in the
context of a comparatively quiet period of the war, from Autumn 1940 to Spring
1941, when the German armed forces were not involved in any major land
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campaigns in the West. During this period, most people probably believed that the
conflict was not set to continue, nor to broaden and would indeed soon be over.
Early in the war, II Popolo tried to assure its readers that Italy had enough oil
and fats for everyone to get a fair share even though it had been decided to ration
popular commodities.16 In practice, however, shortages soon appeared. On 1 October
1940 the regime introduced the rationing of oils, butter and lard and all other fats
used for cooking or salad dressing. Italians were issued with new ration books (carte
annonarie) including coupons (buoni di prelevamento) for half a litre of oil a month
and 300 grams of butter or vice versa. At about this time, rationed foodstuffs made
up less than half the daily intake of calories Italians needed and so people had to
supplement their diets with items which were not rationed, but sold freely on the
market. Paola Zagatti has argued that if the prices and availability of non-rationed
foodstuffs had been properly supervised and controlled, this situation might have
been workable, but during the conflict the price of non-rationed foodstuffs
immediately began to rise and many rationed goods quickly appeared on the black
market (mercato nero or borsa nerd). People felt it was legitimate to buy foodstuffs
from the black market because non-rationed commodities had disappeared, leaving
them little choice.17 As another historian, Vittorio Rifani, has demonstrated, there
were three distinct phases in the wartime food shortages. In the first phase, the
monthly ration was gradually reduced. In the second phase, the quality of rationed
food declined; for example, water was added to milk and bread flour was adulterated
with things like maize flour. Eventually, the distribution system itself failed to
deliver goods and people experienced increasing shortages.18
During the period December 1940 to February 1941, it became clear that it
was not to be just a short war. In the winter of 1940-41, the Italian army in Greece
suffered its first big defeat of the war. Italy suffered other catastrophic defeats in
Libya and Egypt and, in the spring of 1941, lost Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia. The
East African Empire disintegrated and Italy was now totally dependent on Nazi
Germany. As a result of the military situation, the categories of cereals to be amassed
were extended to include barley and rye both of which had hitherto been allowed to
be sold freely on the open market. In theory, this represented a further increase in
state control of the war economy as farmers in Friuli now had to hand over more
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produce to officials. In practice, however, the state did not have enough warehouses
to amass all of the produce, and thus officials were forced to rely on the collaboration
of peasant-farmers who were paid to store grain on their premises on behalf of the
state.19 This situation clearly made abuse of the system easier.
An article that appeared in March 1941 in II Popolo, which criticised local
peasant-farmers who were failing to hand over their entire maize harvest, shows that
the local Party was already fully aware of how unpopular the ammassi were in rural
areas.20 It is also clear from ministerial circulars that the ammassi system was
experiencing resistance from peasant-farmers throughout Italy at least as early as
21 • • ...
August 1941. In Udine, according to carabinieri reports from July 1941, the
peasant-farmers initially complied with the regulations and the police estimated that
some ninety two thousand quintals had been handed over by July that year, which
was much more than had been collected the previous summer. No doubt to reassure
the regime, the carabinieri suggested that much of the success was due to the
authorities' efforts to place depots for grain in the rural areas themselves so that
• 99
peasant-farmers did not have to travel too far to hand over their grain.
As impressive as carabinieri reports were about the ammassi campaigns of
1940-41, the police had little real evidence that peasants were in fact handing over
their entire produce to the state because, in the early part of the war at least, accurate
figures of past crop yields did not exist. This meant that, in practical terms, the
Fascist authorities had no idea how much grain Friulian peasants were supposed to
be bringing to the ammassi.23 The absence of official records explains why
government inspectors from Sepral were invariably accompanied by local peasant-
farmers (stimatori) who were entrusted to estimate the crop yields of other farmers.24
On the whole, peasant loyalty to the community was much stronger than to the state,
however, and it is doubtful that many stimatori were willing to denounce fellow
villagers to the police. As a result, there was probably a very wide margin of error in
local government estimates of crop yields.
In the meantime, officials at the amassing warehouses were finding it difficult
to convince many farmers to come forward with their produce. The Centri ammassi
del Consorzio Agrario sent producers a card (la cartolina di invito) instructing them
to either turn over their grain or to store it for the state on their premises (alia
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costituzione del deposito fiduciario).25 Here there is plenty of evidence to show that
farmers resented the ammassi laws. For example, after the sending of the first card, it
not uncommon for the amassing depots to send a second or third card before farmers
reluctantly handed over grain. During the winter of 1941-42, some peasant-farmers
even claimed that the severe cold weather had prevented them from handing over
grain, which led one inspector to remark sarcastically that he hoped that February's
warmer weather would make peasants 'somewhat more conscientious.'26
RURAL COMMISSIONS FOR THE AMMASSI
According to an important ministerial circular issued in October 1941, the
regime had no real control of the war economy in rural areas, and thus it was decided
to establish commissions within farming communities to report infringements of the
regulations to the Fascist authorities (commissioni comunali).27 During this period,
the Prefect was supposed to ensure that the rural commissions were not 'undermined
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by parochialism.' In practice this was almost impossible. In many communities, the
control commissions were reluctant to force local peasant-farmers to surrender their
grain and instead asked them to come forward on a voluntary basis. The results were
9Q
predictably poor. The commissioners were not only supposed to prevent peasants
beating the system, but also to accelerate the amassing of cereals because the
authorities admitted that the campaign was 'losing momentum'.30
In practice, the commissioners whose job it was to oversee the amassing of
cereals had an ambivalent attitude towards war economy regulations and the
ammassi. Commissioners were Fascist Party members who wanted peasants to get
behind the war effort and obey Fascist laws. At the same time, however, it was
natural that commissioners wanted to retain as much food as possible in their own
local district and so they felt the pull of rival allegiances. Also, Rome was far away,
but the village was their source of identity and authority, and in small communities
many commissioners were both local government officials and prominent farmers.
An article entitled 'Mobilitare la terra' published in II Popolo of 6 March 1941, for
example, stated bluntly that the majority of Podestas in Friuli were themselves from
large rural families and hardly needed bureaucracy—statistics, investigations or
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reports—to understand 'the situation in the countryside'. This article, which
attempted to cajole Podestas into mobilising peasant-farmers for the war effort,
appears to admit that state interference in farming communities could cause
resentment. Moreover, local allegiances meant that some commissions failed to
report infringements to the Questore or the Prefect, which explains why the
authorities could claim to be unaware of the true extent of resistance to war
^9
regulations in rural areas. By January 1942, however, it was clear to even the
Prefect that amassing in the province was rapidly declining.33 The example of Udine
suggests that the rural authorities, the Podestas and the members of commissions,
were extremely reluctant to comply with national orders and extend the state's
control of farming communities.
Moreover, police reports from Udine show that the carabinieri preferred to
blame peasant-farmers rather than criticize the local government officials. For
example, in December 1941, local carabinieri reports were noting that peasant-
farmers, especially those who lived in the lowlands of Friuli, were unwilling to hand
over their produce to the ammassi and that the commissions were forced to hold
meetings in churches in an effort to convince peasants to comply with wartime
regulations.34 By January 1942, according to the Prefect, the amassing of cereals was
in a downward spiral throughout the province.35 At about this time, the Fascist
Farmers' Union (Confederazione fascista degli Agricoltori, servizio acceleramento
ammassi cereali) wrote to the Ministry of Agriculture to complain that vast amounts
of cereal were being sold on the black market in the province.36 The same month,
February 1942, the Union's inspectors claimed that more than six hundred local
farms had committed infringements by refusing to hand over maize—amounting to
some four thousand quintals of grain—and that local commissions had deliberately
withheld this amount from the ammassi?1 The police and Fascist authorities were
quick to accuse farmers and agricultural workers of having failed to amass grain. It is
obvious that local commissions were turning a blind eye to much of the black market
activities of peasant-farmers. As Luigi Ganapini has written, the rationing and food
distribution system introduced by the Fascist regime seemed to take it for granted
that people would use the black market at the very least to supplement their diet,
io
otherwise it is difficult to explain such low rations.
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RESISTANCE TO THE WAR ECONOMY REGULATIONS
In Udine, one way in which the Questore tried to make peasant-farmers
comply with wartime regulations was by deploying more police in rural areas during
-5Q # t t
the amassing of cereals. That the Questore insisted on this large police presence,
demonstrates that the authorities did not have confidence in their ability to collect
enough food. They expected resistance.
The village of Osoppo exemplifies the tendency of local government to resist
the ammassi laws. According to Fascist regulations, the Osoppo community should
have been amassing forage for the army in particular, which still relied heavily on
horse-drawn transport. Investigations by Sepral on 25 September 1942, however,
revealed the true extent of resistance to the ammassi campaign. In Osoppo, as in
other communities, local government officials rented out council land to peasant-
farmers, but Sepral discovered at least five peasant-farmers who were not officially
listed as hay-producers even though their crops were on council land, and who were
not handing over produce to the ammassi. The army, too, rented out the grounds of
the local fort to another local farmer, whose illegal crop sprawled over 15,000 square
metres of the military aerodrome. There is little doubt that the village authorities,
both civil and military, connived with peasant-farmers to make large sums ofmoney
from crops which did not officially exist. The report from Osoppo is important in
that Sepral blamed local government officials for the widespread infringements of
the amassing laws.40 The case of the local government officials and peasant-farmers
conniving to retain crops in Osoppo also suggests that there were few, if any,
inspections in the period 1940-42 and that local government authorities enjoyed quite
wide autonomy.
Moreover, there is evidence that Osoppo was not a unique case: for example
in the district of Latisana, the community openly refused to hand over grain, and as a
result the authorities threatened to withdraw the town's permit to mill grain. Later in
the war, such emergency measures were so unpopular that there were large and
rowdy protests by rural inhabitants, mostly women. In a rural area near San Vito al
Tagliamento, for example, in hostility to the closure of the only mill in the district, a
noisy crowd ofmore than 500 protesters demanded that the authorities reopen the
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mill. The women vented their feelings by removing the mill doors from their hinges
and hiding them from the police. After about eight hours, the carabinieri managed to
disperse the protesters at the mill, many of whom later thronged the main street
shouting 'we want bread!' (vogliamo pane!)41 Action on this scale—and there were
other similar incidents at about this time—was undoubtedly provoked by scarcity
and by high food prices. It demonstrates that rural inhabitants themselves were
willing to fight back quite openly if the Fascist authorities tried to force communities
to hand over grain.
The Prefect believed that most of the infringements of the ammassi rules
were the result of millers refusing to comply with war economy regulations.42
Peasant-farmers could easily avoid handing over grain to the ammassi, but in theory
they had to have a milling ticket before they could turn cereals into flour. Millers
played a leading role in the black market because they refused to implement the
Fascist authorities' strict practices for milling grain, and hence people had no
difficulty in beating the rationing system and obtaining flour without a milling ticket.
Evidence from the Prefettura archive confirms this point. In Udine, as
elsewhere in Italy, many millers accepted, or insisted on, payment in kind (molenda
in natura). This was strictly prohibited in wartime, but remained common practice
here. According to the ammassi laws, millers were not classified as food-producers
and therefore were not entitled to store food or to withhold it for their own private
consumption. Nevertheless, through payment in kind, millers were able to stockpile
flour which they then exchanged with farmers for grain. The advantage of this
system was that millers could avoid keeping accurate records of transactions with
peasant-farmers and hence they did not need to require people to produce the state
milling ticket. In a typical case which came before the court in Udine, a check by the
rationing authority Sepral found one miller to have declared less than half the wheat
which was actually stored in his mill.43 It is important to bear in mind that there was
a widespread belief in this period that millers were naturally corrupt and dishonest.
In reality, however, millers were often shielded by local officials who, according to
the Confederazione Fascista degli Industriali (Servizio controllo macinazione per
conto terzi), were themselves not using milling tickets, a serious infringement of war
economy regulations.44 Evidence from Udine supports Cavazzoli's suggestion that to
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some extent the authorities tolerated the situation.45 Giacomo Becattini and Nicolo
Bellanca have gone further and suggested that local officials who were responsible
for the rationing of foodstuffs were themselves often directly involved in the
blackmarket.46 Evidence from Udine shows that the authorities in farming
communities were refusing to follow national orders which had been circulated by
the Prefettura although I have found no evidence of Fascist officials actually
operating on the black market.
Moreover, as millers and local government officials refused to use milling
tickets, the Prefect was powerless to prevent vast quantities of grain from leaving the
province. This explains why, during the Winter of 1940-41, there was a sudden
shortage of maize flour that was so serious that the Prefect had to adopt emergency
measures (provvedimenti speciali) to provide the province with grain—measures
which undoubtedly involved distributing grain from the ammassi warehouses. In
short, it was discovered that Udine's mills had sold large quantities of flour beyond
the province (some 6265 quintals out of the 13913 assigned to Udine by the
Federazione dei Consorzi Agrari to the province). The problem was that the majority
ofmillers' customers were from other provinces and the relatively few customers
from Udine did not need more flour. Hence the millers had been forced to sell maize
flour to other provinces. Moreover, the drop in flour was in part due to a reduction in
flour assigned to the province from 16.600 to 12,380 quintals.47 As Renzo Martinelli
has written, the disorganised aspects of food distribution system clearly revealed just
how unprepared the Fascist regime was to fight a major war.
Another reason the ammassi system was resented was that the new
war economy made traditional rural farming habits illegal. A good example is
bartering which was an integral part of the pre-war peasant economy in Udine.
Peasant-farmers in the lowlands exchanged their produce with farmers in the
mountains; for instance, grain was bartered for chestnuts or seed potatoes. Even
though the ammassi system made bartering illegal, there is some evidence that, in
practice, rural communities still continued to exchange flour for other commodities,
especially wood, during the conflict.49 In theory, war economy regulations were
designed to compartmentalise rationing because food prices occasionally differed
from province to province and regulations prevented black marketers from creating
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shortages by 'exporting' foodstuffs to neighbouring provinces to profit from price
fluctuations. In practice the situation was very different.
That said, the difficulties of trying to punish people for wartime
infringements may be seen ifwe examine court records of the Tribunale di Udine for
the period. Documents from the courts of Udine show that the local judiciary was
remarkably tolerant of infringements ofwar economy regulations. Here we can see
that judges rarely punished infringements of the war regulations with custodial
sentences. A good example is the court's attitude towards peasant-farmers who
hoarded grain. In theory, hoarding was an illegal way to beat the ration system and
undermined the Fascist war aims of common sacrifice and solidarity on the home
front. In practice, however, the Fascist authorities allowed food producers to
withhold very generous amounts of grain during the war—much more than they
received in peacetime—for family consumption and sowing, and inevitably peasants
hoarded cereals that had been assigned to them and sold surplus amounts on the
black market, usually to urban housewives. In this context, judges rarely punished
women who bought food on the black market because the women themselves
invariably pointed out that they were trying to provide large families with food. One
woman, for example, declared during her trial in Udine that she had five children to
feed.50
In fact, court records of trials against people accused of infringements of food
regulations, show that judges were extremely tolerant and invariably came down on
the side of peasant-farmers. They often stated that the law would not punish peasants
who hoarded grain and sold it to others in that the cereal had been assigned to them
and was thus a form of rural charity towards urban inhabitants, and a demonstration
of solidarity towards fellow nationals (altruismo e di umana solidarieta). Courts did
not find peasant-farmers guilty of serious crimes, but rather tended to impose fines
for minor infringements of the war economy. For example, rather than imprison
peasants and housewives for black market activities, the courts instead found
defendants guilty of taking foodstuffs from the province of Udine to Trieste without
the written permission of Sepral, a very minor infringement.51 Also, peasant farmers
who sold foodstuffs to urban inhabitants normally remained unpunished because city
women never learned their full names or were perhaps reluctant to name peasants.
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Moreover, most women tended to purchase tiny quantities ofmaize flour, or other
foodstuffs, from several different peasant-farmers and hence it was impossible for
the courts to unravel the individual transactions.
In many ways, the war economy and the thriving black market radically
changed the relationship between the urban population and the peasants. Rural
communities enjoyed a new power as basic provisions became increasingly scarce,
and self-sufficiency and thrift became a matter of pride. Conversely, urban
inhabitants were increasingly seen as supplicants; urban life lost much of its prestige
as towns became wracked by worsening living conditions and rising inflation.
Whereas pre-war urban society had looked down on rural inhabitants, with the
strains of war, the countryside took on a new prestige. Large numbers of urban
women, mostly from Trieste, travelled by bus or train to rural areas of Friuli to buy
cereal on the black market. On one typical bus to Trieste, the police found some 640
kilograms of flour and another search of a train to Casarsa revealed that many of the
passengers had suitcases full of maize flour. According to the urban inhabitants of
Trieste who were questioned by the police, they had paid peasant-farmers in Friuli
very high prices.52 Giacomo Becattini and Nicolo Bellanca have suggested that
peasant-farmers were reluctant to hand over grain to the ammassi because the state
paid them very little for their produce.53 This seems to have been the case in Udine
too, as contemporary reports suggest that one reason why peasant-farmers refused to
hand over their produce to the ammassi was because it was much more profitable to
sell their produce on the black market.54
With reference to Tuscany in the period 1941 to 1944, Becattini and Bellanca
have pointed out the population's ambivalent attitude to the black market which was
sometimes viewed as exploitation, at others seen as a form of popular solidarity: on
the one hand it was thought of as speculation but on the other hand it was described
as just another way to make ends meet (arte di arrangiarsi)55 Evidence suggests that
the black market in Udine was already on a vast scale as early as September 1942.
According to the Prefect, Udine's black market was made up of the illegal traffic of
tiny quantities of food, transported from the countryside to urban areas by peasant-
farmers. Couriers were used who generally only transported small amounts that they
could hide from the authorities or convince police checks that the food was for their
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own consumption. It was this black market in tiny quantities which in no small
measure led to the scarcity of food which should have been handed over to the
ammassi.56
The Segretario Federale of Udine was alarmed by the black market and noted
in 194257:
I have recently had occasion to travel by rail in the province and have
noticed that in many railway stations there is a considerable movement of produce
from our province to neighbouring provinces. People, mostly Slovene women, travel
to several rural centres in our province where they buy flour, beans, maize flour and
then freely take suitcases full of food to other provinces. Propaganda for food
producers has had no effect given the attraction of lucrative and easy profits and the
desire to make money is stronger than a sense of duty which all Italians should feel.
If the authorities are not able to curb this illegal activity, the regulations for the
ammassi will become meaningless, with serious consequences for solidarity on the
home front.
A good example of the peasant-farmers' desire to profit from the black market was
the sale of potatoes direct to consumers. The official price that the ammassi gave
peasants was 75 lire, which was half the amount that shopkeepers charged the public.
It is not difficult to see why both peasants and consumers were happy to exchange
potatoes directly for between 100 and 120 lire per quintal and why there was no
financial incentive for peasants to hand over their potatoes to the ammassi. In this
case, the police report suggested that a fairer price for peasant-farmers at the
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ammassi would have significantly reduced black market activities.
The rationing system had a contradictory impact and created social conflict in
that it was perceived to be unfair also by people who lived in semi-urban
communities fringing the provincial capital, communities which still maintained their
rural character. As Ganapini has suggested, any discussion about the working class in
the period cannot ignore villages that were engulfed by the industrial suburbs of
large towns and cities.39A good example of this is the district of Pasian di Prato, near
Udine, whose residents, according to the Podesta, particularly resented the rationing
system because Fascist regulations supposed that nearly all the inhabitants of semi-
urban communities kept small farmyard animals such as rabbits and poultry (animali
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di cortile) for their own consumption. In practice, however, the vast majority of
people in Pasian di Prato were factory or clerical workers not agricultural workers,
but were nevertheless classed as peasant families, according to the rationing laws,
and hence received a much smaller meat ration than urban families who lived in the
centre ofUdine.60 Later in the war, an incensed factory worker living in a semi-rural
area of Friuli wrote an anonymous letter to Mussolini saying 'Don't the children of
factory workers in rural areas need the same amount of food as the children of urban
workers?'61
From 1940 onwards, people in remote rural areas grew increasingly critical of
the ammassi, especially in the mountainous area of Carnia. In September 1942, for
example, the Podesta ofAiello complained bitterly that 200 grams of salami had
been handed out to every household which meant that people living alone received
200 grams, whilst large families with ten or more children received only 20 grams or
less per person. Shortly afterwards, people in Carnia experienced serious shortages,
including of fats, butter, and oil which had not been distributed in the area for more
f\9
than three weeks.
The perceived unfairness of the ammassi system is most clearly revealed in
the case of cheese-producing households in the town ofGemona and illustrates one
of the central problems of the system—the fact that rural people quite naturally
wanted to retain local food produce in times of scarcity. Gemona was a small town in
the hilly area of northern Friuli. In the lowlands, maize flour was important to rural
families whose diet consisted of polenta, milk and cheese, but peasant families in
Gemona ate more milk and cheese because of the lack of maize flour in upland areas.
The whole economy ofGemona was geared towards producing dairy products,
notably high-quality cheese, which catered to the daily needs of the population.
According to the ammassi laws, however, peasant-farmers were supposed to hand
over all their produce to the ammassi in exchange for cheese of an inferior quality.
Although in theory this was probably a 'fair share' of the nation's food supply, it was
somewhat unrealistic to expect rural communities to cooperate with this system
because local families naturally assumed that urban inhabitants in Trieste, among
other places, were happily eating high-quality cheese from Friuli whilst they were
burdened with processed cheese of very different quality.63
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In any case, it was clear to people living in Gemona that the Ente nazionale
fascista delle corporazioni was prioritizing Trieste by requisitioning milk for the city
on alternate days from dairies in Gemona. Local women, whose livelihood as
producers of butter and cheese was directly threatened by this wartime requisition,
protested that war economy regulations effectively plundered the staple diet of the
impoverished population of Gemona. Because wartime regulations were a direct
threat to the local economy, which had hitherto been the economy of the free market,
the Podesta of Gemona was naturally reluctant to enforce Fascist laws and in fact
told the Prefect that he was sympathetic to the protests of local women and cheese
producers.64
The Podesta ofGemona used arguments related to Fascism and war to
present an image of peasant-farmers as good, patriotic Italians; but also to
demonstrate that the peasant-farmers were poor because they were numerous. For
example, the Podesta noted that Mussolini had demanded demographic increase, and
in fact Gemona listed several families with ten or more children. Some 300 families
were listed as having contributed to the Demographic Campaign by having seven or
more children. Also Gemona had provided peasant infantry for the Alpini regiment
ofmountain troops and had suffered 21 dead and 10 missing in action. In a terse
comment, the Podesta noted that Gemona's milk producers had only a single cow in
each household, including the large families. If they were pushed around, he stated,
peasant-farmers would probably resort to direct action and hand in less milk.65 In
Gemona at least, the effect of ammassi regulations was to discredit the Fascist
authorities in the eyes of peasant-farmers. The evidence from Udine supports
Ganapini's assertion that the failure of the rationing system resulted in social
conflict. In particular, the case of Udine reveals that rural inhabitants resented the
idea of 'a fair share' of the nation's food supply because it meant that their
community would have to give up small luxuries which were locally produced and
were indeed part of the benefit of living on the land.
It is worth noting, however, as Luigi Cavazzoli has pointed out, that milk did
not became increasingly scarce simply because of a reduction in supply from rural
areas but rather as a result of an increase in demand for milk as a substitute for other
foodstuffs which were expensive and of poor quantity.66 This explains why the
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practice of diluting milk with water became so widespread in Udine. One example,
was the case of the owner of a milk shop in Via de Rubeis, Venuti Erminia, who was
arrested for selling milk which was about 10% water according to the laboratory
f\7 •
tests. She was fined 120 lire in addition to the trial costs. Another shopkeeper, Pia
Gorasso, was found guilty of selling milk that had been diluted with water. The
health inspectors (vigili sanitari) took a sample from the shop and the laboratory
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found that the milk was diluted by about 23-24 per cent.
Before the war, about six hundred women (villiche) from rural areas
delivered milk around the doors in the town ofUdine, but new wartime price
regulations prevented them from earning a living by reselling milk to urban
communities because the wholesale price was the same as the list price.69 People
were dismayed when milk sellers disappeared from the streets, for even in wartime
urban women still expected to provide their families with milk at breakfast.
By mid-1942, women were to be found queuing at five o'clock in the
morning at milk distribution centres, and sometimes they had to wait three or four
hours before receiving the ration, or being turned away by the authorities. In fact, it
was not uncommon for crowds of two or three hundred women to be left without
milk. One mother in Udine observed that
After two hours of queuing many people went away without any milk at all.
We have the ration books (libretto) and we ordered milk but then women from other
districts come along saying their dairies are closed and they receive milk both here
and there also for making butter. For all dairies the order should be to give milk to
those who ordered first and then the others. Instead even those of us who have five
in our family get half a litre and sometimes one litre ofmilk. Some people come
with four bottles saying that its for four families and who is to know? People should
queue themselves because with this system some are getting milk whilst others
70
receive nothing at all after two hours of queuing.
This letter sent to the Prefect sheds light on some of the tensions and complex
animosities between women from different districts of the town, especially those
who had large families to feed. Furthermore, women were particularly annoyed by
the military authorities because soldiers themselves regularly jumped the queue to
collect milk for army officers' families.
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Another example of this inequality was the ammassi of fats. Pig owners were
supposed to handover fats to the ammassi. That said, in Friuli at least, most of the
people who were pig owners on paper were not peasant-farmers or landowners, but
waged factory workers, office staff and housewives, who, in a deeply-rooted
tradition, bought a piglet at market at springtime, fed it on grass gathered in the
countryside and perhaps some potatoes over summer and autumn, and then
slaughtered the animal in November or December when it was mature, though
usually still somewhat lean.71 In fact, later in the war when it became increasingly
difficult to find fodder for pigs, some of the slaughtered animals were so lean that the
local rationing authority had to give pig owners ration coupons for meat.72 Pig
owners who were not actually peasant-farmers felt that there was little government
incentive to keep pigs to supplement waged work if workers who devoted time and
energy to keeping pigs then had to hand over fats to the ammassi. Thus the case of
pig owners shows, the ammassi laws occasionally backfired in that war economy
regulations actually ended up by discouraging some categories of people from
rearing animals for meat.
In addition, the amassing of fats was unpopular with peasant-farmers not least
because the blanket war economy regulations sent from Rome paid no attention to
local differences in agricultural practice. For example, it was well known that pigs in
the mountainous area of Carnia were on average much smaller than the pigs in the
lowland regions of Friuli because the latter were fattened on spoiled maize and
wheat. By contrast, the pigs in the mountains were lean because Carnia was not an
arable farming area. Despite this fact, according to the ammassi laws, a family of
fifteen people in Carnia with a sixty kilogram pig was expected to hand over the
same amount of fats, two kilograms of lard, as a family of seven in the lowlands with
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a 200 kilogram pig. Simple in theory, the amassing of fats generated real hostility
towards the regime. It is not difficult to see why many people deeply distrusted
Fascist rhetoric which claimed that all Italians were making the same sacrifices and
getting a fair share of the nation's food. In the case of fats, the point at issue was
quite complex. The result of people's widespread reluctance to hand over fats to the
ammassi was that by August 1943, the fat ration assigned for each individual per
month was lower than the minimum amount required for nutrition. The milk
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allowance was also well below that required by civilians and this shortage caused
particular anxiety among the public because milk was considered vital for small
children and the elderly.74
Later in the war, one local Fascist leader described how the rationing system
had degenerated into farce. Officials, he wrote, thought the food controls were
merely 'a sterile bureaucratic procedure' and even police fines (verbali di denuncia)
for transgressors who were caught red-handed no longer had the persuasive or
restrictive nature that the measure had once had. Even the rules concerning the
maximum size of luggage on trains were completely ignored by railway personnel.
The loads of grain being regularly smuggled by passengers in October 1943 was
often so heavy, for example as much as two quintals, that railway workers had to
assist passengers with suitcases of flour to help them board the trains.73 By
December 1943 the amassing of cereals had declined to such an extent that the
7f\
ammassi were described as 'ludicrous' by the Prefect. With the standard ration
becoming increasingly inadequate, some local government officials began to give out
extra rations, especially of sugar, for civilians under the pretence that they were ill
and needed food supplements.77 Here in Udine, similar to the situation described by
other historians in other provinces, the perceived inequalities of the system generated
a great deal of animosity towards the regime.
Rationing allowed the regime to discriminate against certain sections of the
population which also caused social conflict. For example, the local branch of the
Fascist industrial workers' union (Confederazione dei Lavoratori dell'Industria,
Unione Provinciale di Udine) organised food outlets on factory premises so that
workers involved in the war effort had their own shops that sold rationed foodstuffs
and other goods that were otherwise hard to find. The union's aim was to promote
greater solidarity among workers, promote Fascism, and prioritise the needs of
civilians who were directly involved in producing armaments and materiel.
The town council in Udine, however, opposed the idea because factory
outlets—administered by the ancillary organisation of the PNF—were exempt from
local trade regulations that required shopkeepers to buy a license from the town
council and pay a large deposit. Unsurprisingly, much of the hostility towards the
party's initiative in this case came from the middle class business community which
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viewed workers' shops as unfair and unwanted competition.78 The Fascist union's
outlets are but one example of how Fascist initiatives to build consensus for the
regime and to increase national solidarity and cohesion rode roughshod over pre-war
trading laws, inevitably generating hostility and divisions within the community.
To conclude, in practical terms, the safeguarding of the nation's food supply
involved a much greater degree of state-regulation that largely excluded rural
communities from the distribution network. The case of Udine suggests that local
government officials interpreted this to mean that the regime did not fully trust rural
communities to protect the nation's food supply during wartime. In Udine, the
greater degree of state-regulation was deeply resented not only by peasant-farmers,
whom Fascist authorities were unable to completely exclude from the distribution
network, but also by rural officials themselves, who were unwilling to comply with
national orders to police the ammassi campaign.
The Fascists recognised that the dramatic aspects ofmodern warfare—aerial
bombardments, evacuation and food shortages—would have a much greater impact
on large urban communities where the cost of living was higher, and therefore the
regime had to prioritise the needs of the industrial working population in the large
cities to minimise popular dissent. But the reality of the much trumpeted ammassi
campaign was quite contrary to the Fascists' revolutionary rhetoric. In fact
communities like Osoppo and Gemona sought to insulate themselves from wartime
regulations and resist the ammassi not least because many inhabitants believed that
they were not getting a fair share of the nation's food supply. There is little doubt
that local government authorities connived with peasant-farmers to commit
infringements of the amassing laws. The ammassi campaign failed to fulfil important
war aims in that it generated serious social conflict not cohesion and ultimately did
not turn peasant-farmers into convinced supporters of the regime. The example of
Udine, moreover, suggests that one of the reasons the rationing system failed was
that the authorities in farming communities were not prepared to follow national
orders for a war economy and hand over their control of food supply to state
bureaucracies. The strength of local ties, therefore, led them to turn a blind eye to
very widespread flouting of the rules in their areas.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE RSI DURING GERMAN OCCUPATION 1943-45
The psychological impact of the Allied invasion of French North Africa in
1942 on Italian public opinion was profound. The landings created a new war front
on the Tunisian border and made an all-out assault on mainland Italy inevitable. In
reality, however, it was the catastrophic defeat of the army on the Russian Front that
proved the decisive psychological blow to Italy's war. Mussolini had insisted on
sending an Italian expeditionary force to help Germany attack Russia, but the
infantry were not properly trained or equipped for the mechanised warfare on the
Eastern Front and the demoralised Italian divisions were ripped to pieces by the
overwhelmingly superior forces of the Red Army. Defeat on the Russian Front also
marked a dramatic deterioration in relations between Germany and Italy. In practical
terms, Italy had suffered military defeats in Libya and Egypt (December-February
1941), Russia (November 1942-February 1943), and Tunisia (January-May 1943)
that eliminated a total of 34 Italian divisions. The army and the Party clashed over
responsibilities, in an atmosphere of impending crisis, but Italy's war was already
irretrievably lost.
As a result of the defeats and war weariness on the home front, there was a
crisis in public morale which culminated in big industrial strikes in March 1943. On
5 March, thousands ofworkers at the Rasetti factory and the Mirafiori plant in Turin
staged a prolonged stoppage. The protests were primarily against the declining living
conditions in the industrial cities, but many of the 100,000 workers involved in the
strike were making a political statement too. The reaction of the Fascist authorities to
the industrial unrest in the north revealed the weakness of the regime which did little
to punish the workers despite the fact that the factories were under martial law.
On 10 July, the Allied armies landed in Sicily and encountered virtually no
resistance from Italian soldiers, many ofwhom actually welcomed the invaders. It
was clear that the entry of the Allies into the Italian peninsula was imminent. At the
same time, support for the regime was disintegrating as the vast majority of Italians
could see that the war was lost.
The Fascist leaders (gerarchi) were themselves divided on whether or not to
withdraw from the war. At the last meeting of the Fascist Grand Council on the night
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of 24-25 July 1943, the majority agreed on a motion to restore military command to
the King, who was the legal head of state. This provoked the fall ofMussolini and
the regime. It is worthwhile noting that the coup d'etat was not the result ofmassive
popular pressure, but rather ofmoves by Fascist dissidents who had judged that
Mussolini had become a liability and who had conspired to withdraw from the war.
Marshal Pietro Badoglio formed a new non-Fascist government that was
nevertheless a military dictatorship and in no sense anti-Fascist. Badoglio had been a
major beneficiary of Fascism. He had been an army commander in Ethiopia and had
been made Duke of Addis Ababa after the invasion ofEthiopia. At the outbreak of
the Second World War he was Chief of the General Staff. He was dismissed,
however, after the fiasco of the Greek campaign. The period known as the 'Forty-
Five Days' began with huge popular peace demonstrations as most people assumed
the end of the regime meant an end to the war. Badoglio issued a proclamation
promising to continue the war on the side ofGermany, but secretly initiated slow
negotiations with the Allies to withdraw Italy from the war.
On 3 September an armistice agreement was reached between the Allies and
the Italians and on 8 September, the eve ofAllied landings on the Italian mainland,
Eisenhower announced that Italy had surrendered unconditionally. The Italian armed
forces stopped fighting the Allies. However, Italy did not officially become an ally,
but was given the somewhat ambivalent status of 'co-belligerent'.
The king, who was now head of the Italian armed forces, abandoned Rome to
its fate, and fled south, together with Badoglio, to Brindisi. The Germans seized the
capital and dissolved the Italian armed forces. A few days later, the Germans
occupied the whole of northern Italy and, although a few Italian infantry units
resisted for a short period of time, without orders from the general staff, the vast
majority of soldiers disbanded.
On 10 September 1943, Hitler appointed a Nazi official, Fredrich Rainer, to
administer the provinces of Trieste, Gorizia and Udine. This meant that Udine was
effectively under the direct control of a German Gauleiter. Rainer, who was
originally from Carinthia, had been an official in the Habsburg Empire before 1918
and, according to F.W. Deakin, regarded himself as fulfilling a historic mission to
annex the regions once more to the Reich.1 A Higher SS and Police Chief, Odilo
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Globocnik, a protege of Himmler, was appointed as head of the German police
services. Globocnik was not German. Born in Trieste, his father was Slovene and his
mother Hungarian. As a young man he had moved to Austria where he became a
member of the local NSDAP and a prominent Nazi in the Anschlufi. Thus, Globocnik
was quite familiar with the region and its politics because, through the German
Consulate, he had had contact with Nazi officials in Trieste during the 1930s. During
the war, Globocnik was transferred to northeast Italy from a career helping to
exterminate two million Jews in Poland. Under his command, the SS dominated the
occupation of northeast Italy. It is worthwhile noting that there were several German
police forces in the town of Udine: SS Protection Squads (Schutzstaffeln), the regular
German military police (Ordnungspolizei), and the Security Service
(.Sicherheitsdienst or SD). All played a role in policing the province. In addition,
even the German Nazi Party (NSDAP) had a local office.
The Germans occupied the province of Udine with little difficulty after the
Italian armed forces withdrew from the war. On September 12, the German army
crossed the Italian border at Tarvisio and a small armoured column occupied the
town of Udine itself that evening. Infantry troops surrounded the Prefettura, the
Questura, and other important institutions, including the post and telegraph office
and the local branch of the national bank (Banca d'Italia), and set up roadblocks and
requisitioned hotels. German troops also surrounded the barracks of the Eighth
Alpini Regiment and disarmed, arrested, and later deported the garrison to Germany
in railway carriages. The same evening, as a young deserter from the Italian army
recalled, German infantry erected tents in the gardens of the First World War
memorial.
The officers and men of the Italian army did not oppose the occupation of
Udine. Nor did they immediately transfer their allegiance to the German army.
Some, like Alberto Cosattini, the soldier son of the man who was to become Udine's
first post-war mayor, managed to escape from the Germans, and join the Resistance
movement. According to one local historian, Giampaolo Gallo, when the German
armed forces crossed the Italian border at Tarvisio, there was a meeting of local anti-
Fascists who called on the Italian army to fight the Germans, or at least hand over
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their weapons to the civilian population, but, without orders from the High
Command, the vast majority of soldiers were unwilling to oppose the occupation.
Meanwhile, in central Italy, on 12 September, a special SS commando unit
rescued Mussolini from imprisonment on Gran Sasso mountain and flew him to
Munich the next day. Hitler decided that Mussolini should lead a new Fascist
government to assist the German war effort and installed him at Said, a small town
on the west side of Lake Garda on the northern frontier. Mussolini was unable to
persuade the Germans that Rome should be the seat of the new Italian Social
Republic (Repubblica sociale italiana or RSI) and to most Italians this was another
sign of the disintegration of Italy. Rome was designated an open city and politically
neutral. Mussolini publicly committed himself to rebuilding the Italian army on the
basis of a draft in northern Italy. In theory, the RSI was a return to the revolutionary
origins of Fascism, without the conservative monarchy.
THE ITALIAN SOCIAL REPUBLIC
This chapter focuses on some aspects of the German occupation of Udine. It
examines the role of Italian collaborators and in particular, the military operations of
the RSI against civilians (known as the rastrellamenti). De Felice has argued that
Mussolini agreed to return to power because he alone could ensure that Italy avoided
the fate of Poland under German rule.4 Therefore, one aim of this chapter is to
examine the extent to which the RSI really did shield the local population from the
excesses ofNazi rule in this area, as De Felice has suggested.
In writing and re-writing the history of the Resistance, Italy's chain of
institutes founded to write and analyse its history did discuss aspects of the RSI.
However, they tended to minimise the role of the Repubblica sociale italiana
because it was believed that it was not an autonomous force. For example, the author
of the first important history of the Resistance, Roberto Battaglia, briefly mentions
the Repubblica sociale italiana in his work and likens it to all other puppet regimes
which the Nazis created during the Second World War. The reason for the reluctance
ofmany Resistane historians to address the question is undoubtedly, as Luigi
Ganapini has argued, because they felt that discussing the RSI would serve to
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legitimise Italian quislings.3 It was not until 1977 that the first well-researched book
on the RSI appeared. Its author, the journalist Giorgio Bocca, who had himself been
a prominent partisan in the Resistance, was heavily criticised at the time by ex-
partisans because he had personally collected the oral testimonies of several
notorious Republicans.6 The domestic climate in Italy in the late 1970s meant that
Resistance historiography was extremely politicised and that certain arguments were
still seen as politically unacceptable.
In the mid-1980s, however, the field became more open and some more
sophisticated interpretations of the period appeared, notably a series of essays
published by the Fondazione Micheletti in Brescia. Much of the debate was
generated by the growth of empirical evidence as RSI archives became available to
the public for the first time. Historians who wrote about this were, in some cases,
basing their work on hitherto unread documents conserved in the National State
Archives (Archivio Centrale dello Stato) in Rome. An important milestone in this
historiography was the publication in 1997 of the last volume of Renzo De Felice's
enormous biography ofMussolini which caused considerable controversy and led to
renewed interest in the RSI. De Felice's revisionismo consisted in the author's
refusal to interpret the period 1943 to 1945 as the history of the Resistance, but rather
as the history of the Repubblica sociale italiana. More recent historiography, such as
the work ofGanapini and Gagliani has begun to recognise that both were important.
Because the Resistance in Udine has been much studied by other historians, here I
will focus particularly on the RSI during the German occupation.
THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF UDINE
Some historians have suggested that the German occupation of Udine was
very different from that experienced in most of the rest of northern Italy because the
border provinces were effectively annexed to the German Reich. In practical terms,
however, the German army and SS wielded supreme authority in all the territories of
the RSI whether there was a Gauleiter present or not. Some historians who have
studied the German occupation in northeast Italy have argued that the Nazis
administered this area directly in 1943-1945 as part of a wartime plan to incorporate
former Habsburg provinces into the German Reich and transform Friuli and Venezia
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Giulia into a model for the New European Order.7 It is true that the province was
different from other areas of Italy because it was on the Austrian border, and Eastern
Friuli had been part of the Elabsburg Empire before 1918 and Austrian Nazis were
prominent in the German occupation of Udine.
However, the notion that the German occupation of northeast Italy effectively
annexed Italian provinces has been made popular by the Resistance research
institutes partly because it diminishes the importance ofMussolini's Social Republic,
plays down the role of the Italian officials, and portrays the Resistance as a patriotic
struggle against a foreign invader rather than a war fought between Italians. Early
Resistance historiography blamed the Germans almost entirely for the violence and
brutalities and thus sidestepped questions about national war-guilt in the years 1943-
45. On the whole, Resistance historiography has tended to understate the importance
of the RSI, and, in provinces under direct German administration, scholars have been
much less interested in the role ofMussolini's Social Republic. As the example of
Udine shows, however, this is a mistake. In fact, the RSI played a much more
important role in this area than such accounts would have us believe, at least in the
repression of the Resistance.
THE PARTITO FASCISTA REPUBBLICANO (PFR) OF UDINE
Once the town of Udine was effectively in German hands, some of
Mussolini's supporters answered his call to reconstitute the local section of the
Fascist Party to defend Italy's honour, and fight the traitors who had destroyed
Fascism. On 14 September, a group of former Fascists in Udine established a section
of the new Partito Fascista Repubblicano (PFR) and obtained control of II Popolo
which thereafter became a broadsheet for both RSI and Nazi propaganda. One of the
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founding members of the Udine PFR was Piero Pisenti, a prominent local lawyer,
who was soon to become Mussolini's Justice Minister in the RSI. The new leader
(Commissario Federate) of the Republican Fascist Party was Mario Cabai, a high-
ranking officer in the militia (centurione delta Milizia), who had fought in previous
Fascist wars, including the campaign in Ethiopia. Cabai had been in charge of the
Dopolavoro, the Fascist after-work organisation dedicated to the improvement of the
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workers' leisure time, and he had commanded the youth section of the local PNF
(.Fascio Giovanile).9 He was, therefore, well known to local people.
According to their writings in II Popolo, the Udine PFR considered
themselves to be a revival of the dissolved PNF, and an elite movement of hard-core
Republicans who were demanding revenge on those who had betrayed Fascism and
had collaborated with the Badoglio government during the 'Forty-five Days'.10 An
important theme both in II Popolo, and in various propaganda pamphlets which it
cranked out, was the return to a fighting spirit (ritornare al combattimento). From
the start, the public voice of Republican Fascism in Udine made clear in their
propaganda leaflets that the last phase of the war was a conflict of armed doctrines
and that blood would flow.11
However, in practice, local Republicans were unable to carry out such threats
because the German authorities did not allow them a free hand. The Germans
occupying Udine doubtless believed that, if revenge was going to manifest itself in
executions, lynching, and public humiliation, then the PFR would merely foment
resistance to the occupation. A local PFR memorandum from 1 December 1943
shows that the German authorities were against the idea of a wholesale purge by the
PFR. They undermined the authority of the new party by appointing civic officials
who were not PFR members and who ultimately owed their allegiance to the SS
Police rather than the RSI. On 25 October 1943, for example, Mussolini nominated
Giovanni Mosconi as the RSI Prefect of Udine. At this point, II Popolo suggested
that Mosconi, a former squadrista who had briefly been Prefect from 10 June to 30
July 1943 before he was removed by Badoglio (due to his Fascist past), would
himself purge the town's administration of non-Fascists.12 In a speech published in II
Popolo, Mosconi assured readers that he wanted not only to rekindle the Fascist
revolution, but also to re-establish the Italian army and continue the war alongside
the Germans. The path to victory, he insisted, lay in a purge of local government
officials who had supported Badoglio, and in the reconstruction of an independent
Italian war effort.13
The Germans, however, had quite different plans: their priority was effective
and orderly government in Udine. The German Gauleiter, Friedrich Rainer, refused
to employ the Prefect selected by the RSI, and chose instead, Riccardo De Beden,
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who had formerly been an official in the Habsburg Empire. Fluent in German, and
with long experience as a Primo Consigliere in the Udine Prefettura, De Beden was
over seventy when he became Prefect on 17 November 1943. Unlike Mosconi, De
Beden, in his inaugural speech, emphasized collaboration with the German war effort
and pacification of the home front. Indeed, in a veiled reference to the PFR, he made
clear that he would suppress rebellious movements that threatened public order.
Significantly, he talked about working exclusively with the German armed forces
and never mentioned the Governo Fascista Republicano, still less the possibility of a
new Italian army in the province.14
De Beden was thus only nominally an RSI Prefect. Indeed, an important RSI
official, Giovanni Dolfin, wrote in his memoirs, Con Mussolini nella tragedia, that
De Beden's correspondence with the RSI was formal and disinterested.13 Moreover,
Udine's Republicans described De Beden as being weak (una nullita), and in the
hands of the Germans (nelle mani dei Tedeschi) and, with only some exaggeration,
anti-Italian and anti-Fascist.16 What is clear is that the Germans had appointed a
prefect who did not support, and had little support from, the local Republican Fascist
Party.
Similarly, the RSI nominated a Republican Questore on 11 November 1943,
but the German Gauleiter ignored this and instead appointed his own Chief of Police.
He chose Luigi Cosenza, the very Questore who had persecuted Fascists, including
Piero Pisenti, after the fall of Mussolini in July 1943. Cosenza was a non-Fascist
Questore in the sense that he opposed the PFR and the RSI, and like De Beden, he
effectively transferred his allegiance to the Nazis. Documents from the PFR archive
describe similar nominations in other cities occupied by the German army. From the
start, the Udine PFR was unable to exercise much influence on or through the
important figures of the Prefect and the Questore. It was the customary procedure to
appoint military and civil commanders who ruled through the existing civil service
and Udine was no exception. This was obviously an avenue to direct German control
of the Italian police services. By November 1943, the SS Police were in control of
administration of Udine and consequently RSI officials had much less power in the
Zone of Operations. It is clear that in Udine the German authorities did not want the
RSI to become a rallying point for reactionary groups and refused to support the
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organisation probably because the Nazis knew it would ultimately foment social
turmoil and divide society.
Despite this, the Udine Partito Fascista Repubblicano was soon involved in
suppressing the Resistance. On 25 November 1943, anti-Fascists established a local
section of the Committee for National Liberation (CLN) and communists began to
organise urban guerrilla groups (Gruppi d'azione pattriotica or GAP) in several
districts at about this time. The local Resistance movement not only aimed to liberate
the province from German occupation, but also to prevent the RSI from uniting
Italians under a new government in the north after the events of 8 September.
Moreover, local PFR reports to the German authorities, and to Mussolini, make clear
that the Republican Party in Udine soon became heavily involved in anti-partisan
operations, especially as informants and spies for the SS.17
The Germans realised that ifRSI officials (rather than non-Fascist badogliani
officials) were prominent in the administration, then it would only serve to
strengthen the Resistance. By 1944, Germany needed to drain the resources of its
occupied territories in order to achieve victory which meant the SS had to draft as
many Italians as possible into the Todt organisation to work for the German war
effort. Colonel Ermacora Zuliani, who commanded the Alpini-Tagliamento
Regiment in Udine, claimed in the regimental diary that the SS wanted the
pacification of the Resistance rather than a draft for the Republican army. Although
SS propaganda tried to convince men to abandon the Resistance it did not suggest
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that they should enlist in the newly formed Republican army.
The local population, the Nazis believed, would be more divided and less
useful to the German war effort if the Fascist party was permitted to regain its former
power and take revenge on those who had collaborated with the Badoglio
government. To some extent, this view was shared by some officials of the RSI. In
particular, Piero Pisenti, one of the founders of the PRF in Udine, nevertheless
recognised that the party, whose aim was to purge non-Fascists, would ultimately
divide Italians at a time when the RSI government was supposed to be strengthening
the Italian identity (italianita) of the regions now under direct German control. This
explains why there was no purge of officials who had been appointed by Badoglio
despite recommendations from Mario Cabai to remove them. According to a report
127
ofmid-October 1943, important officials in the RSI were remarkably tolerant
towards non-Fascists in local government, an ambivalent attitude which infuriated
many local PFR members.19
In many ways, events in this period suggest that RSI officials in Said were
not particularly interested in the Udine PFR. It is significant that the PFR stopped
recruiting members on 15 November, only a month after a local section of party was
established. This meant that the number of PFR members in Udine was remarkably
small compared to the numbers that had previously joined the Fascist Party. For
instance, on 20 December 1943, the Udine PFR had a mere 5,100 members in 56
comuni, whereas at the beginning of the war, the PNF had had more than 127,000
members in 173 comuni.
Evidence from Udine shows, moreover, that the RSI had particularly few
supporters in rural areas and that RSI Podestas were unable to keep public order.20 In
a report to Mussolini, the PFR's local Commissario, Mario Cabai, said that, after a
purge of Fascists in July 1943, most officials appointed by the Badoglio government
remained in office during the German occupation. In the same report, Cabai insisted
on an immediate purge of army officers who had not joined the PFR. An unsigned
PFR memorandum dated 1 December 1943 states bluntly that the RSI government
was supposed to purge the directors ofmany institutions, including the Italian Red
Cross and the Veterans' Association, of badogliani, and replace them with PFR
cadres.21 Again, however, in practice, nothing was done to weed out non-Fascists
from the state bureaucracies and institutions in the province.
THE RSI ALPINI-TAGLIAMENTO REGIMENT
At the same time that the PFR was established, the dissolved Fascist militia
(MSVN) was reconstituted in a new guise as the Republican army (Esercito
repubblicano). On 22 September, a new regiment, the Alpini-Tagliamento, was
established for anti-partisan warfare. It is worthwhile looking at this military
organisation as it had an important role in the period of the German occupation of the
province. According to one former army officer who joined the regiment, it was a
rallying point for Republicans and former Fascists who had fled north from southern
Italy.22
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On 21 September the commander of the Alpini-Tagliamento regiment,
Ermacora Zuliani, issued a draft of young men for the new organisation that was to
be the army of the Italian Social Republic. According to the diaries of the Alpini-
Tagliamento regiment, which have survived the war, few regular army officers
responded to their call-up papers, and consequently officers from the town's
dissolved Militia formed the regiment's leadership corps. By contrast, the non¬
commissioned officers in the regiment came mostly from the infantry ranks of the
army, although others who joined had served in the navy and the air force.23 The
majority of those who responded to the local draft and joined the regiment were
young men, but older volunteers joined them too, men who had not been conscripted
but wanted to enlist. This suggests that propaganda could be effective, especially in
terms of attracting men with the incentive of regular wages and food.
Diary entries about recruitment suggest that the rank-and-file came mainly
from the urban working-class. Few middle class men were drafted because state
employees, medical students and final year students were all exempted from military
service.24 This suggests that, in the case of Udine at least, the RSI army was not a
rallying point for the middle classes.
The results of the first recruitment campaign were so poor that the RSI
organised another draft on 4 November of even younger men, those born in 1924. To
increase the numbers coming forward, Republican army officers delivered the call-
up papers to comuni in person, rather than rely on the dubious postal service.
That same month, however, Fredrich Rainer annulled the Italian draft and
issued a German draft for labour of those born in 1923, 1924, and 1925. Without
consulting the Italian commanders, Rainer informed the local population that
military service in the Republican army was purely voluntary, not obligatory.25 No
doubt the Germans realised that the RSI army was very unpopular and that young
men were more likely to join the Resistance when faced with the RSI call-up.
According to its diaries, this was a devastating blow to the credibility and prestige of
the Alpini-Tagliamento regiment as the organisation was now powerless to conscript
local men into its ranks. The clear message from the German authorities was that the
reconstruction of the Italian army in the province was unimportant to the course of
the war. This suggested to the local population that the Germans did not want to rely
129
on Italian soldiers. It also undermined RSI propaganda which emphasised the
importance of reconstructing the Italian army, and which repeated ad nauseum how
crucial it was for young men to return to combat following the events of 8
September, so that Italy's war could be salvaged, and won. After the German ban on
conscription, one Republican army officer's diary entry summed up the dismay of
the regiment by commenting 'What is the point of army Headquarters?' The result
was that no more young men with draft papers arrived at the Alpini-Tagliamento
Regiment barracks in Udine, and recruitment ground to a halt within days of Rainer's
proclamation. Only a small number of conscripts decided to remain. The rest were
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immediately demobilised. The German draft further undermined morale in the
Alpini-Tagliamento regiment by creating chaos among soldiers who had been drafted
into the army, but who now refused to serve as volunteers after hearing about the
German proclamation.27
On November 19, Globocnik took over command of the regiment and told
the commander Zuliani to change the regiment's name to the Reggimento Volontari
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Friulani Tagliamento. At the same time, Zuliani exchanged the soldiers' militia
insignias (fascetti littori) for army stars, and began to take orders from the German
army, rather than the RSI Militia chiefs.29 In fact, when Rudolfo Graziani visited the
barracks on 16 March 1944, he found that the regiment was at the service of the
Nazis, and even he had to obtain permission from the SS Police to inspect his own
troops.30 Eventually, Graziani managed to visit the troops for two hours, but the SS
Commander in Udine, Von Feil, did not even bother to show up to meet him.31 The
Italian Commander noted in the regimental diary that the local population interpreted
this change of leadership as a sign that the regiment had distanced itself from
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Mussolini's Social Republic. In fact the regiment now owed allegiance to the SS.
On 24 July, the SS arrested all the policemen in the Questura Repubblicana
and, although the majority were released from the town jail several hours later, the
Nazis dismissed the Questore Luigi Cosenza and other officials, who were later
deported to concentration camps in Germany. The official reason for the purge was
that the Questore had established contact with Communist Resistance forces without
informing the SS. At about this time the SS disarmed the carabinieri and arrested a
few prominent former army commanders. The SS significantly reduced the
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numbers of Italian officials and curbed their power.34 Cosenza, for example, was
replaced by the Questore of Gorizia, a notorious Republican, who was clearly
working for the German police.
Various important figures in the RSI later tried to justify their actions. An
account by the RSI ambassador in Berlin, Filippo Anfuso, published in 1950, for
example, claimed that Mussolini's regime provided northern Italy with some sort of
governance and ensured that important state institutions, for example the judiciary
and the police, were not dismantled by the Nazis, but continued to function
throughout the last phase of the war.35 In a similar vein, the RSI Justice Minister,
Piero Pisenti, argued that Mussolini's Social Republic was what he called 'a
necessary republic' (.Repubblica necessaria) whose role was to forestall German
reprisals after the events of 8 September 1943. Evidence from Udine, however,
suggests that the Nazis had no real difficulty dismantling the important state
institutions despite, or because of, the presence of the Repubblica sociale italiana. In
reality it seems that officials of the RSI were either unable or unwilling to shield
fellow Italians from the brutalities ofGerman occupation. Indeed, this situation led
the Prefect of Trieste, in December 1944, to question whether there was any point, at
all, in having RSI prefects.36
Nor were RSI soldiers able to police the province. Diary entries suggest that
the Alpini-Tagliamento regiment was not effective in keeping public order in the
town of Udine. The regiment was supposed to police the town and enforce SS
proclamations. Some soldiers guarded the ammassi depots to prevent looting as a
result of food shortages, whilst others guarded the Republican Fascist Party offices.37
Republicans, as town guards, however, had a heavy-handed approach to policing.
For example, when the Germans ordered them to curb prostitution, soldiers from the
regiment promptly arrested eighty women who were walking the streets, bundled
them into lorries, and interrogated them at the barracks before accompanying them to
the hospital for medical inspections. There it was discovered that none of the women
had venereal disease and some were, in fact, virgins. Incidents like this brought
TO
enormous discredit on the Republicans as a police force.
Udine's Republicans were increasingly involved in more sinister forms of
collaboration with the German authorities. The militia rounded up workers who had
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deserted the Todt Organisation. It also arrested Jews and Resistance activists and
deported them to German death camps, usually after a brief interrogation by SS
police that often resulted in the individual being found guilty without a trial or
39
witnesses.
REPUBLICAN VIOLENCE: THE RASTRELLAMENTI
The most notorious episodes of Republican violence, however, took place in
rural not urban areas. The rastellamenti were brutally heavy-handed, anti-partisan
operations organised by the Republicans and Nazis which led to mass deportation
and slaughter in unthreatening rural communities. The true extent of Republican
violence that occurred as a result of rearguard actions will never be known for, as
contemporary Questura memorandums make clear, most crimes of rape, theft, and
arson went unreported for fear of further reprisals against victims or their
communities.40 That said, post-war testimonies at collaborators' trials do shed light
on at least some of the violence perpetrated by Italians against Italians in Udine.
Why did Italians become involved in rastrellamenti? One reason was that,
according to the PFR in Udine, the German army was remarkably thin on the ground
in the province, and occupying troops were not necessarily available to be deployed
for anti-partisan warfare.41 Moreover, RSI sources maintained that the SS Police
were present only in urban areas not rural communities and, to enforce German war
regulations in the countryside, the SS carried out brutal reprisals which involved
mass arrests and deportations.42 Furthermore, reports from the Republican Fascist
Party and the Questore suggest that the SS Police did not have sufficient forces to
combat the growing Resistance movement and increasingly relied on Italian units for
military operations in Friuli. In this way, the Resistance was prevented from tying
down large numbers ofGerman soldiers in rearguard actions, and it meant that
Italians were fighting Italians in a conflict that resembled civil war.
Spring 1944 marked a new and terrible phase in the ideological struggle
between Republicans and partisans. During this period, Resistance activities
broadened and intensified, and violence became literally an everyday experience in
Friuli. The number of fighting partisans was relatively small during the winter of
1943-44, but, by March, there were three non-communist Osoppo Brigades and a
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Garibaldi Friuli Division in the mountains north of the provincial capital which were
able to mount offensives against the Germans. The territory which was free from
Resistance attacks continued to shrink and even Republicans in Udine were no
longer safe from partisan reprisals. Writing to his mother in Forli, Romagna, one
Republican summed up the attitudes ofUdine's inhabitants in early March:
The local people really hate us because they say we are volunteers, and the military
authorities don't even let us out of the barracks because partisans are always in town. It is
dreadful to be in the army without ever leaving the barracks, and I was shocked and
disappointed when I learned about the Resistance movement.43
Mario Cabai, the local PFR Federate, not only asked the SS Police to let the
party have an important role in reprisals which the SS unleashed on the civilian
population, but asked the Germans to mount even more violent attacks in rural areas.
A report to Mussolini from Ettore Delia Pietra, the leading RSI authority in Udine,
said that Cabai had often suggested combined operations of SS and Republican
forces against rural communities.44 Another notorious PFR activist, Gino Covre, who
had been a violent squadrista in the early days of Fascism, complained that the
Germans did not accept the Udine PFR's offers to attack communists, and begged
Giovanni Dolfin, Mussolini's secretary at Salo, to provide Udine's Republicans with
weapons to combat the local population's indifference and resistance.45
De Felice has suggested that Mussolini was out of touch and that widespread
war weariness meant the vast majority of Italians sided with neither the Resistance or
Salo. In De Felice's opinion, many civilians failed to support the RSI because they
felt Fascism was ultimately responsible for 8 September.46 The case of Udine,
however, shows that, as the Republican Questore admitted in one of his reports to
Mussolini in April 1944, the local population associated the Udine PFR with turmoil,
social conflict, criminality and a propensity towards violence and this was one of the
reasons why people failed to join its ranks or offer support.47
For example, in June 1944, the PFR in Udine decided to try to become an
armed party and a militarised force. Gino Covre sent out call up papers to all
Republicans who were to come to the PFR offices on 6 June 1944 to join a new
armed battalion. According to the head of the RSI in the province (Capo delta
Provincia), Ettore Delia Pietra, the PFR believed that the German police were not
repressive enough, and failed to understand the true scale of the Resistance
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movement.48 On 3 June 1944, at a meeting in the Europa Hotel, a squadrista, Chiesa,
promised a crowd of Republicans that local PFR members would arm themselves
with truncheons and terrorize people into supporting the organisation.49 On 25 June
the national PFR Secretary, Pavolini, sent orders to the various sections to transform
the party into an armed party.50 With all the talk of violence, it is not difficult to see
why the party was not popular with local people in Udine.
One reason for the Republican calls for political violence was the total
frustration within the ranks of the Udine PFR. Rumours that the province of Udine
would return to Italian administration in May had failed to materialise and the SS
never allowed the party much room for manoeuvre. In addition, by mid-1944, a
number of PFR members had been murdered by partisans, and some Republicans
wanted to arm themselves and avenge the killings.51 Furthermore, RSI garrisons in
rural areas were being attacked by large numbers of partisans who often managed to
overthrow the Republicans. In one typical episode on 12 July about two hundred
Resistance activists overwhelmed a garrison of seventeen soldiers near the town of
Udine. The report went on to describe with surprise how one of the 'bandits' was a
young dark-haired woman in army uniform.52
The head of the RSI in Udine (Capo della Provincia) Ettore Delia Pietra,
described to Mussolini how the violence had recently intensified and that
the number of Republicans kidnapped or killed by partisans has increased alarmingly, as
has the number of villages burned down by the Germans, who intervene but their actions
are often heavy-handed: they carry out mass arrests of suspects including Republicans,
53and destroy the houses of people who have nothing to do with the partisans.
Partisans were increasingly attacking individual Republicans. For example, the
leader of the Republican Fascist Party in the village of Buia, north of Udine, was
killed by partisans who blew up his house with a large landmine.54 PFR reports show
that Republicans were shocked at the scale and commitment of the Resistance in
Udine.
Nonetheless, Republicans proved themselves to be willing collaborators
during rastrellamenti and I have found no evidence to suggest that Italians were any
less barbaric than their German counterparts during operations against rural
communities. On the contrary, witnesses at collaborators' trials in the immediate
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aftermath of the war claimed that Republicans were even more aggressive than the
SS. Claudio Pavone has put forward an interesting explanation for this. It may be
that, as he argues, the Republicans were particularly violent due to their fear of not
being taken seriously.55
Admittedly, it could be argued that sometimes Republicans were commanded
by SS officers and were therefore simply following orders. It should be remembered,
however, that Republicans who took part in anti-partisan operations were not
conscripts but volunteers, usually commanded by Italian, not German, officers. Also
Italians who took part in Nazi operations saved the SS from having to use German
soldiers who were much needed as frontline troops. Nor does fear or adrenalin in the
heat of battle explain the barbarity since much of the violence took place at the
regimental barracks in specially equipped rooms that were veritable 'torture
chambers.' Here civilians were suspended from meat hooks, bludgeoned, whipped
and drenched with boiling or freezing water. Most were tortured so that they would
name names and denounce fellow villagers56 but others were beaten without even
any pretence of questioning. On one occasion, an SS officer had to prevent a
Republican soldier from stabbing an individual to death in the town jail before
interrogation had begun.
When suspected Resistance activists were arrested in the rastrellamenti,
interrogations always involved grisly torture at the Republican barracks. One
partisan, Ottavio Villa, testified that Republican soldiers took him to a special room,
stripped him, and beat him for more than three hours.57 Such beatings were
sometimes so disfiguring that when the victims returned to their cells they were
unrecognisable to fellow prisoners.
One ferocious Republican, Odorico Borsatti, prepared a torture chamber with
various instruments at the barracks in Palmanova, occupied by a section of the
regiment in Udine. In this room, Republicans suspended prisoners from meat hooks
for four or five days. Other prisoners were stripped, beaten and put in a cell whose
floor was covered with water and quicklime to increase the suffering. Many victims
died of their injuries and were buried under the floorboards, in the courtyard or in
fO
some other part of the barracks. One suspected partisan suffered a horrific death:
Republicans tied him with long ropes to two horses which were then made to bolt in
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opposite directions. Other Republicans gagged and tortured prisoners inside a tank so
that their screams could not be heard in the street outside. Many partisans had teeth
broken with rifle butts, or ears cut off with bayonets during interrogations, and many
had to be propped up against the walls of the cells because they could no longer
stand on their feet. After the war, judges at Republicans' trials compared the violence
to the worst barbarity of the Middle Ages. During trials, judges were shocked to
learn that fellow nationals were capable of brutalities normally associated with the
SS. One asked for example: 'How is it that an Italian from Pola, a truly Italian city, is
capable of such crimes?'59
Nor does there seem to have been an aura of shame about crimes carried out
during the rastrellamenti. Evidence from Udine shows that Republican perpetrators
of gratuitous violence frequently boasted about their barbaric acts. In a letter to his
sister-in-law, a soldier who had taken part in the interrogation and killing of a
partisan described how he had kicked the corpse.60 Another Republican wrote that
during one of the rastrellamenti, he had beaten a badly wounded civilian to death
with a stone after he and other members of the firing squad had failed to execute the
prisoner.61
Not all rastrellamenti were true anti-partisan operations, or even an
exaggerated deterrent for rural communities that favoured the Resistance. Evidence
presented at collaborators' trials makes clear that some of the rastrellamenti took
place in areas where there were no partisans, and where there had been no police
reports of Resistance activity for months. Furthermore, Italian officers frequently
organised a rastrellamento without knowing exactly why they had been sent to that
particular area, and were often only given this information by the SS Police after the
violence and destruction had taken place.62 This suggests that the violence was often
indiscriminate and the destruction random. In fact rastrellamenti frequently took
place because Republican soldiers, who were unable to find partisans in the
countryside, vented their anger and frustration on rural communities.
Republicans did not distance themselves from German terror as the violence
escalated. On the contrary, the head of the local RSI, Ettore Delia Pietra, suggested
to Mussolini, in mid-June 1944, that Udine's Republican forces should completely
assimilate the SS.63 Nor does Fascist indoctrination fully explain the violence. Trial
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evidence shows that some perpetrators of violence had no Fascist past at all. One
Republican, Bruno Zatti, who was so ferocious that he earned the admiration of the
SS, had never been a member of the Fascist Party nor had he ever lived in Italy
during the Fascist period. His family had lived for years in the United States and he
had only returned to Italy in 1940 when war broke out in Europe.64
Many Italians who took part in the rastrellamenti were very young, teenagers
in fact. As part of the RSI recruitment campaign, II Popolo printed up some 1,000
posters and 5,000 leaflets in town and as a result small groups of boys presented
themselves at the barracks each day. The young men could choose whether to join
the Todt organisation, the Republican army or the German SS formations, or the
Black Shirt Brigades, and recruitment boards comprised officers from the various
services, carefully chosen for their appeal to the young. Whether destined for the SS,
or the RSI armed forces, all young men entered the services first by going to barracks
of the Republican army.65
Edmondo Bernucci, for example, was just sixteen when he joined the
Battaglione fascisti friulani in the town ofUdine and took part in anti-partisan
operations in rural areas.66 Another young man, Martino De Bello, was fifteen when
he joined the Republican armed forces and, by the age of sixteen, was already
directly responsible for the arrest and deportation of several people. Boys like De
Bello, who guarded columns of civilians as they were loaded onto railway wagons at
the station and deported to death camps, did not simply passively guard deportees,
but intimidated them and threatened to kill those who attempted escape.67 Once
Udine became the target of air attacks, and the war situation on the battlefront
rapidly deteriorated, the recruitment campaign had to search further afield for new
recruits and as a result of increased propaganda in the mountain regions of Friuli,
more volunteers joined the Fascist battalion in early 1944, especially in areas remote
from the town, where there was a greater tradition of Alpine infantry regiments.68
Therefore, anti-partisan operations were often conducted by young men who were
themselves from rural communities.
It is worth describing a typical rastrellamento which took place in the village
ofOsoppo. The community had been an important military base for the Italian army
before the armistice, and villagers had lived peacefully alongside soldiers during the
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war. On 1 December 1944, however, Republicans and Germans surrounded the small
town and mined all the exits with explosives. Most villagers fled to the air raid
shelters, and Republicans ransacked their houses for valuables and other items. On
this occasion, one hundred and fifty villagers, including children, were taken to
Udine town jail and later deported to Dachau and other death camps.69 On such
occasions, heavily pregnant women and young girls were raped during the
rastrellamenti.
Foreign labour was vital to the German war effort and so rastrellamenti were
70often rural manhunts for pressing villagers into service with the Todt Organisation.
During one rastrellamento, a Republican, Giorgio Vucovich, rounded up boys in
Tolmezzo for the auxiliary service of the German air force and loaded them onto a
lorry which departed for Udine. The boys were so young, however, that those who
did not manage to escape during the journey were returned by the Germans to their
families after a few days.71 Rastrellamenti were also important occasions to find
female labour. Evidence shows that Republicans rounded up girls and young women
for service in the Todt Organisation.72 Himmler had emphasised in 1944 that if anti¬
tank ditches were not dug, then German soldiers would die. Therefore Republicans
had an important role in providing the Todt Organisation with forced labour, where
employment regulations were nonexistent for Italians. A report from Tarvisio near
the Austrian border describes a typical example of forced labour in November 1944:
The call-up was carried out by a council worker and women were conscripted without the
signature of the Podesta. When the Podesta queried the regulations he was told that all the
local women had to turn up whether married or not. In practice, a few women with small
children were exempted by the council official, but in a wholly arbitrary manner. On 28
November, of the one hundred women conscripted, only sixteen departed for the labour
service. Conditions and hygiene were not worthy of a civilised nation: the women's
accommodation was an unheated, wooden hut with damp straw for bedding. The
communal latrines were far away and were simply holes dug in the earth.
The women worked nine hours with one short break to consume the appalling food
rations. During the night, the women were constantly harassed by male workers and
soldiers, who forced their way into the huts.
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The women viewed labour service as a form of deportation. One sixteen year old girl,
who had volunteered to take her mother's place, broke her leg and was left in a hut for
73
two days without being taken to hospital or sent home.
Women and children were a cheap labour source and therefore, during
rastrellamenti, there was the unpredictable threat of being rounded up and sent to dig
anti-tank ditches or to work in Germany.
Early accounts of the RSI—diaries and memoirs of prominent
Fascists—tended to try to defend what they had done. One very prominent
Republican, Rudolfo Graziani, who had been commander of the RSI army, published
his memoirs in 1950. According to his version of events, Italians who fought for the
Repubblica sociale italiana were patriots who preferred to remain with Mussolini to
the bitter end rather than take sides with the Allies or the Communists. Furthermore,
Graziani presented Republican soldiers as defenders of the Italian identity (italianita)
of border regions that had been won with considerable sacrifice during the First
World War. The case ofUdine, however, demonstrates that the rastrellamenti carried
out by RSI soldiers were far from patriotic actions because they were military
operations against fellow nationals which resulted in slaughter, deportation and
forced labour.
As Allied air raids intensified, the PFR was increasingly involved in welfare
work, especially in the aftermath of aerial attacks. Republican Fasci femminili, who
visited soldiers' dependants and refugee families, were something like town social
workers, and among other things, the party sought accommodation for evacuee
families who had fled from the bombed cities or the Allied armies. They turned to
the party for help in finding a house, or job. It demonstrates that the party did have
the political clout to cut through bureaucracy and acquire funds from the RSI Interior
Ministry. But in Udine at least, the PFR mainly only assisted its own
people—Republicans working directly for the SS or important officials for the
German war effort.
There was a special reason to provide assistance in 1943. With the Allied
advance steadily pushing back Republicans in Central Italy, there were many
Republicans who chose to continue the Italian war effort in Udine rather than
surrender to the British or Americans. Many fled with an entourage—children,
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elderly parents—and it was they who needed housing. Letters from the PFR on
behalf of people asking for help, show that the party was often assisting so-called
war refugees who were former Fascists or Republicans from other parts of Italy or
from Italian colonies or other invaded territories. Most Fascists who were fleeing
north from the Allied advance brought their families with them. Some families asked
for assistance in Udine because they had become cut off from male relatives in
southern Italy or abroad but it is important to note that people were assisted primarily
because they were working for the RSI or the SS.
In April and May most refugees were from Sicily and southern Italy. A
typical case was that of the Fraioli family. Carlo Fraioli, a Fascist, had left Rome
with his wife, four children, including a newly born baby, and his elderly parents on
20 May and arrived in Udine on the evening of 3 June. After staying in a local hotel
for four months the family was still unable to find accommodation and turned to the
Republican Fascist Party for help.74 The problem was that accommodation,
particularly large, middle class apartments, was almost impossible to find in Udine.
By February 1944, the SS had requisitioned two hundred and fifty flats in Udine
including whole sections of streets. The SS commander justified this inconvenience
to the local population by saying that if Italy had not betrayed Germany then the SS
would not be in town at all. Another important group of people who asked for
Republican Party assistance was the growing number of army officers and RSI
officials who were vulnerable to partisan attacks. In a sense they were RSI refugees
from Udine's rural areas which were now controlled by the Resistance. At the
beginning ofNovember 1944, the council housing department was inundated with
requests from RSI personnel who wanted to move to the town for safety.
Through its welfare role, the PFR did at least try to convey the image of
benevolent organisation but, in practice, in towns too, its main activities were far
more violent. RSI officials and PFR members were involved in some of the most
sinister aspects ofGerman occupation of urban areas. For example, Republican
officers actively collaborated in hunting down Jews who had gone into hiding, and
the Republican secret police service, the Ufficio Politico Investigativo (UPO), were
the eyes and ears of the SS. UPO had particular functions which included
marshalling or fabricating incriminating evidence that Jews or Resistance activists
140
were carrying out subversive activities. For example, according to the Fascists, a
Jewish schoolteacher, Renata Steccati, had asked her pupils if there were German
troops, ammunition dumps, or air fields near their houses so that she could pass this
information on to the partisans.73 Republicans managed to get people dismissed from
jobs—and deported to Nazi Germany—by reporting them as anti-Fascists. For
example, one Republican, Luciano Tita, a schoolteacher who incited boys to join the
RSI armed forces, denounced council workers in Gemona, near Udine, and replaced
them with Republican Party members.76
On 20 September 1944, Globocnik conscripted the council police officers
(vigili urbanx) into the SS police services (Schutzpoliziei). The Podesta was never
consulted and only learned about the order on 27 September. Globocnik believed
'that Italian policeman should either be on the beat or dismissed from their posts',
which meant that the SS got rid of police chiefs and clerical staff. In reality, vigili
urbani had been working for the SS since the town had been occupied. In fact some
policemen guarded SS telephone lines while two policemen were employed by the
SD to find accommodation and food for German officers passing through Udine.
Therefore council police collaborated with the German administration. From
September, however, the role of vigili urbani changed. They no longer had ordinary
police duties such as patrolling the market squares and gardens, checking lighting,
traffic and public buildings. Council records show that the police force was very
small: at any one time only ten officers watched over the thoroughfares including the
central square, Piazza Contarena, while ten others patrolled the outskirts of the
town.77
Evidence from Udine, then, demonstrates that Italians, too, were capable of
horrendous brutality during the war, often against people from their own
communities. De Felice's version of events has papered over the sinister aspects of
the regime, notably the massacre of Italians, the deportation of Jews from RSI
provinces, and support for the German war effort.
It is wrong, of course, to be selective of trial evidence in order to make
sweeping statements about all Italians who served in the RSI armed forces. In fact
testimonies at collaborators' trials also describe how many individuals were forced to
participate in the extraordinary brutality and how some had been arrested by the SS
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Police chose military service with Republican forces rather than suffer deportation.
Others, particularly men from the urban proletariat with families to support, joined
the Republican army because the SS did not send Italian regiments to the battlefront.
To conclude, evidence from Republican Party reports suggests that the
Germans were relatively thin on the ground in Udine, fewer than people popularly
imagine. Military occupation really amounted to little more than the control of the
province by SS police services. The Germans were particularly weak in rural areas
and this explains the important role of the RSI armed forces. In the rastrellamenti,
Italians proved themselves willing collaborators and so during the occupation the
Germans did not have a monopoly on violence and brutality. More evidence is
needed from other regions, but trial reports from Udine do suggest that Italians were
perpetrators of horrific crimes too, and in many ways the brutality was more
shocking because it was against fellow nationals and sometimes even fellow
villagers, people from the same small community. Ideology alone cannot explain the
violence because, as trial evidence proves, some perpetrators had not been prominent
Fascists before the Resistance period. Of course, trial evidence has to be used with
caution, especially when attempting to draw conclusions about the general attitudes
and behaviour of all Italians who took part in anti-partisan operations. However, the
violence recorded in trials may be no more than the tip of the iceberg. Judges
themselves admitted that the evidence before courts was not the whole picture. Much
of the worst violence had no witnesses and did not form part of post-war testimonies.
The true extent of violence perpetrated by Italians will doubtless never be known.
The evidence I have collected for Udine does suggest that that the RSI did
have an important role during the German occupation in the years 1943 to 1945,
albeit with limited room for manoeuvre. Admittedly, the SS were often the
organisers of the violence, but the fact that the Germans were so few in number
meant that many Italians carried out some of the worst atrocities. In short, much of
the brutality of the occupation was the work of Italians. Indeed, their involvement
was integral to German occupation. Responsibility for war-related crimes went far
beyond the ranks of the SS.
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Marxist historians have equated the Allied occupation of Italy with
international capitalism and have attempted to relate AMG wartime policy to anti-
Marxism and the ideological world of Cold War alignments. Early Resistance
historiography suggested that Allied Military Government had a negative role in Italy
in that occupation prevented the Resistance from achieving important wartime goals
including radical changes to Italian politics and society. According to this version,
the Allies, who did not share the socialist values of the Resistance, obstructed a
purge of Fascists and Republicans, and prevented the anti-Fascists from achieving
what they called 'progressive democracy'. However, much of the early research by
Resistance institutions was based on sources conserved in Resistance archives not on
Allied documents and in the mid-1970s, David Ellwood wrote that there was still
insufficient documentation to confirm the argument ofResistance historians that the
Allies had intervened directly in Italian politics.1
This chapter examines the role of Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) in Allied
Military Government in the period of great social tension following the war. CAOs
were responsible for the general supervision of the various comuni or administrative
districts. CAOs wrote detailed reports which in many ways epitomized army
attitudes towards Italian society and politics and the documents helped shape Allied
thinking. Naturally, their writings varied in substance and quality, but unlike army
bureaucrats and high-ranking officers at AMG headquarters, CAOs were sending
dispatches from the field. Although a great deal of excellent research has been done
on the involvement of the Allies in Italian politics, most studies have jumbled
together its protagonists as 'AMG', a somewhat vague term. This section also
focuses on Friuli's all-important state institutions, the Prefettura, the Questura and
the carabinieri, all ofwhich provided AMG with impressions of post-war Udine,
which, of course, found their way into CAO reports.
Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) played a crucial role in establishing military
government and their detailed reports on civil society helped map out the political
situation in the province in the aftermath of the war. CAOs were in the vanguard of
Allied Military Government, at the head of a vast army , the British Eighth Army,
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and were privileged observers as Italy entered a crucible in the period 1946 and
emerged as a democratic republic.
Not themselves Italian, it is reasonable to conclude that CAOs had little or no
direct experience of Italian political and cultural life other than the exceptional
circumstances of the war, a turbulent period of social and economic crisis. It is quite
possible that many British officers were more familiar with the classical history of
the peninsula read in public schools and at Oxford or Cambridge than with
contemporary events in Fascist Italy. With notable exceptions, CAOs did not speak
the language, and had to make use of interpreters whenever they met local officials
or members of the general public.
This meant that CAOs did not see Italian society through its broadsheets,
Liberta, II Nuovo Friuli, II Gazzettino, and later II Messaggero Veneto or other
important publications which rolled from the presses to an increasingly wide public.
These publications could have provided a useful adjunct to confidential reports and
may even have helped form a more accurate picture of civil life or at very least a
more balanced assessment of the political parties. In particular, the Communist Party
demonstrated in the local press that, among other things, its intellectuals had a good
grasp of'the problem of Trieste', were contributing to 'high' culture, and were
pressing for early elections and a Constituent Assembly—political goals that led
away from the notion that some kind of armed insurrection might be attempted. In
particular, the quality of journalism in the local Communist Party broadsheet, Lotta e
Lavoro, was very high and owed much to its association with the prestigious national
daily L 'Unita, founded by Antonio Gramsci. Not only did Lotta e Lavoro throw
much light apon post-war social problems, but the broadsheet also conveyed a fairly
accurate picture of the tensions within Friulian society. Rural poverty loomed large
in its pages, but so did a widely shared desire for reform. Above all, the editorial
repeatedly argued that a meaningful reconstruction had to be based on a clear
understanding of what had gone wrong in the past.
In November 1945, the CAO of Pordenone and Sacile, Captain Chamlers of
the Royal Artillery, requested 'that copies of the Eighth Army News and the Stars
and Stripes be send out to CAOs so that they may be kept conversant with the
outside world.' This remark seems to confirm that most CAOs did not read the
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Italian broadsheets which were full of international and local news, but rather, in
good faith, would rely primarily on the version of events in the literature of the
armed forces, which no doubt had its own alternative views.
As it was, CAOs relied heavily on fragmentary reports from the Prefettura,
Questura, and carabinieri and, to a certain extent, on the word of informants as a
basis for generalizing about consensus, dissent, and public mood; these views alone
did not always provide perfect insight into post-war society. Moreover, it is equally
important to note that Prefettura and Questura reports were sometimes designed to
inculcate certain notions about society and politics in this border province, notions
that Slav nationalists were a menace to public order and that Communism was a real
threat to democracy.
In addition, most, perhaps all, British officers possessed stereotype notions of
Italy and the Italians, still current today, as backward, corrupt, and chaotically
administered, whilst the British tended to think of themselves as progressive,
hardworking, and efficient: they were confident that they knew what was the right
and practical thing to do. Not only had the war proved that Britain still counted in the
world, but that its people were prepared to stand up to tyrants. For many CAOs,
Italy's dismal war effort and subsequent changing of sides only confirmed the
Machiavellian nature of Italians and the cultural superiority of the British, which in
part justified military government. In short, it can be said that most British officers
had a high regard for Italy, but not the Italians. Such condescending views no doubt
coloured reports on civil society during the period ofmilitary government.
To be fair to British officers, however, Allied Military Government was
highly desirable in that it was better than Nazi occupation and a continuation of the
war. Also, it is worth remembering that CAOs genuinely wanted post-war Italy to get
off to a good start, and no doubt believed military government might correct some of
the injustices and errors of the past. There is also the important question of morale
among AMG personnel. What could motivate CAOs to learn more about Italy and
the Italians beyond stereotype notions given that the war in Europe had already been
won and that mass demobilisation was rapidly depleting the British army? The vast
majority of officers must have equated the war's end with a return to Britain and
there was doubtless some resentment about having to stay behind and deal with the
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continuities of Italian history and the problems of post-war reconstruction. More than
anything else in June 1945, war-weary CAOs wanted to go home, and the general
winding down of Allied Control in other parts of the north suggested that Udine
would soon be handed over to the Italians. Paradoxically for AMG, the oldest and
most experienced officers were the first age groups to be sent home. As early as
February 1946 there were already a number of British officers new to the province,
who had never been a CAO before and who did not share the collective experience of
the war.3
It could also be argued that CAO reports were never written for a wide
public, but rather for the army leadership and were in part written to impress higher
authority and demonstrate that the officers were good observers, tuned to the wave¬
length ofmilitary thinking. Moreover, whilst apparently striving for professional
detachment, officers often conveyed an impression of being very conservative, and
this in part accounts for the cynical tone in much of their writing on Italian society.
The goal of this chapter is to answer one question. To what extent did Civil Affairs
Officers demonstrate a good grasp of the realities of politics and society in Friuli?
Civil Affairs Officers who had already served in AMG in southern or central
Italy during the war found a very different situation in Udine from that experienced
in the rest of the peninsula. Here was a border province in a region that was
politically and ethnically divided and thus fraught with potential conflicts: just before
the war's end, Tito and the Yugoslav partisans had launched a major offensive
against the retreating Germans in Venezia Giulia and had occupied the principal port
in the Adriatic before the Allies reached a political settlement on the future of
Trieste. Moreover, the Allies expected that Yugoslavia would try to claim all the
territory which Italy had won during the First World War and perhaps additional
lands in Friuli, and that this might cause dangerous complications in northeast Italy.
Although Tito agreed to withdraw his troops from Friuli in June 1945, in the period I
am discussing here, the disputed region remained divided into what became two
zones: Zone A, Trieste occupied by AMG and zone B, the Isonzo valley and
Capodistria under Yugoslav military government. Hence in Udine there were many
tensions lying just below the surface. This situation gave CAOs a particularly
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important role in Friuli since their observations on local politics undoubtedly
contributed to the wider picture.
The first reports from Udine described a picture of political turbulence. The
Allies had some evidence to suggest that Yugoslav partisans intended to establish
themselves as an alternative authority in Friuli in the immediate aftermath of the
Liberation. When CAOs arrived in the province they found that the Yugoslav army
had issued mobilisation orders in some border communities occupied by Tito's
troops. For example, in the Italian town of Gorizia more than five hundred men had
fled to Udine after the Yugoslav army had sent them call up papers.4 At the same
time, the first Intelligence Corps officers could see that Italian partisan units from the
Garibaldi Division were circulating in vehicles with Yugoslav army markings which
conveyed the impression that the Italian Communists were in fact under the
command of the Yugoslav forces.5 Slovene officers in Udine had demanded a supply
of requisitioning books from the non-Communist Osoppo partisans6 and there was a
large number of Yugoslav, Czech and Polish refugees housed in a high school (liceo
classico) where the Slovene battalion was billeted and Tito's troops were trying to
win over the refugees by supplying them with red stars.7 Slovene troops also set up
roadblocks in Friuli supposedly as part of their effort to prevent Nazis and Fascists
from escaping justice, but troops at the check points were hostile towards Christian
Democrat partisans and deprived Osoppo units of identity cards, weapons and
vehicles. This naturally suggested to the British that Tito's troops were trying to
o
manoeuvre non-Communist partisans out of the way. Slovene troops wanted a
prominent role in searching for and arresting Nazis and Republicans,9 but, according
to the Allies, at least half the roadblocks established by the Yugoslavs were wholly
unnecessary and caused much friction with the Christian Democrat Resistance.10 In a
confidential report, the AMG Provincial Commissioner admitted that he did not trust
the Yugoslav commander in Udine or his commissar in part because he had obtained
little information from them during their meetings." Another British officer wrote
that the difficulties were caused by Slovene officers in Tito's army who were more
militant than the rank-and-file troops, and that the political commissars were
unpopular with ordinary soldiers who wanted nothing more than to return home to
Yugoslavia now that the war was over.12 Furthermore, AMG believed that many
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Italian partisans had sold their weapons to Slovene troops during the brief occupation
of Friuli.13 British Intelligence officers offered these incidents as proof that some
kind of insurrection might be attempted by Slovene partisans.
The early Intelligence reports conveyed a picture of popular resentment at the
Yugoslav presence in town. CAOs noted that the Yugoslavs did not receive a
rapturous reception in Udine when another two hundred Slovene partisans arrived on
12 May and that their commissars had difficulty in finding billets.14 Yugoslav troops
continued to arrive in town until 15 May when about 60 per cent of the Yugoslav
army stationed there withdrew from Friuli and crossed the Isonzo River, and
according to one Allied report, there was much relief that the quasi-insurrectionary
occupation of Udine had ended.15 All these examples served to emphasize the CAO's
view that the Yugoslavs were very unpopular with the local population.
Another perceived problem for CAOs was the Friulian Resistance. The
partisan insurrection between 28-30 April was the culmination of twenty-two months
of popular struggle and, for many of those who had taken part in it, the Resistance
wiped the slate clean and showed an alternative Italy. That the province ofUdine had
been liberated by partisans alone suggested that some Friulians would question the
need for military government now that the war was over and the province was back
in Italian hands. Worse, AMG intended to deny the Resistance organisation, the
Committee for National Liberation (Comitate) di liberazione nazionale or CLN), a
prominent role in local government even though the Allies themselves had solid
evidence that the Resistance committees in the so-called liberated zones 'had worked
out an administration which, considering the difficulties of the situation, was
surprisingly efficient'.16 In fact on 4 May, the Provincial Commissioner formally
requested the CLNP, which had hitherto administered the town, to hand over power
to AMG and the partisan organisation was to be no more than a consultative body for
CAOs.17 It followed that AMG refused to define any responsibilities for the CLN,
who were forbidden to send delegations to Rome without military approval. In
summing up the new position of the CLN, AMG declared that the council 'had no
i o
power or legal status'.
However, it is worthwhile noting that, during May, local CLNs continued to
exercise their authority and issue proclamations despite the fact that the Allies had
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outlawed the practice and had torn down most of the notices.19 In fact the Allies
noted that the CLN continued to be an alternative source of authority, especially in
20
virtually unpoliced rural areas where there were still no British troops or CAOs.
Also the Allies believed that Resistance activists exerted a powerful and negative
influence on both the Questore and the Prefect who were unable to make decisions or
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give their opinions autonomously because they had to consult with partisans. Later
in 1946, the Provincial Commissioner remarked that 'the CLN [was] useful if
composed of sensible people willing to cooperate'.22 Thus AMG was hostile to the
CLN because the latter viewed itself as an alternative source of authority and this, in
part, explains why the Provincial Commissioner placed so much power in the hands
of CAOs.
There were other reasons why CAOs were wary of partisans. One was simple
ignorance: prior to the mass insurrection there was very little Allied involvement
with the Friulian Resistance, especially the Communist Divisions, and the number of
SITREP messages sent by Intelligence Corps in the advancing Eighth Army suggests
that the Allies knew nothing about the real intentions of the Resistance, and were
concerned that the movement might use the national insurrection as a green light for
a socialist revolution.
There was also the general question about the ambivalent nature of links
between Italian Communists and Yugoslav Communists and divisions within the
Resistance itself. Early SITREP messages tried hard to understand to what extent, if
any, the Friulian Resistance was being controlled or influenced by Tito and the
Yugoslav partisans. The army Intelligence Corps could see that the Yugoslavs were
not planning any immediate military aggression—SITREP reports were able to
establish that, although a large number of Yugoslav troops were on the move and
crossing the Isonzo in Friuli, there was no reconnaissance; nor were the Yugoslavs
bringing large amounts of ammunition, petrol and other materiel with them into Italy.
It cannot be argued, therefore, that the Allies were reacting to a real military threat
from Communist forces; though the ideological threat was much harder for the
British army Intelligence Corps to assess. Thus a crucial role of CAOs was to
observe and report on the activities of partisans. Similarly, in the early briefings, the
Provincial Commissioner suggested that CAOs were to prioritize investigations into
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the political background of new CLN-nominated, appointments, rather than explore
the Fascist past of officials who had served under the Nazis.23
For their part, many local partisans were highly critical of the Allies' attitude
towards them and expected AMG to take some interest in their social plight.24
According to the Questore, unemployed partisans were particularly bitter to see some
Germans who had worked for the Todt Organisation being given jobs in private
9S
companies in Friuli. CAOs were supposed to do everything they could 'to absorb
patriots into employment after they had been disbanded, and all employers [were to]
be urged to give them preference'26 but in fact very little was done by the Allies in
Udine. During the heady experience of the Liberation, some AMG officers had
promised partisans that they would receive jobs, but the work never materialised.27
The impression given in the Questura daily reports was one of great poverty among
many former partisans. The Questore pointed out that even men who had jobs were
often living in extreme hardship: the income ofmany commuting workers was so
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low that they were unable to afford basic travel costs like the purchase of a bicycle.
Flow did CAOs establish their authority? In rural areas, an important initial
task was to compel local CLN officials to embrace AMG, usually by pointing out
that the communities would receive none of the benefits of Allied aid, including
food, medicines, clothes, and reconstruction materials, if they refused to accept
military government. In other words, their authority was bolstered by the power to
provide much needed provisions, and this was used as a form of control. Moreover,
CAOs appointed the local majors after an interview and could remove them without
giving the communities a reason. CAOs could also jail Italian officials who had the
insolence to organise any sort of demonstration or strike.
AMG also introduced oppressive restrictions, including a curfew from 2100
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to 0600 hours, though the Questore pointed out that most Friulians questioned the
need for a measure that was wholly incompatible with the notion of liberation.30
Initially, AMG banned political gatherings and introduced press censorship and
travel restrictions, and, according to the Provincial Commissioner, political debate
was stymied by these measures.31 The case ofUdine serves to remind us that the
Allies perpetuated some Fascist war regulations associated with the Fascist regime as
well as with Nazi occupation. It can be argued that such unpopular restrictions also
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encouraged CAOs to become insulated individuals and this may have added to the
difficulties of assessing consensus and public mood.
As regards travel restrictions, it is interesting to note that, in the months
following the Liberation, many Italians tried to obtain travel permits to cross the
Isonzo River and enter Zone B which was controlled by the Yugoslav partisans.
Even though the Christian Democrat press was full of anti-communist and anti-Slav
stories which described Zone B as dangerous, many people were not discouraged
from travelling to areas occupied by Tito's forces. The carabinieri rejected most
requests for travel permits, while the Field Security Section policed railway booking
offices to ensure that only civilians with official AMG travel permits could obtain
tickets. This no doubt gave the impression that few people in Udine dared to venture
into areas under Communist occupation because Slavs were now hostile towards
ordinary Italians, but the real picture was very different: the Allies and the carabinieri
were preventing large numbers from visiting Trieste and other areas under Yugoslav
control.
The CAO's in Udine tended to write mainly about politics, and, in particular,
focussed on the activities of the local Communists and Socialists. In addition to
police reports, CAOs also relied on information from ordinary Italians in the form of
denunciations which were then conveyed to the Provincial Commissioner in the
'Political' section ofCAO weekly reports. Communist activities, however, were
often reported in the Public Safety section of a SITREP rather than in the Political
section. Not only did this insinuate that the party was a potential threat to the general
public, but it also criminalized some forms of legitimate party action, arguably the
real stuff of politics. Significantly, activity by the Communist Party was invariably
described as 'propaganda' or 'pro-Slav propaganda' or 'anti-Allied propaganda'32
and, in a very one-sided discourse on local politics, CAOs tended to magnify the
'negatives', like signs of dissent, protests, and disorder, and invariably blamed
demonstrations on the Communist Party which was supposedly pulling the strings.
By contrast, the political scene in November was described as orderly and 'quiet'
because the Christian Democrats had apparently made significant gains in popularity
at the expense of the Communists.
154
Worse, evidence indicates that political incidents reported in the Public
Safety section were conveyed to the Public Safety Division and to the Field Security
Section ofAMG and may very well have led to arrests and imprisonment. One CAO
report from Latisana, for example, wrote that 'the leader of the Communist Party has
been causing trouble' in the village of Teor and 'has the Sindaco completely
terrorized and has taken office in the town hall.' Perhaps he was a bully, but it is
difficult to believe that the man, who was the village schoolmaster, was terrorising
the mayor and, from the details, it seems there was no firm evidence against the
Communist. Nonetheless, the CAO concluded by noting that 'his arrest by the Italian
authorities in connection with a previous offence is being arranged'.34 What is most
noticeable in the CAO's handling of the case is the complete lack of evidence from
the other side. The mayor, who presumably had made the allegations, was a Christian
Democrat and political foe, and the carabinieri major who had been following the
case was himself being investigated as part of the purge of Republican sympathisers.
Another report by the same CAO described how during one demonstration
Communist protestors had had the insolence to tear down the Italian flag. The CAO
went on to say that:
an anonymous letter was received by this office naming ringleaders and urging their
arrest. This confirmed information already received and steps have been taken to
ensure prompt action by the Italian authorities. The local Commander of the
carabinieri, who visited Latisana during the week, has promised to deal with the case
at once.35
This example from Udine illustrates that the slightest, most trifling, accusation about
a relatively minor incident could be magnified and might result in the arrest of
Communists based on anonymous letters, accusations, and hearsay rather than hard
evidence.
Another feature ofCAO reports is that criminal activity was often seen as
political. Thus the Provincial Commissioner was able to conclude in his monthly
report, which was really a summary of all the CAO reports, that 'lawlessness in the
province is the responsibility of the Communist Party with which the Youth Front is
allied' .36 In a sense, local Communists and Socialists laid themselves open to the
charge of causing trouble because they were often exclusively concerned with the
plight of their fellow-citizens. True, the party was quick to assist workers and
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peasants in the organisation of demonstrations or strikes. Yet it is also true that the
experience of the war and Resistance had done much to raise the political
consciousness of ordinary Italians, and therefore many had more clearly defined
goals. Furthermore, without remembering how poor many of them were in the post¬
war period it is difficult to understand why groups were pressing the authorities to do
something and why the Communists were quick to organise them. Certainly, with all
the talk in the local press about a new start, many members of the public now had
great expectations of Allied Military Government in the province. It is worth taking a
closer look at the conditions prevailing in Latisana to illustrate this point.
Latisana, like many towns in Friuli, was a picture of intense misery after the
war. It had a population of about 10,000 inhabitants, including some 200 refugees
from southern and central Italy, but many had been made homeless by the bombing
and now maintained a precarious existence. Unlike the rural villages which had been
burned down by the Germans, Latisana had been severely damaged by Allied
warplanes, but, in the weeks following the Liberation, shortages of funds and
materials meant that little had been done about the overarching problems of
unemployment and reconstruction. About 450 Garibaldi (Communist) partisans had
operated in the area during the war, but when the Allies occupied Latisana the CLN
appointed a new Christian Democrat mayor, Antonio Tonnelli, and retained the town
clerk, a local official who had been employed by the RSI during German
occupation.37
The budget allocated for Latisana was so tiny that there were no funds to pay
council workers' wages still less to start repairing the catastrophic war damage, and
unemployment was acute: the only work the council could offer locals was
shovelling gravel and earth to fill in anti-tank ditches that TODT workers had dug for
the Nazis. The CAO described the food situation as 'not bad' because it was assumed
that most peasants were self-sufficient, however this was not in fact the case. As his
own report shows, the Mayor was aware of the magnitude of rural poverty and had
begun to hand out maize flour to the poorest people in the area, though this was
quickly stopped because the Prefect had not authorized the distribution of emergency
provisions. The hospital in Latisana was the worst bombed in the whole province,
according to one CAO report. In mid-winter, six months after the Liberation, none of
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the windows on the ground floor, including the operating theatre, had glass and
although the hospital was comparatively well-equipped, surgical patients had to be
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sent to Udine. All these factors help us understand why there was so much agitation
in Latisana.
In a sense, the CAO for Latisana was at the mercy of his informants who
claimed that most of the population supported the Christian Democrats, but the
Resistance in the area had been organized by Communist Garibaldi partisans and it is
reasonable to assume that the party had gained some prestige from its involvement in
the war of liberation. Nevertheless, the CAO invariably came down on the side of
Christian Democrats.
Another method of dealing with Communists or Socialists who were
perceived to be a threat to public order was the 'special arrest' of individuals 'on the
grounds that the people concerned are dangerous characters from the army's point of
view'. This gave CAOs widely defined powers of arrest in that they had only to
report individuals to the AMG Provincial Commissioner as being 'a threat' and the
people would be arrested and expelled from Udine province in a practice reminiscent
of Fascism's confino. Papers in the AMG files reveal that the Questura had a crucial
role in the 'special arrest' of ordinary Italians because the Questore occasionally
provided the Public Safety Officer, Major Manuel, with the names of people who
were said to be involved in 'pro-Slav activities'. The individuals were then detained
while the Field Security Section investigated the accusations. Of course, this was a
standard tactic ofmilitary occupation since 'dangerous characters' was a sweeping
term that could apply to anyone who aired strong criticism of Allied policy and was
believed to be an opponent ofAMG. Repression, it seems, was deliberately visible as
in the case of the arrests of Communist leaders which also served as a warning to the
others.
A good example of special arrests by the Allied authorities occurred on 8
December 1945 in Udine. Fourteen partisans were arrested in Udine by the Field
Security Section, and among others, AMG detained men who had been prominent
Communist activists in the Resistance, including the leaders of the 'Silvio Pellico'
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Brigade, the GAP Commander in Latisana, and the head of the Resistance
information service (Servizio informativo segreto).40 The men were all placed in
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solitary confinement for months, apparently to prevent them communicating with
each other, but the psychological impact of this scenario must have been severe for at
some point one of partisans tried to commit suicide in his cell. Although the detained
partisans were supposed to be informed about the grounds of their arrest, in complete
disregard for Italian law, none of the men, their lawyers, or their relatives were told
why they had been picked up and were being held in jail. The only answer AMG
gave was that 'for security reasons it is not considered prudent to go into full details
concerning the activities of the arrestees'.41 This case illustrates how AMG rode
rough shod over Italian law.
It is true that AMG found hidden arms on several occasions, but it is equally
true that many searches by the Field Security Section, carabinieri, and ordinary
troops often failed to find a single pistol or bullet despite an informant's tip-off that
civilians were hiding arms. In one typical incident in November 1945, the CAO of
Pordenone received information from informants that a rural family in Brughera was
hiding weapons. Accompanied by carabinieri from Sacile and a sergeant of the Field
Security Section, the CAO turned up in an army truck at the house and ordered the
carabinieri to place the male members of the family in prison while he interrogated
the female members, all of whom denied the accusations. 'There were no arms to be
found as hoped' wrote the CAO 'and informants said that the family had removed
the weapons with wheelbarrows during the night'.42 This incident illustrates how the
least evidence of arms drew the immediate attention of the carabinieri and Field
Security Section.
Some reports of arms-trafficking were highly romanticized. One mysterious
woman known only as 'Norma' was said to be gunrunning in the mountains between
Italy and Yugoslavia. She was driven away each night by a sinister blue Lancia
Aprilia and whisked off to an unknown destination in the hills, and it was said that
She spoke impeccable English and was playing a double game with the Allies. The
suspected possession of arms was one of the devices used to initiate house searches
and resulted in numerous arrests ofmen and women in Friuli whom the Allies
suspected of hiding weapons. Reports suggested that the Communist Party organized
arms dumps, perhaps for an eventual insurrection against the Allies should Tito
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overrun the province, and the notion was used to undermine the party's democratic
credentials.
By contrast, the illegal possession ofweapons by right-wing reactionaries and
by the carabinieri and Italian army officers involved in arms-trafficking was never
criminalised to the same extent, perhaps because AMG perceived those individuals
as counter-revolutionaries who were to be treated in a very different way. For
example, the CAO of Palmanova wrote in October 1945 that Osoppo partisans had
encouraged DC sympathisers 'to take adequate measures for their own protection'
that is, to procure weapons because 'it is rumoured that the Communists in San
Giorgio are planning an armed uprising in support ofMarshal Tito'.43 The CAO for
Palmanova seems to have thought that there was nothing wrong with this attempt to
create a citizen militia, and yet the possession of illegal arms was an offence against
Allied military proclamations and could result in a summary trial and heavy
sentencing,44 as was illustrated in the case of a Communist militant who received a
12-month prison sentence for being in possession of a pistol.45
It should also be remembered that the Resistance had handed over a large
number ofweapons to the Allies when the partisans were demobilised. Between 11
June to 10 July 1945 partisans handed over about 18,300 rifles to the Allies46 which
testified to the military power of the partisans at the end of the war but also
suggested that the Resistance was committed to disarmament. The arms were handed
over to the carabinieri and the Guardia di Finanza who were supposed to hand over
the weapons to army artillery depots in Udine. The argument was that a democratic
culture would not flourish if large numbers of civilians possessed weapons. In
September 1946, however, it was discovered that some of the weapons handed in by
partisans had found their way to shadowy, stay-behind organisations in Friuli. Light
is thrown upon this event by key reports in an AMG file entitled 'Osoppo' which
contains statements by high-ranking officers. In one document, an Italian army
General hints that AMG was well-informed about arms-trafficking in Udine and that
the Allies seemed to be condoning the supply ofweapons to Christian Democrat
partisans whilst sequestrating arms in the possession of Communist groups.47
In another memorandum on the Osoppo situation in Friuli, a Lt-Colonel on
the army General Staffwent much further and wrote that he believed the Italian
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government and the Italian army were somehow involved in supplying arms to
groups of former Osoppo partisans, and that it was all a matter for ALCOM—the
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Allied Commission. These comments may explain why the Provincial
Commissioner was reluctant to make an example, through trial, of the right-wing
reactionaries; in most cases no charge was advanced. The Provincial Commissioner
closed the file with the dry comment 'I have studied all aspects of this case and am
satisfied that the fewer people who know the real reasons for the acquittal of the
defendants, the better it will be for all concerned'.49 Admittedly, police and army
officers involved in arms-trafficking wove a tangled web and it is therefore difficult
to understand which parts of their statements are true, but it is important to appreciate
that the Allies had unwritten rules about how to deal with the opponents of
Communism.
AMG reports show that British officers were very anxious to get information
from ordinary Italians, especially about Communist and criminal activities in the
area. Without the active collaboration of the general population, it was very difficult
for the Allies to enforce AMG proclamations. There is some evidence in the files of
the involvement of priests as informants and denouncers in Allied Military
Government. For example, priests denounced Italian Communists who were working
in refugee centres in Udine. Priests also informed on their own parishioners and the
Allies took such denunciations particularly seriously since they came from a
respected authority within the community. It is doubtful that priests had witnessed
many of the incidents which they reported to the Allies, therefore how they came
upon the information is an interesting question. On 7 October 1945, for example, the
CAO ofPalmanova wrote that confidential information he had received from the
parish priest of Santa Maria La Longa about Slav activity in the area contained the
names of two people who were alleged to have sold British teleprinters to the
Yugoslavs. This serious allegation was forwarded to the Field Security Section. In
the same report, it is evident that a Christian Democrat partisan, a member of the
Osoppo Intelligence Branch, was working as an informant for the Allies and had
supplied the CAO with additional information on Yugoslav activities in the town.50
Even when he had no definite evidence or names to pass onto AMG, files
show that the Archbishop ofUdine was particularly concerned with the 'criminal
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tendencies' of former left-wing Resistance activists and made sure that cases
involving Communists reached the desk of the Provincial Commissioner. For
example, in the early days ofMay 1945, the Archbishop of Udine reported the
killings of four Fascists by Communist partisans who had probably decided to settle
some old score.51 In fairness we have to keep in mind that CAOs were instructed by
AMG to enlist the help of prominent figures in society, notably the Archbishop, who
could help form a picture of the local situation, and, on the face of it, priests were
well-placed to provide inside information, but it meant that the door was open to
clergymen who wanted to come forward with their suspicions and accusations, and it
can be seen that their bias found its way into CAO reports.
Why did priests inform CAOs when they suspected that Communists were
breaking the law? Anti-communism seems to be a decisive factor in all the cases.
Perhaps informing on others also owed something to the denunciatory atmosphere of
the Fascist period and Nazi occupation. It seems difficult to argue that all denouncers
believed that they were reporting serious crimes since Christian Democrats often
denounced Communists on quite frivolous grounds that would not even get them into
trouble with the Allies. For instance, DC leaders were furious and informed the
AMG authorities that Communists, posing as pilgrims, had taken the Vatican bus
service from Udine to Rome to attend the National Congress of the Communist
Party.52 To summarise, then, the case ofUdine suggests that denunciations were a
form of direct collaboration with the Allies since important information often led to
house-searches and arrests, but to say that priests and Christian Democrats
denounced Communists and Socialists is not to say that they supported the Allies;
rather, AMG provided an opportunity to oppress potential opponents.
THE PREFETTURA, QUESTURA AND CARABINIERI
The Prefettura, the Questura and the carabinieri all provided CAOs with
important information. To start with the Prefettura. It should be appreciated that
AMG normally governed the province by officially endorsing the Prefect's orders
and circulars rather than issuing its own regulations because AMG proclamations
were solely reserved for emergency situations, not humdrum bureaucracy. In
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addition, to simplify a complex legal situation, all Italian laws passed in Rome were
also valid for Udine unless the AMG Provincial Commissioner annulled them.53 This
meant that the Prefettura had a crucial role in military government. Allied documents
prepared before the occupation of northern Italy show that AMG fully intended to
retain the Prefettura staff that had served under the Fascists and the Nazis. To be fair,
the Allies doubted that they would find war criminals still at their desks, as it was
expected that notorious collaborators would flee the town following the popular
insurrection and the disintegration of the German armed forces in Italy. This in fact is
precisely what happened: the RSI Prefect, Riccardo De Beden, left his post three
days before the Liberation and the RSI Questore, Nicola Bruni, tried to flee but was
captured together with his eighteen year old son by local partisans who recognized
the notorious Republican in civilian clothing. The Podesta ofUdine avoided capture,
but was later arrested in Austria as a war criminal and brought back to the province.
Even so, a purge of the Prefettura should have been one of the first and most
necessary acts of military government not least because it was to become the
principal source of important information for AMG and the institution in part shaped
Allied thinking about salient issues: the problem of Trieste, the nature of
Communism, the extent of the so-called 'Slav menace'. As the Prefettura officials
made sketch after sketch of the political situation in the province, it was surely
important to understand the mind-set of those who penned confidential reports for
military government. In theory at least, the Prefect was responsible to the Italian state
alone, but from the start the Allies made it perfectly clear to the new Prefect, Agosto
Candolini, that he was working for AMG and was subordinate to the Provincial
Commissioner.
It is perhaps understandable that in the first topsy-turvey days following
Allied occupation, there was little questioning of the role of Italian officials in the
Prefettura who had served under German occupation, until things had cooled down.
There were just so many other pressing problems, including military demands, and
there was no telephone service between Udine and other provinces in June which
slowed down bureaucracy.54 Nonetheless, it is striking that the Field Security Section
only interrogated Riccardo De Beden on 27 June 1945, almost two months after the
Allies had arrived. According to the Field Security Section of the Intelligence Corps,
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previous Allied Intelligence sources and CLN reports confirmed his statement, but,
almost as an afterthought, the army captain who wrote the Field Security Section
report concluded that it seemed very strange that an individual who had been Prefect
throughout the period ofGerman occupation was not at least guilty of being a Nazi
sympathizer.53
That the Allies clearly did not want sweeping changes to the Prefettura
personnel even though it had unmistakably been an RSI institution, was confirmed
when the Provincial Commissioner reviewed its staff. It would be wrong to write that
the Allies were unaware that Prefettura staff had a Fascist past and that much was
concealed from AMG because documents show that the bureaucrats had to fill out a
form detailing their past as civil servants for both the Fascist and the Nazi regimes
and describe how they had reached their rank within the Prefettura. This procedure
meant that the Provincial Commissioner and the Prefect were well-informed about
the past records of Prefettura staff. In a sense the RSI officials, who had been on the
losing side during the war, had to reapply for their old jobs, and from the impressive
records ofmilitary service and awards, PNF membership dates and meteoric careers
during the Fascist period they listed, they were cocksure about being reemployed. In
at least one case, a former RSI official in the Prefettura, Giorgio Baccos, was
approved with the remark 'very good' though his only recommendation was that of
his father, Leopoldo Baccos, who had been vice-Prefect of Pola before the Italians
were driven out of the region by Tito's partisans. It deserves noting that Giorgio
Baccos was appointed by the Nazis in August 1944 when the German occupation of
Friuli had entered its most murderous phase. Another official who had no previous
experience in the Prefettura, but who was appointed by the RSI, was Luigi Danieli
who had been an army officer and engineer from 1941 to September 1943. The
Provincial Commissioner's remark was 'very inexperienced but enthusiastic'.
Another official, the vice-Prefect Aldo Cuttini received a 'very good' remark even
though he produced a blank form which stated only that he had been born in Udine in
1906 and at some point had been a corporal in the army. Not only did the Allies
approve of individuals who had made a career during the Fascist period, but they also
retained officials who had been directly installed by the Nazis during the worst phase
of Italy's war. To summarise, then, the example of Udine shows that the Prefettura
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which AMG inherited was not that far removed from the institution which had served
under the RSI and German occupation. A further point can be made: on 24 May the
provincial Commissioner changed both the Questore and vice-Questore, who had
been appointed by the CLN, on the grounds that they were 'unqualified and
inefficient' and therefore not fit for the job, but evidence shows that the attitude
towards Prefettura staff who were not 'career men' and who had worked for the
Fascists and the Nazis was of a very different nature.
It is important to note that even those who were 'career men' that is, who had
worked in the Questura since the 1920s or 1930s, had often benefited in some way
during the Nazi period. The case of Udine suggests that the rigid distinction
continually adopted by the Allies between career men and Nazi collaborators was in
fact blurred by the events of 1943-45. For example, a so-called career man, Eugenio
Nicolella, had been promoted in July 1944 when the Nazis and Republicans were
conducting operations against rural communities with unprecedented savagery.
Furthermore, in December 1944, at a time when the Italian Jews were being deported
from the city, Eugenio Nicolella received an honorary degree in law from the
University of Trieste, a dubious award which nevertheless enhanced his career
prospects.
The decision not to remove Prefettura staff depended heavily on questionable
assumptions about the definition of collaboration. Whether implicated in SS police-
organised mass slaughter and persecution in Friuli or not—and there was often some
legitimising Prefettura circulars behind direct action by SS police—at the very least
officials had quietly watched while fellow Italians were rounded up and murdered or
deported to death camps in Nazi Germany. In any event, AMG made no significant
changes to the local Prefettura staff. There is some evidence to suggest that the
Prefettura staffwere useful to AMG as records show that some of the officials in
Udine had previously served in areas now disputed by Tito's forces and had long
experienced the problems ofmilitary occupation and Slavic Communism, and were
therefore deemed to be ofmore value to AMG than the anti-Fascists who had fought
in the Resistance.
I will now turn to another important institution, the Questura which also
provided AMG with detailed daily reports on the situation in Udine, especially in
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urban areas. The Garibaldi Division occupied the Questura on 30 April while the
Resistance was still fighting Germans in the San Gottardo district of town, and
Communist partisans discovered about one hundred Questura police officers still in
service, all ofwhom were unarmed. At the war's end, the CLNP nominated a
Communist Questore, Lino Zocchi, in part because a Christian Democrat, Agostino
Candolini, had already been given the all-important post of Prefect. In addition,
about six hundred partisans were employed by the new Questore to police the town.
However, in the first week ofMay, Army Intelligence Officers in the special
forces unit known as the Coolant Mission Group recommended that a new police
force should be formed with 'no party colours' that is, without partisans, a
remarkably swift decision given that the Resistance had been in charge of the
Questura for a mere six days.57 The Coolant Mission Group complained that about
two-fifths of the Friulian Resistance were Communist partisans and three-fifths were
Christian Democrat partisans, whereas the town appeared to be completely in the
hands of the Communist Party.58 However, evidence shows that the Communists did
not attempt to dominate the Questura at the expense ofOsoppo forces. In fact the
Garibaldi Commander invited the Osoppo partisans to send an equal number of
cadres to form a police battalion, but the Christian Democrats refused to legitimise
the new police force and sent only a few men who were wholly inadequate for the
police duties— they possessed no weapons, among other things.59 Moreover, we
should not assume that all of the five or six hundred partisans who became police
officers in the province were from the Garibaldi Division; many were from
independent partisan brigades and even those from the Garibaldi Division were not a
highly-politicised group—many were not even Communist party card-holders.60
Furthermore, in the days following the Liberation, there were no obvious
examples of brutality and bloodshed to suggest that partisans could not guarantee the
safety and discipline of fellow-citizens. On the contrary, a hand-written report by
Colonel Willmer, an AMG legal expert in Udine, describes how partisan police
arrested Republicans usually because local people had denounced notorious Fascists
and RSI collaborators, and, from his account, there is little empirical evidence for the
argument that partisans were not fit to police Udine. Certainly, it was not a witch¬
hunt still less a revolutionary purge of officials. Ultimately, the reports point out, it
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was the new Questore who decided whether the people should be taken into custody
or released and there was a proper register of all those held in prison.61 In other
words, the partisans were showing discipline and the legal officer's report did not
contain any criticisms of the Resistance police battalion. If correct, his report shows
that Resistance cadres were efficient police officers who obeyed orders; on the other
hand, perhaps it was precisely because of their efficiency in arresting and jailing
collaborators that the Provincial Commissioner decided to get rid of them. The point
is that there were no Christian Democrats in the police force because the DC was
unwilling to support radical changes to the Questura.
In any case, the Allies were convinced that the Questura and the police
battalion were under Communist control, and believed this to be a particularly
inappropriate situation for a province on the border with Yugoslavia. One of the most
prominent activists in the Friulian Resistance, Mario Lizzero, known as 'Andrea',
who later became a member of the national parliament, was regularly depicted by
AMG as 'perhaps the most dangerous of Garibaldi leaders' and 'working in Udine as
the Commissar of the Garibaldi Group of Divisions'. He was described as 'intelligent
and unscrupulous', with 'complete control of the Communist Party in the whole of
Venezia Guilia'. This report also showed that AMG believed 'that the Communist
aim in Udine is to penetrate all municipal and provincial offices by placing
Communist sympathisers in important institutions. In this, by one way or another
[Andrea] is notably successful'.62
For this reason, on 24 May the Provincial Commissioner dismissed the
Questore and the vice-Questore who had both been appointed by the leaders of the
local Resistance, the Provincial Committee ofNational Liberation (CLNP). The
official reason was that the men were inexperienced and unqualified but there can be
little doubt that they were dismissed for their Communist beliefs. In response to the
partisan involvement in the organisation, and in sharp contrast with his policy
adopted for the Prefettura, the Provincial Commissioner wrote that it was necessary
to make changes in the Questura and to bring up from the south 'men with
professional experience',63 essentially the same bureaucrats who had served under
the Fascist regime, and who had no connection with anti-Fascism. In October the
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Provincial Commissioner again wrote that more career officials were urgently
required.64
The Allies wanted to appoint a certain Galliano as Questore, but there was
severe opposition from the CLNP because of his Fascist past. In particular, on 22
May the CLNP President, Lo Curto, warned military government that officials who
had served in the Questura would do a great deal of harm in the new Italy and he
suggested that the Allies employ Carlo Bertodo, as Questore and Luigi Zoratti65 as
Vice-Questore.66 It is interesting to note that the Allies sometimes reemployed
Questura officials without checking their background. According to a report in AMG
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files which both the Prefect and the Questore saw, Stefano Giulla, a Commissario
in the Questura of Gorizia had been denounced by the CLN for abusing prisoners
during the Resistance period. In particular, Giulla, who was now employed by the
Allies in the Questura in Udine, was said to have arrested women so that he could
rape them in police custody. According to the same file, another notorious
collaborator, Dr. Pispica, who worked in the Questura, was responsible for rounding
up hostages for the SS.68 Another list in AMG hands alleged that Gian-Carlo
Franceschinis, who was working in the Questura as Capo Gabinetto, had been a
notorious Republican and was the author of numerous pro-Nazi articles in II Popolo,
including propaganda which attacked the Allies.69
What difference, if any, did such people make in the Questura? One
particular example illustrates how the Questura provided the Allies with information
that helped a notorious Fascist retain his job. Gastone Conti came to Udine in
October 1937 from Pisa to become the headmaster of a school, the Istituto Tecnico
Industriale Locatelli and soon became director of the local Fascist cultural institute
(.Istituto di cultura fascista), and a member of the province's Direttorio del Fascio.
According to the CLN, Conti denounced teachers who allowed anti-Fascist
comments in their classrooms and, from December 1943 onwards, he was a Nazi and
Republican collaborator who, as part of a network of informers, encouraged
unwitting pupils to denounce Resistance activity in their communities. The
Commissione di epurazione found the CLN allegations to be true and dismissed
Conti, though he was later reinstated by the Ministry of Education despite his
Republican past. In May 1946, according to a copy of the document in Allied files,
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the head of the political police in the Questura (II dirigente della squadra politico)
sent a report to the Questore which rejected the evidence of the CLN and the
Commissione di epurazione, and claimed that Conti had never been a 'factious
Fascist' and was in actual fact 'esteemed for his honesty and uprightness'70 a
statement which was completely untrue.
It should be noted that the Questura situation reports for AMG often
contained serious accusations against Communists, but such reports were written up
without mentioning that the information had come from paid informants not police
officers. The difference was very important because Allied officers assumed they
were reading facts that had been established by the Italian police when in reality they
were reading nothing more than the suspicions and accusations of anonymous
informants. Not that the Allies themselves did not use information provided by
members of the public, but they did at least expect some indication of the reliability
of informants. This, however, was missing from Questura reports. There is evidence
that on at least one occasion the use of an informant led to falsification of the truth.
The AMG Public Safety Officer complained to the Provincial Commissioner that 'a
confidential informant' had passed on information to the Questura which yielded 'a
number of inaccuracies' about two men who lived in the village ofCave del Previl
and that the accusations had then appeared in the Questura Monthy Report of January
1946.71
At the war's end, the Questura in Udine was a radically different organisation
from the traditional force characterized by Carmine Senise, Mussolini's Chief of
Police from 1940 to 1943, who minimized the role of its police officers (agenti di
pubblica sicurezza).12 As the previous chapter showed, in July 1944 the SS had
purged the Questura of elements, including the then Questore, Luigi Cosenza, who
were not arch-Republicans or Fascists and who had expected some pretence of
legality from the Nazis.73 Thus in the period 1943 to 1945 the Questura had become
an increasingly Fascist police force committed to ruthless repression of resistance.
It is worth remembering that there was a great deal of evidence in the
wartime press about how the Questura had collaborated with the Nazis in opposing
resistance in Friuli. As I have shown, anyone who wanted could read about
Republican police operations against partisans, including blow by blow accounts in II
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Popolo where the Fascist paper boasted openly that the Republican Questura police
officers (agenti di P.S.) were dealing with resistance. Anti-partisan operations were
written up in the newspaper as if the participants were somehow 'heroic', and, of
course, police funeral notices showed how the officials had been killed during
Questura operations against the Resistance.74
Questura reports were of particular importance to CAOs stationed in urban
and suburban areas, but, in rural areas, CAOs relied more on carabinieri reports, of
greater significance to their understanding of the situation than other police sources.
Thus the role of carabinieri in AMG also deserves some mention here, but has been
largely neglected by historians. For example, it is not widely known that spearhead
units of special 'AMG' carabinieri went into the province along with the British
armed forces when the Allies occupied Udine. Being an integral part of the Italian
army, the carabinieri were a militarized police force with both a military and a civil
role in society, and this meant that the carabinieri were very useful for military
government and were an alternative to partisan police battalions. Another reason the
Allies brought extra carabinieri into northeast Italy was the belief that there were
relatively few officers left in the province after German occupation. In fact, on paper
the carabinieri preserved about half the force's strength during the Resistance period,
but, although some three hundred carabinieri were still policing Friuli, most of them
were wholly ineffective: they suffered from inadequate transport and equipment:
some had no uniform or weapons whilst others patrolled with horses or bicycles.
Thus a priority for AMG was to enhance the carabinieri force by providing
weapons, transport, and urging the Interior Ministry to do something about the poor
morale among carabinieri, chiefly attributed to low-pay. The carabinieri reflected
their royalist origins and their deep-rooted mistrust of Communists and Socialists,
and therefore the introduction of this militarized police force into a Resistance
stronghold was not without friction. In fact Garibaldi partisans in particular were
hostile towards the force when it was introduced by AMG believing it was
deliberately biased in favour of Osoppo partisans.
In conclusion, it can be said that CAO reports offered a distorted picture of
post-war Friuli. In some ways, this was due to a sense of cultural superiority,
mirrored in the victory of the Allied forces. The officers were blinkered by military
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rhetoric and obedience, a profound distrust of Communism, and pre-war stereotype
notions about Italy and Italians that were antecedent to the land-war in Europe. Their
depictions of Communists sometimes resulted in the repression of working class and
peasant activism or at very least denied some of Italy's post-war problems in need of
reform.
It is often overlooked by historians that Civil Affairs Officers were also
heavily influenced by the impressions that Prefettura and Questura reports conveyed
to AMG. Studies of the role of Allied Military Government rarely point to the crucial
influence of Italian institutions in shaping Allied thinking. Fascism had been
overthrown, but a close look at the officials in the Prefettura and Questura in Udine
shows that reactionary forces within these all-important institutions were not purged
by AMG. On the contrary, the officials in the Prefettura and Questura seem to have
made a remarkably easy passage from Fascist government to military government.
Perhaps it is unfair to state, polemically, that AMG deliberately retained Fascist
officials; without much knowledge of this important border region, the Provincial
Commissioner was probably reluctant to dismiss police technocrats and replace them
with inexperienced anti-Fascists. But there is no question that the retention of RSI
bureaucrats, who were not sympathetic to the Communists, peasants or workers who
feature so prominently in police reports, would also shape military government. It is
difficult to believe that the implications of retaining RSI officials who had served
under Nazi occupation somehow escaped the Allies, but one cannot ignore the
consequences for Friulian society and politics. That the inclusion ofRSI bureaucrats
in the Prefettura and Questura had implications for military government, is
demonstrated by the fact that the anti-communist sentiment of Italian officials easily
found its way into CAO reports which supposedly evaluated and assessed the
political situation in Friuli and this no doubt had some effect on higher military
authority.
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As David Ellwood has remarked, the most decisive Allied contribution to the
evolution of Italian political life in the years after Fascism lay in the restoration of
the Italian state and its authority.1 This chapter explores one important aspect of this
process, the epurazione (purging process). Nearly all the historical judgements on the
purging process in Italy during and after the war have been negative. Historians such
as Roy Palmer Domenico and John Foot have argued that the purge was ineffectual
.... 2and failed to cleanse Italian society in any meaningful sense. My research on Udine
confirms these conclusions for, here too, the purge was far from rigorous.
In the research that has been published on the purging process, to date, there
has been little discussion about the local public prosecutor's role in the investigation
of violent crimes committed by Republicans and collaborators. In discussing the
failure of epurazione, Roy Palmer Domenico, among others, has tended to focus on
the decisions made by trial judges rather than the role of the investigating
magistrates. This chapter examines the hitherto neglected role of the public
prosecutor's office in Udine in the purging process, and explores the interrelated
themes of the purging Commission and the state of prisons in the province. I will
also analyse the extent to which the Allies and the Prefect supported the investigating
magistrates in their efforts to gather important evidence and find witnesses for the
trials of Republicans and collaborators.
Many of the documents used in this chapter were written by Allied Legal
Officers with AMG. The Legal Officers, who were in the vanguard of the Allied
armed forces approaching Udine, fully expected the local judiciary to have been
dissolved by the SS police services during Nazi occupation. The Provincial Legal
Officer for Venezie Region, Colonel Willmer, at least hoped that members of the
judiciary had not been deported to concentration camps or compromised by
collaboration. Willmer had such difficulty finding soldiers with any legal expertise
for the province of Udine that he himself had to leave his office at AMG HQ Venezie
and go into the field, as it were. It was therefore a hastily mobilised team of British
legal officers that entered the town with the vanguard of the armed forces on 1 May
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1945. For the next forty-eight hours, AMG HQ Venezie heard nothing from Udine.
Then, the first situation report (SITREP) came from the new Provincial Legal Officer
Udine, C.E. Keysell, stating that the town's courtrooms had survived the Allied air
raids and that the Pretura and high courts were sitting. There was also a new People's
Court (Tribunale del popolo) sitting and it had already adjudicated one case, that of a
notorious collaborator, Odorico Borsatti. Found guilty of mass murder, Borsatti was
sentenced to death by firing squad on May 6, the day after his trial. He was supposed
to be shot in the back sitting on a chair in the prison courtyard with the public
prosecutor and the Procurator present. But when the Procurator, Carlo Bertodo of the
People's Court, arrived at the prison, Borsatti was already dead: partisans, who now
controlled the prison, had killed him as soon as he arrived back in prison from the
People's Court. This episode brought discredit on the Resistance as gaolers and when
Bertodo became Questore in June 1945 he made a great effort to draft in career
prison guards. Incidents like this led Bertodo to conclude that the Resistance was
unable to run the prison impartially or efficiently.
However, the People's Court (Tribunale delpopolo) was a conscious,
organised attempt by the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale Provinciale di Udine
(CLNP) to purge collaborators, especially prominent Fascists and Republicans, and
diffuse the public outrage at the terror that had been unleashed during German
occupation. Resistance leaders believed that the purging of Republicans was a crucial
aspect of Italy's rebirth and political renewal. If significant numbers of Republicans
remained in influential positions, then there would be no regeneration of institutions
that had made up the police state, a situation that might have far-reaching
implications for Italian democracy in the post-war period. Allied Military
Government, on the other hand, was concerned that the Resistance would use the
Tribunale delpopolo for political purposes, and perhaps even turn popular anger into
a revolutionary channel. In particular, the Allies believed that, unlike the judiciary,
the most prominent judges and jury members of the Tribunale del popolo could
easily be linked to the anti-Fascist political parties of the CLNP. Therefore, in
accordance with AMG policy, the Provincial Commissioner decided to abolish the
Tribunale delpopolo on the basis that it was a drumhead court.4 As David Ellwood
has pointed out, the Allies used various political tactics to counter the threat of a
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breakaway alternative governments in the north5 and this was certainly one of them.
It is clear that the Allies did not want the CLNP in Udine to organise the purge of
Fascists and Republicans. There were no doubt other motives; for example, the
People's Court represented an alternative authority which the Allies perceived as a
direct challenge to their own power.
The term Legal Officer or legal expert was used in Allied documentation, but
it is worth asking how familiar AMG officers were with Italian law. In the case of
Udine, evidence shows that even when Legal Officers were dealing with Allied
Military Government law in the shape of the AMG proclamations, there were serious
mistakes made. The cases brought against Italians by Legal Officers often make
perplexing reading: for example, seven children appeared before an AMG Court in
August 1945 and were given jail sentences by Lieutenant Hemsted in Cividale for
having 'played games' with a discarded pistol (without ammunition) that the boys
had found in the wreck ofGerman truck. AMG files did not even contain an arrest
report and the boys were so young that they had to be brought into court by their
parents.6 This is but one of the cases which suggest that the judgement of Legal
Officers was sometimes dubious.
In any case, the CLNP broadsheet, Liberta, announced that the closure of the
Tribunate delpopolo was of a purely technical nature in that no further trials could
be expected until local judges had consulted with government officials on the subject
of epurazione. It is worth noting that the original article for publication, 'Giustizia',
written by the president of the CLNP, Luigi Cossatini, promised that all collaborators
would be brought to justice. However, this promise to the people of Udine was
censored by Major C.E. Keysell, the provincial Legal Officer, and did not appear in
the published version7 which suggests that the Allies were not fully committed to
punishing local Fascists and Republicans.
Although the Tribunate delpopolo adjudicated only one case before the
British abolished it, the court deserves attention because it is a rare example of the
system of justice created by the legal experts of the Resistance movement being put
into practice. In his study of the purge of Republicans, the German historian Hans
Woller has suggested that the People's Court in Udine was an example of rough
o
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justice in a Resistance tribunal. Yet there is little evidence in the AMG archives that
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the CLNP intended to use the court for a radical purge of Republicans and it is
possible to offer a more charitable interpretation.
Evidence from the AMG files shows that the Tribunale del popolo was not
established exclusively by the Communist Party or left-wing partisans. The
legitimacy of the court was furnished by a decree of the CLNP which represented the
political parties of the Resistance, and the military wing of the movement, the Corpo
Volontari delta Liberta (CVL) and included other organisations representing various
groups in society: workers, peasants, young people and women. The CLNP
established a number of commissions which were to discuss post-war problems,
including a Commissione di giustizia which focussed on the purge. People who were
on CLNP commissions had not necessarily taken part in the Resistance; it was seen
as more important that they should be experts in their field. It is therefore clear that
the Tribunale del popolo was not a revolutionary court in any accepted sense.
On the contrary, evidence suggests that the CLNP hoped the court would be a
stabilising force in a period of great social turmoil following the sudden and
unexpected collapse of the German armed forces and the RSI. According to the chief
legal expert of the CLNP, the Tribunale del popolo was established to satisfy popular
demand for justice for the victims of months of civil war and anarchy, and in
establishing a People's Court, the CLNP, and in particular the CVL, actively
dissuaded renegade partisans from taking the law into their own hands. In short, the
People's Court pre-empted summary trials and executions by Resistance members in
the immediate aftermath of the Liberation.9 This explains why the Catholic
newspaper, II Nuovo Friuli, which was normally deeply hostile to the purging
process, fully supported the establishment of a People's Court.10 It is difficult to
believe that the court had a revolutionary colour in that it was modelled on the old
Assize Court which been abolished by the Fascists in 1930. It is perhaps testimony to
the fairness of the trials that Carlo Bertodo, a respectable magistrate who had served
in the local High Court during the Fascist period, and who went on to become
Questore of Udine, presided over the Tribunale del popolo.11
Also, it should be noted that the first defendant, Odorico Borsatti, was tried
according to the penal code that had been established under Fascism because the new
epurazione laws only arrived in the province with AMG.12 A popular jury of ten men
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{assessori) were chosen the day before the trial from a CLN list of thirty jurors, most
ofwhom were white-collar workers (impiegati), not factory workers or peasants. The
list included only six people who claimed to be partisans, three of whom were from
Communist brigades and could plausibly be described as party cadres.13 What my
research in the AMG files demonstrates is that the Allied authorities themselves had
solid evidence that the Tribunale delpopolo was not a revolutionary court fomenting
violence and public disorder; rather its officials and jury members represented a fair
cross-section of local society. That a significant part of the public reacted to the
closure of the Tribunale delpopolo by protesting to the authorities suggests that the
court had been popular. On 9 May the Allies realised from Questore reports that the
closure of the People's Court had aroused public protest and that there was a serious
possibility of dissent if collaborators were not brought to trial. The Allies concluded
that that it was important to establish the Special Assize Court immediately to allay
ill-feeling.14
Nationally, the legal process to purge Republicans was organised into two
sections which dealt with collaboration and other war-related crimes. Firstly, the
Italian government passed a decree, DLL 249, establishing Special Assize Courts
(Corte straordinarie d'assise) for the provinces which had been occupied by the
Germans, a decree which was approved by the Allied Control Commission on 25
April 1945. The Special Assize Courts were 'special' in that they were established to
deal with the specific crime of collaboration (collaborazione politica or
collaborazione militare) to the detriment of the armed forces of the Italian
state—that is, the anti-Fascist Resistance movement, according to article 5 of the
Decree DLL 159 of 27 July 1944.
Secondly, a commission (Commissione di epurazione) was supposed to
investigate the backgrounds of state officials and suspended those who had
collaborated with the Germans, including local officials who had been members of
the Partito fascista repubblicano (PFR) or who had been appointed in the period of
Mussolini's Italian Social Republic (RSI). Historians have often defined the work of
Special Assize Courts in punishing collaborators and the perpetrators of serious war-
related crimes as a purge, but this is somewhat misleading: in actual fact only the
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Commissione di epurazione was technically purging Republicans from public
institutions and positions of power within society.
It should be noted that, at local level, the purge was limited to the crime of
collaboration after 8 September 1943 and therefore people involved in war-related
crimes in the period 1940-43 were never prosecuted. The reason was that the Allies
believed the Fascist regime to be fundamentally different from the RSI in that the
latter was specifically created to collaborate with the German armed forces in Italy.
Of course, as Luigi Ganapini has noted, not all Republicans were combatants imbued
with fanaticism and racism.15 As De Felice has insisted, it is wrong to tar all RSI
adherents with the same brush.16 Dianella Gagliani is right to point out that rallying
to the RSI in Autumn 1943 after Victor Emanuel and Badoglio fled Rome was very
different from adhesion in the spring and summer of 1944 when Nazi violence had
intensified and widened to include the civilian population.17 In any case, most of
those who appeared at the Special Assize Court had taken part in the latter period of
the RSI, in April-November 1944.
With regard to war-related crimes in the period 1940-43, Alberto Buvoli has
demonstrated that the Italian army in Yugoslavia carried out mass deportations,
executions and the destruction of villages in anti-partisan operations that were
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similar to those of the German armed forces. Moreover, Claudio Pavone has
written that in Venezia Giulia anti-partisan operations involved the execution of
Slovene partisans by the Italian army.19 Even so, the purge did not deal with the
army officers and men who had committed such war-related crimes. Therefore it is
important to note that the way the purge was carried out meant that ordinary Italians
did not have to come to terms with the Fascist past but only with war-related crimes
during the period ofGerman occupation.
According to an AMG document, one reason why AMG was determined to
establish Special Assize Courts in Udine and other provinces was that Allied officers
hoped that these courts in northern Italy would prevent some of the criticisms that
had hitherto been made ofMilitary Government in southern and central Italy, namely
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the Allies' perceived 'weakness in dealing with Fascists and collaborators'.
In this chapter, I will refer to members of the RSI as Republicans, not
Republican Fascists for reasons of clarity. The CLNP press popularized the term
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Fascist to refer to any member of the RSI and Allied documents also use the term
'Fascists' or 'neo-fascist' to refer to RSI members. In practice, however,
Republicans, especially local government officials, never explicitly referred to
themselves as Fascists, a term used only by their political opponents.
THE SPECIAL ASSIZE COURT IN UDINE
A study of the purging process in Friuli published in the mid-1970s found
that, whereas the courts in Udine had effectively punished collaborators, the Appeal
Court in Milan later quashed most of the tough sentences that had been handed down
to Republicans.21 The Special Assize Courts consisted of a president and four lay
judges (giudici popolari). The president of the Assize Court in Udine was nominated
by the president of the Appeal Court in Venice which ensured that only magistrates
with long experience were chosen to take part in the purge. The president of the
Assize Court was at least of equal status to a consigliere at the Appeal Court. On 10
May the legal team in Udine applied for permission from Eighth Army HQ to
establish an Assize Court for local Italian officials and Republicans who had
collaborated with the German armed forces.22 Some three weeks later, on the
morning of 7 June, the Special Section of the Assize Court sat for the first time amid
much fanfare. Brigadier General J.K. Dunlop, the Regional Legal Officer, said at the
inaugural ceremony that reconstruction could only be based on justice—the judiciary
of a state mirrored the nation and true democracy meant a free justice system in a
free nation. The occasion was heralded in the CLNP press as an important event.23 In
reality, at this point in time, the Allies were planning to abandon the country within
about six weeks24 and therefore AMG officials did not expect to oversee the purge.
The German historian, Hans Woller has written that in Como, Udine and other
northern cities, Prefects, Questori, and Fascist leaders appeared before the Assize
Courts,25 but this was not in fact the case in Udine at least.
In Udine, the story is different. The first trial at the Special Section of the
Assize Court was of a very public figure—Federico Valentinis, the former editor of
the local broadsheet, II Popolo, who had been arrested and detained on 1 May.
Valentinis was accused of collaboration with the enemy and reporting false news
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items on the Resistance movement in particular and the war in general. Valentinis
admitted that he had been a Fascist Republican Party member but denied having had
any particular ties to the Nazis.
What happened at the first trial deserves attention as Valentinis ran the
printing presses of the Fascist Republican Party broadsheet, and edited and published
a great deal of Nazi propaganda, including articles that officially condoned and
inspired anti-Semitism. During the trial, however, the court heard evidence that the
misinformation and propaganda in the broadsheet had had little if any discernable
impact on its readers and that the items of Nazi propaganda were in any case
unattributed, making it difficult to prove that Valentinis had written any of them
himself. Important people in Udine appeared at Valentinis' trial and reiterated the
claims of his defence that the allegations were untrue. Some went further and
claimed that Valentinis had used his position as editor to save them from
imprisonment or deportation while others testified that he had aided partisans and
Jews in escaping arrest. According to detailed guidelines on how to interpret the new
laws on epurazione, Valentinis should have been sentenced to at least ten years in
prison, but the judge accepted the statements of a number of witnesses at face value
and found Valentinis guilty only of the minor charge of indirect collaboration and he
received a third off for what the judge termed 'good deeds during the Resistance
period'.
However, it should also be noted that Valentinis was very different from most
collaborators who appeared before the Assize Court for war-related crimes in that he
was not guilty of violence against the Resistance, but rather of publishing Nazi
propaganda in II Popolo which most partisans had dismissed as a Fascist rag. The
vast majority of defendants in Udine were young men from the rank and file of the
RSI armed forces, people who were working class and had mostly received only a
very elementary education.
This is most clearly revealed in the case of the second defendant to appear at
the Assize Court, a Republican, Giuseppe Cocolo, who was accused of murdering
twenty partisans and civilians and of spying for the German armed forces. Cocolo
was only sixteen when he appeared before magistrates and was sentenced to life in
prison. A third defendant, Nerino Cerovaz who was twenty-three years old, was
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sentenced to death for espionage. Given the kind of ordinary soldiers of the
Republican Guard who appeared before the Special Assize Court, it is difficult to
9f\
believe Woller's conclusion that the court was used in a general class struggle.
It is worthwhile mentioning that, although the Special Assize Court was a
'special' court, its judge was an ordinary Assize judge and the court was therefore
subordinate to the Procuratore Generale at the Court of Cassation. This meant that
those who were found guilty ofwar crimes at the Special Assize Courts had the right
to appeal to a Special Section of the Court of Cassation in Brescia, and, of course,
the lawyers ofValentinis sent a swift appeal to this court by air from Treviso airport
immediately after his conviction. As in many other cases, the Special Section of the
Court of Cassation thought that Valentinis had been punished too severely and
overturned the decision of the judges in Udine: Valentinis received a very mild
punishment for war-related crimes, and was released on 1 June 1946 after serving
less than a year in prison.27 It is perhaps telling that the president of the Special
Section of the Court of Cassation, sitting in Brescia, had previously raised doubts
about the jurisdiction of the Special Assize Courts to try army officers and men who
28would normally have appeared before military tribunals.
According to a report by Carlo Bertodo, who had by then become the
Questore in Udine, most local people criticized the slow progress of the Special
Assize Court in dealing with cases of collaboration and there was profound
disenchantment with the small number of trials.29 Reports about the public mood in
Udine were similar to the situation in Naples where, according to an article by Paolo
De Marco, the population's initial sympathy towards AMG rapidly declined in the
aftermath of liberation.30 Hans Woller has suggested that the Special Assize Courts
showed no clemency in initial trials and that this is demonstrated by what happened
at Genoa, Rovigo, Como and many other northern cities. Woller goes on to add that
many of these sentences were legally dubious as the courts issued sentences because
31
they were unwilling or unable to disinterest themselves from public pressure.
Indeed, the Resistance authorities in Udine claimed that the public gallery of
the Special Assize Court was also filled with Republican sympathisers, and, on at
least one occasion, lorries brought RSI supporters to the courtroom so that they could
cheer an SS major who was on trial. At about this time, the Catholic Church was
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holding public memorials for Republicans who had been killed during the war, and
the Resistance leaders believed that both the Questura and the Prefect were doing
little to defend emerging democracy.
AMG Public Safety officers had the impression that public order was
remarkably good in town given the turbulent events of the aftermath ofwar and
Liberation. Even the Christian Democrat press, II Nuovo Friuli,—a broadsheet that
seized every opportunity to carry stories of Communist barbarity—reported that
there had been remarkably few episodes of violence and revenge against local
collaborators and Republicans.33 Certainly I have found no evidence that any of the
Fascist or Republican leaders were shot by partisans, after the Liberation. It is
worthwhile noting that even British Intelligence reports, which were anti-
Communist, never mention incidents of Resistance violence in the immediate
aftermath of the partisan insurrection.34
There is some evidence, however, that the new Christian Democrat Prefect,
Agostino Candolini, was reluctant to assist the local Public Prosecutor in preparing
the cases for the court; for example, Udine was one of the largest provinces in Italy
and there were two Special Sections of the Assize Court in Pordenone and Tolmezzo,
but the Prefettura refused to provide transport for investigating magistrates. The
Procuratore Generale and the AMG legal officer, Major W.D. Stump, repeatedly
asked Candolini to supply transport. AMG officers themselves did not take any
practical measures to improve matters. The Prefect did eventually provide two cars,36
but the vehicles were not roadworthy due to their worn tyres, and the magistrates of
• • • 37the Assize Court had to go on borrowing private cars to carry out investigations. It
is clear that, without proper transport, and with a tiny staff in the Public Prosecutor's
Office, the investigating magistrates were unable to gather much evidence that
collaborators had also been directly involved in crimes like murder, torture and the
massacres and atrocities of the rastrellamenti. Therefore, investigating magistrates
did not discover, collect and bring evidence to the Public Prosecutor to support the
accusation of collaboration and, as a result, cases presented at the Special Assize
Court were often weak or lacking in evidence.
In a legal report of 26 July on the local Assize Courts, Major W.D. Stump
described the courts as an 'apparent failure' and wrote that the underlying reason for
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the slow progress of the Special Assize Court was not the transport problem, but the
• • • 38fact that 'obviously the job cannot be done by sessions of one day each week.'
In theory, the presence of four lay judges, who were chosen from a pool put
forward by the CLNP, meant that ordinary Italians had an important role in deciding
on how Republican collaborators were to be punished. In practice, however, it was
the investigating magistrates who had a crucial role in the trials at the Special Assize
Courts. The Public Prosecutor gathered evidence and decided on the charges. Trial
records from the Special Assize Court in Udine demonstrate that the Public
Prosecutor invariably charged Republicans and collaborators with the crime of
collaboration, rather than with violent crimes such as rape, torture and murder, of
which they were also guilty; for example, Giovanni Vidoni was accused only of
collaboration, even though it emerged from the Public Prosecutor's investigations
that the people who Vidoni denounced were murdered by the Cossacks as a direct
result of his accusations.39 In most cases, the Public Prosecutor was reluctant to put
Republicans on trial for crimes other than collaboration. It is true that collaboration
was a serious crime in that the minimum sentence was ten years in prison and the
maximum sentence was the death penalty, but, by ignoring the additional violent
crimes, the Public Prosecutor was not presenting a strong case for a custodial
sentence or revealing the true brutality of the war.
Moreover, as the Public Prosecutor refused to investigate the more serious
crimes committed by Republicans—massacres, murder, rape, torture, arson—there
was little evidence gathered by the magistrates and cases against collaborators were
often incomplete and therefore dropped. In the light of this, it can be said that the
brutality ofmany collaborators was unpunished. For example, in the case of Antonio
Bressan, a member of the RSI battalion «Volontari fascisti friulani», who had
participated in numerous atrocities and was personally responsible for executing
innocent civilians, several witnesses testified that he had inflicted torture on
partisans, including putting a steel wire round victims' testicles, and tightening it
with a piece of wood. Despite this he was found guilty only of collaboration not
violent crimes.
In reality, the Public Prosecutor and investigating magistrates were
themselves part of the problem. The Public Prosecutor and investigating magistrates
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in Udine all belonged to the local judiciary which had served under the Fascist
regime. As an elite group within the judicial system, the judges had utilized Fascist
laws and their powers of arrest to persecute anti-Fascists and suppress democratic
opposition to the regime. One of the paradoxes of the purge process was that there
was no purge of the judiciary itself. As Pier Giuseppe Murgia, among others, has
pointed out, this meant that the Special Assize Courts were in the hands of a
judiciary which was deeply conservative, if not Fascist, in its approach to the law and
the role of the courts.40
It is worth looking at the attitude of the Public Prosecutor in Udine, under the
direction of the Procurator General at the Appeal Court in Venice, which prepared
the cases for the Special Section of the Assize Court. The Public Prosecutor later
wrote in 1947 that 'any episode of hostility towards the Resistance movement was
not presented in a calm way by either the witnesses or victims [of war-related
crimes] but rather their hatred towards the defendants magnified the crimes out of all
proportion.'41 In another letter, written in 1946, the public prosecutor argued that:
there were many accusations, but little evidence, and only espionage could be
proven. The death sentence was passed in a period when public emotions and the
desire for revenge were very strong. Later defendants, who were found guilty of
similar crimes, received much lighter sentences [from the Special section of the
Assize Court in Udine].4"
It can be argued that there was little evidence because investigating
magistrates had failed to investigate crimes properly. In addition, it is worthwhile
remembering that much of the public anger was the result of the horrific disclosures
of the Special Assize Court trials themselves because the bestiality ofNazi and RSI
terror had previously been kept out of the press. The atrocities perpetrated by the RSI
during the German occupation of Udine—culminating in the rastrellamenti
discussed in Chapter Six— were of a nature and scale which had hitherto never been
seen in Friuli and the gruesome details of war-related crimes naturally provoked
horror. The American historian Roy Palmer Domenico has correctly written that
defendants at the Assize Courts came mainly from the Black Brigades or the
Guardia nazionale repubblicana of the RSI.43 In actual fact they were guilty of
violent crimes as well as collaboration though in most cases only the latter was
prosecuted.
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Also, decisions at the Special Assize Court were appealed at the Court of
Cassation in Milan, the highest court in the land, whose tribunal of career judges
were even more conservative than the lay judges of the Special Assize Court. At the
Court of Cassation an appeal procedure involved a complete retrial of the case rather
than a review of some aspect of the trial. Hence the Court of Cassation had the power
to make a very different assessment of the facts. The Court of Cassation constituted
the final appeal court and many of the decisions of the Special Assize Court were
annulled or the cases were transferred to another Assize Court for retrial. Antonio
Bressan, for example, was sentenced to twenty years in prison by the Special Assize
Court in Udine, but, on appeal, the Court of Cassation found that there was lack of
evidence, annulled the verdict and ordered the case to be retried at the Special Court
of Assize in Padua. Therefore, it is worthwhile noting that many of the sentences of
the Special Assize Court were later heavily reduced or annulled on appeal by the
Court of Cassation.
Moreover, because the judicial system was particularly slow, by the time
most of the cases in Udine reached the Court of Cassation an amnesty for political
prisoners had already been passed by the government of the new Italian Republic in
June 1946. The Court of Cassation had the power to grant an amnesty to those
accused of political crimes without consulting with the judge at the Special Assize
Court.
One reason the purge in Udine was so slow was the sheer size of the task
facing the local judiciary. The Public Prosecutor's Office in Udine had only seven
magistrates and five lawyers to cope with some 1,300 Republican trials involving
more than 1,500 prisoners held in jails throughout the province. Some Republicans
were still free in Udine, including members of the Questura who had handed over
hostages to the Germans. The Public Prosecutor made such slow progress in the
screening of political prisoners that the local court was only able to deal with one
case a week.
In this situation, the Regional Legal Officer felt that prisoners should either
be charged or released as tension was mounting within prisons. As the Regional
Legal Officer Willmer commented, the solution was to employ more staff to assist
the Public Prosecutor. He thought that an important factor in the poor progress of the
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courts was that 'no one seems to know which legal authority was actually
responsible for screening people who have been imprisoned for war-related
, 44
crimes .
Nor did Allied occupation make the work of Italian magistrates more easy.
Until the Italian legal authorities in Udine had received permission from the Eighth
Army to establish the Special Section of the Assize Court in Udine, investigating
magistrates could do little about a purge since epurazione laws had strict time limits
for investigations and trials. Evidence shows that AMG Udine requested permission
to implement General Order 35 with a telegram to AMG Venezia Region on 15 May
1945, but permission was not granted by AMG until 25 June, an unnecessary delay.45
THE COMMISSIONE Dl EPURAZIONE
AMG General Order 35 was an Allied proclamation which was intended to
purge former Republicans from important positions within society. The Commissione
di epurazione was supposed to deal with the legacy of the RSI and German
occupation. In particular, the Commission was to suspend Republicans who had been
part of the RSI armed forces and had taken part in the rastrellamenti and the
execution of partisans. People who were not officials or soldiers of the RSI but who
had collaborated with the RSI or the Germans could also be suspended. As Claudio
Pavone has noted, many ordinary Italians claimed that they had been coerced into
collaborating with the Nazis,46 but the commission was supposed to ignore such
pleas. The work of the epuration commissions has been far less studied than that of
the Special Assize Courts.
Individuals who were to be screened by the Commission had to complete a
detailed questionnaire (una scheda) which outlined their background, career and
Republican Party activities. A key point in the Resistance press was that Communist
partisans would not disarm whilst Republicans remained in positions of power, and
some partisans were reported to have said that they would not relinquish their
weapons until there was evidence of a real commitment to epurazione viewed as an
integral part of post-war reconstruction.47
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Towards the end ofMay the Prefect and Resistance leaders put forward
nominations for the Epuration Commission which were supposed to have three
investigating judges (magistrati) and thirteen members from the six political parties
which made up the anti-Fascist alliance, the CLNP. It was soon apparent, however,
that the Prefect, Agostino Candolini, was somewhat reluctant to form the
Commission and the Allies had to insist that the Prefect comply with the orders as
soon as possible.48
AMG files reveal that police investigations by Questura police
officers—some of whom were themselves under suspicion of having committed war-
related crimes—resulted in several nominations being rejected by AMG on the
grounds that the people had a 'criminal record': they had been arrested by the police
authorities for anti-Fascist activities during the Fascist period. By using criminal
records from the Fascist and Republican period, the Questura police officers, who
really assumed the role of liaison officers between the Italian establishment and
AMG, probably manipulated reality and were able to convince Allied officers that
people with an anti-Fascist past were unsuitable candidates to sit on the Epuration
Commission. It seems astonishing that AMG officers excluded nominations for the
Epuration Commission on the basis that individuals had been arrested during the
Fascist period for their political beliefs, but AMG documents demonstrate that this is
indeed the case. It is in fact the central weakness of the purge. Candidates were
carefully chosen by the Provincial Commissioner to ensure that they did not have
radical ideas about removing Republicans and Fascists.
For example, when the Prefect submitted the list of nominations for the
Epuration Commission, the names of those 'persons of a "Red" persuasion' as the
Provincial Legal Officer Major C.E. Keysell described them, were rejected by Allied
Military Government on the grounds that they had an anti-Fascist past. In November
1945 one member of the Epuration Commission had to resign through ill health and
the Prefect sent two nominations to replace him: Guerino Paviotti and Gino Mauro.
Paviotti was a cobbler by trade, thirty-seven years old, and a member of the
Communist Party. In 1934 Paviotti had been sentenced to four years imprisonment
for anti-Fascist activities. Two years of the sentence had been suspended as a result
of an amnesty granted to persons condemned for this offence and he had been
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released in 1936. The following year, the Fascists themselves had revoked the
sentence. However, Paviotti was rejected by William Crago, the Provincial Legal
Officer because Paviotti was not 'of the calibre required for this position'. The other
candidate, Gino Mauro, was also a Communist but he had no criminal record and
was 'apparently a good character' according to the police. Mauro was rejected
because of his age—he was twenty-one—which in the eyes of the Legal Officer
made him 'too young and inexperienced'. At the end of the report, Crago asked the
Provincial Commissioner to invite the CLNP to forward a 'more suitable
candidate'.49 In this case, it is clear that the candidates for the Epuration Commission
were rejected by AMG because they were members of the local section of the
Communist Party. As Ellwood has pointed out, no analysis of the reconstruction
period in Italy should ignore the international context which cannot be separated
from Allied plans for reconstruction.50 De Felice has gone further and suggested that,
in the context of Cold War alignments, the confrontation between Fascism and anti-
Fascism was replaced by a confrontation between Communism and anti-
Communism.51 The extent to which a real 'communist threat' existed is debateable,
however. Marxist historian Giampaolo Gallo, for example, has insisted that it was
only during the period September to October 1944, that the local section of the
Communist Party had revolutionary intentions and that, by the end of the war, the
Communists were fully committed to the cross-party alliance of the CLNP.52
Also, it should be remembered that not only were police officers of the PS
deeply antagonistic to communism and socialism, but that the personal files of the
Questura police officers themselves were to be investigated by members of the
Epuration Commission and therefore they had a personal interest in discrediting
members who were anti-Fascist. In any case, it is clear that the Questura had an
important role in shaping the Epuration Commission and as a result the Commission
had a very conservative mould.
Mario Boschian, a Christian Democrat judge, eventually presided over the
local commissione di epurazione, which included six other members chosen from the
political parties of the CLNP. In addition to Mario Boschian (Christian Democrat
Party), there was Ruggero Tresca (Action Party) the vice president, Tiziano Pessa
(Socialist Party), a lawyer Carlo Piussi (Liberal Party), Antonio Feruglio
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(Communist Party), Claudio Cernuschi (A former partisan from the Christian
Democrat brigade, the Brigata Osoppo Friuli), and Lirusso Evangelista (a former
partisan from the Communist Brigata Garibaldi Friuli). Soon after his nomination,
Lirusso had to go into hospital and so was replaced. Its members were quite
unfamiliar with the Allied legislation, Order 35, and therefore, to aid them in their
task, AMG provided a translation of the proclamation and a set of guidelines for the
Commission.54 In the last week of June, the Commission began meeting in the Casa
dei Littori, a large building which had been the provincial Headquarters of the local
PNF. It is perhaps telling that the Commission, which was supposed to have an
important role in purging society of Fascist elements did not have the technical
means to carry out investigations: it had no car to begin its interviews and only one
typewriter to record its findings. Meanwhile, on 26 June, copies of the proclamation
Order 35 were posted around the town, and, according to a report by the Questore,
there was great public interest in the Epuration Commission: people crowded around
the notices to read the legislation while others discussed its implications.55
The Epuration Commission gave each member responsibility for
investigating a specific profession and requested the personal files of state employees
from the various institutions.56 Commission members examined the most notorious
cases which, in the month of June alone, resulted in the suspension of seventy-five
individuals on the grounds of collaboration, including the Director of Education for
the province (II Provveditore agli Studi). Not only did the Commission want to purge
Republicans, but they also wanted to examine the personal files of those who applied
for the vacancies to ensure that former Republicans did not replace those who had
been suspended for war-related crimes.57 One Questura report commented that
people were dismayed to learn that Germans who had worked for the Todt
CO
Organisation were now employed in private companies.
The Epuration Commission began with the police officers and staff of the
Questura. A report on public mood concluded that the vast majority of people in
Udine wanted to see a thorough purge of the police officers of the Questura.59 It is
curious that the Questore himself, Carlo Bertodo, asked the Epuration Commission
to begin with the police services. Documents in the AMG reveal Carlo Bertodo's real
motive. According to an AMG report, he had made some sort of informal agreement
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with the president of the Commission which precluded an investigation ofwar-
related crimes committed by police officers. The significance of this action, however,
apparently did not escape other members of the Commission who, after investigating
accusations, decided to suspend all the police officers in the Questura and
immediately arrest two of them.60 Bertodo accused the Commission of being highly
politicised and claimed that the allegations against police officers were unfounded.
However, another AMG Legal Officer, Major W.D. Stump, carried out his own
investigation and in a report to AMG Venezie Region concluded that the police
officers in the Questura had committed war-related crimes and that the suspension
was wholly justified.61
One of the problems the Commission encountered was that during the last
phase of the Resistance period, some partisans had issued so-called certificates of
merit to Republicans entitling them to future reward or gratitude because they had
been of service to the Resistance. Many Republicans believed that they were now
exempt from punishment or suspension from office because they had contributed to
the Resistance. For example, when the Commission decided to suspend the police in
the Questura, one officer, Antonio D'Onofrio, produced a certificate of merit from a
prominent Socialist stating that D'Onofrio shown anti-Fascist sympathies during the
period ofGerman occupation.
One of the first public institutes the Epuration Commission investigated was
the Post Office, which had handled important German communications. After
examining the files of postal workers, the Commission concluded in July that thirty-
two clerks and eight officials were to be suspended. The Director of the Post Office
objected to the findings of the Commission and some evidence of the thinking
behind his objections is contained in a letter. According to the Director, his
employees had not been staunch Republicans, but rather ordinary people who had
been deluged with Fascist propaganda. The Director insisted that these individuals
had never been committed to the values of the RSI and were in fact 'valuable
employees', and that staff shortages would cause inevitable disruption to postal
services. In short, the postmaster urged the Committee not to purge the local Post
Office because it would do a great deal of harm to an institution which was important
for reconstruction.62 It is worth noting that the Post Office was involved in the
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compilation of electoral lists during this period and perhaps this was taken into
consideration by the Commission.63 The Post Office is but one example of a state
institution which assured the Commission that, not only were its employees not
Republicans and therefore relatively unimportant figures in the RSI, but that any sort
of purge would merely strike a blow against the institution itself with possible
consequences for reconstruction.
The CLNP press appealed for victims to come forward and testify at the
Special Section of the Assize Court against Republicans and other collaborators who
were accused of war-related crimes.64 Although the CLNP did not officially form its
own commissione di epurazione, it nevertheless established a committee to gather
information about Republicans and other collaborators so that the individuals could
be denounced to the Special Section of the Assize Court. It is probable that the
CLNP became involved in gathering its own incriminating evidence because
Resistance leaders had little faith in the new powers of the Epuration Committee, and
the Resistance representatives were unwilling to trust officers of the Questura and
carabinieri, presumably because they were not using their police powers to
investigate and arrest known Fascists and Republicans. Again, the Questura of Udine
showed nothing but contempt for the CLN committees and pointed to the anti-Fascist
activities of its members in an effort to discredit the incriminating evidence that the
committees were gathering.
AMG showed no enthusiasm for the CLNP committees and, in fact, in
November 1945, Lt. William H. Crago, an Allied legal expert, warned a committee
that Italian government officials had recently taken a much more liberal attitude
towards war-related crimes involving Republicans and therefore the committee had
to be cautious about accusing people. At about this time, the Questore supplied
Crago with a file on Daniele Piedmonte, the president of a CLNP committee which
was investigating war-related crimes committed by Republicans, who had apparently
been imprisoned for what the Fascists termed 'criminal behaviour', that is anti-
Fascism.63 This kind ofQuestura involvement and their willingness to inform the
Allies about individuals had a marked effect on the purge in that it devalued the work
of the CLNP.
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It is worth pointing out that the Epuration Commission did not follow the
Allies' instructions and in fact suspended low grade state employees first rather than
focus on important officials. An Allied report on epuration returns criticised the
Commission for starting with the least important cases, the so-called 'deferred cases'
ofRepublicans in low-grade jobs, and not the high-grade officials in the RSI, who
were listed as 'urgent' cases. According to Major W.D. Stump, the Commissions
'appear generally to have ignored the priorities and to have spent a large proportion
of their time in investigating deferred schede ,'66 The example of Udine confirms the
view of Gian Enrico Rusconi that Republicans with minor roles in the RSI, the so-
called 'piccoli fascisti', were disproportionately blamed for Fascism.67
However, it is worthwhile pointing out that the vast majority cases were in
fact 'deferred cases'. By contrast, the numbers of'urgent cases' were relatively small
and there were serious delays in receiving the personal files for the high-ranking
cases. In theory, the Commission was supposed to deal with urgent cases first, but in
practice, as the Commission explained to the Allied authorities, especially in rural
areas, it was much quicker to go through all files of one institution at a time rather
than ask the institution to send in three different sets of files over a period of time.
It is not clear from AMG files what actually became of individuals who were
suspended by the Commission, but the figures below show that the purge did not
mark a decisive break with the Fascist past.
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Table 1.2. Number of purges by the Commissione di Epurazione, July-December
1945.68
Cases Urgent Routine
Investigations completed without 112 2559
taking any measures against persons
Persons suspended 28 380
Total number of personal files 140 2939
received
Appeals
Successful appeals against suspension 5 144
Appeals rejected and persons 15 132
suspended
Appeals still to be heard 7 95
Total number of appeals 27 371
Suspensions
Cases without appeals 1 9
Persons actually suspended by board 15 132
Total number of persons suspended 16 141
The immediate cases were senior officials. Routine cases were low-grade
officials and deferred cases were the bottom rung, as it were, grade 7. In October, the
Provincial Commissioner commenting on the suspension of a Carabinieri Group
Commander who had been working for the Allies, wrote that the removal of the
Italian police officer who had a Fascist past completely undermined the good work
the commander had done in improving carabinieri morale in the aftermath of the
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THE PRISON SYSTEM
It is difficult to understand the reluctance of the judiciary to incarcerate more
people unless the state of local prisons is borne in mind. In Udine, as elsewhere in
Italy, the purge ofRepublicans was complicated by the fact that prisons were already
overflowing with convicts even before the trials had begun. The Resistance forces
seized control of the prisons in Udine during the Liberation, not only to release
people who had been wrongfully imprisoned by the Nazi and RSI authorities, but
also to hold Republicans and other collaborators who were being rounded up by
partisans.
There were external factors, however, which made the task extremely
difficult. One problem was that the Allies did not consider members of the Fascist
armed forces to be prisoners ofwar, but rather 'members of a surrendered enemy
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force' that is, collaborators, which meant that Republicans in Italian custody on
charges of atrocities and collaboration were to be placed in the local jail, not in
prisoner-of-war camps along with German soldiers. Similarly, RSI personnel
captured by the British were handed over to the Italian authorities and placed in local
jails.71 Thus, the prisons were soon overflowing with members of the RSI armed
forces who had been detained during the Liberation. An Allied report stated bluntly
that it was probable that the majority ofRepublicans would never face trial. Allied
troops seemed uninterested in rounding up Republicans, with the notable exception
of the Jewish troops from the Eighth Army's Palestine Brigade, who pursued
Germans and Republicans, which alarmed AMG who felt their action was tending to
upset rather than calm the public.72
In any case, by late July 1945, there were some 500 prisoners in Udine town
jail awaiting trial at the Special Section of the Assize Court. An Allied report about
conditions in the jail stated that most Republicans were held in the town jail for their
own protection because of the extent of popular fury against those who had
• • 7T
committed war-related crimes against civilians and partisans. In fact another report
went further and claimed that some of the more radical elements of the Resistance
might attempt an assault on the jail and hence twenty-two carabinieri officers
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patrolled the perimeter whilst forty-four wardens kept watch over the prisoners
within the compound.74
The Allies recognised that, in the climate of political tension, such
individuals would probably never be brought to trial and consequently AMG hoped
that Republicans would be also classed as 'surrendered enemy forces' and given the
same status as prisoners of war. In Venice, for example, the Republican Black
Brigades had surrendered to partisan commanders on the condition that they would
be treated as prisoners ofwar unless they were guilty of war-related crimes.
I want to draw attention to the conditions in the prison in Udine. Firstly,
during the Nazi occupation, the Resistance movement had cursed and reviled the
notorious, local jail in Via Spalato and, unsurprisingly, the building, which was a
symbol ofNazi terror, had been extensively vandalized during the partisan
insurrection. Therefore, some wings of the prison were devoid of rudimentary
features such as locks, cell doors, and glass windows. On the other hand, there were
very few guards and the prisoners enjoyed considerable liberty within the building
not least because there were no locks. The picture is somewhat similar to that of the
famous Milanese prison, San Vittore, studied by John Foot.76 What is remarkable
about Udine is that, according to a later report by the Questore, partisans and
Republicans managed to live together reasonably well; the prisoners were not
isolated on remand and Republicans sang Fascist songs and received many visits
from relatives and friends. The provisions, however, were so poor that relatives had
to provided the prisoners with food.77 All these factors help us to understand why the
Public Prosecutor's Office was reluctant to widen investigations into crimes
committed during the Resistance period, investigations that would inevitably result
in more people being taken into custody.
Another problem was that the Italian authorities had to screen all the
prisoners who had been recently jailed by the SS. This explains why more than a
month after the town had been liberated, there were still twelve prisoners in jail who
had been convicted of crimes by Nazi courts, including four individuals who had
been incarcerated by the SS for deserting the German armed forces. As their cases




Prison riots were endemic as a result of local overcrowding and poor
conditions. The tension in Udine jail culminated in a mass rebellion of Republican
prisoners on November 11 1945. According to a report by the Questore, the guards
were overpowered by the convicts who had managed to smuggle weapons into their
cells including rifles. Other prisoners armed themselves with metal bars. Some
Republicans broke into the prison armoury and handed out twelve rifles and some
400 rounds of ammunition to fellow inmates. Republicans destroyed cells and
lighting. The rebellion was so serious that the Italian authorities had to ask the
British military to restore order with soldiers and four tanks which surrounded the
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prison.
The other prisons in the province were also overflowing: the Assize Court of
Udine had sections sitting in the towns of Pordenone and Tolmezzo in whose jails
there were hundreds ofRepublicans awaiting trial. A contemporary illustration of the
conditions in Udine's jails can be seen in an inspection of Pordenone jail carried out
by Joseph Guarini, AMG Regional Prison Officer. Conditions in the prison had no
doubt deteriorated during the Nazi occupation. The prison at Pordenone was very old
and had rough wooden floors that had not been cleaned recently because the guards
had no brooms. The building had a foul odour and was full of vermin. Liberation had
led to the capture ofmany Republicans and collaborators: the jail had a capacity for
100 men and 20 women but in June there were 228 prisoners who had been arrested
during the Liberation. The report concluded that the problem of overcrowding could
be remedied and conditions greatly improved with a proper screening procedure and
the removal of some fifty prisoners.80
The Allies attempted to resolve the problem of overflowing prisons by
removing some 300 Republicans who had been delivered to town jails in the
province and placing them in a new prison camp which had been built by the Fascist
regime during the war for the purpose of holding Allied soldiers and ordinary
civilians who had been deported by the Italian army during its military campaigns.
However this particular camp had never been completed because the regime had
enjoyed no military victories and hence had captured relatively few prisoners ofwar.
According to Allied documents, the camp had large modern buildings, was airy and
well spaced and could hold an estimated 2,000 inmates. Problems with the camp
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began when the Allies allowed thirty partisans to guard the prison, only seven of
whom had weapons. The perimeter was unlit and the camp was situated in an area of
thick vegetation. Unsurprisingly, there were many escapes from this camp, which
discredited the prison system.
It is worthwhile mentioning that after the first few trials, the Special Assize
Court had little novelty and, as a result, the purge received much less press coverage.
Liberta, the Resistance newspaper which had an initial circulation of 24,000 copies
and was the most important daily in the town for the period May-December 1945,
did cover all the important trials, but its influence as a broadsheet declined in 1946,
when a Catholic and Monarchist newspaper group, which launched IIMesseggero
Veneto, took over control of the printing press and ensured that Liberta rolled off the
presses after all the morning trains and couriers had left town.81 II Messeggero
Veneto was a Christian Democrat broadsheet which was anti-Communist and
concerned with supporting Italian claims to Trieste.82 The local Catholic press
trivialised the role ofRepublicans on trial and much public attention was directed to
the virtues of prominent Republicans. The broadsheet's general message was that it
was time to move on from epurazione. For example, in hostility to the trial of the
former PFR leader, Mario Cabai, the Messaggero Veneto focussed on his outstanding
military record, patriotism, anti-German stance, and some shadowy wartime links
with Christian Democrat partisans, no doubt of an anti-Communist nature.
On 22 June 1946, there was a government amnesty for all the prisoners who
had been jailed by the Special Assize Courts (Amnistia e indulto per reati comuni,
politici e militari).83 Palmiro Togliatti, the Communist Party leader, described the
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amnesty as a gesture of clemency that would end the social upheaval in society.
However, as Claudio Pavone has remarked, it was somewhat grotesque in that it
allowed the Court of Cassation to free Republicans who had tortured partisans.85
This effectively marked the end of the punishment of Republicans and collaborators
as the amnesty released the vast majority of convicts, including Mario Cabai and the
director of II Popolo, Federico Valentinis. Only a few Republicans who were guilty
of particularly notorious murders were refused the benefit of the amnesty. Thus, the
vast majority of trials that were still to be heard were suspended as a result.
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In conclusion, it can be said that the trials at the Special Assize Court
neglected the fact that Republicans and collaborators were also common criminals
who had committed violent crimes during the Resistance period. This is most clearly
revealed in the details which emerged from the trials at the Special Assize Court. The
local investigating magistrates and the Public Prosecutor's Office rarely prosecuted
violent crimes, preferring to put Republicans on trial for the political crime of
collaboration. It is true that the tiny number of staff in the local Public Prosecutor's
Office was totally inadequate for the purpose, but the result was that the cases
presented at the Special Assize Court in Udine were far from complete.
One of the underlying causes of the failure to prosecute violent crimes was
the situation in Udine's prisons. The case ofUdine shows that the reluctance of the
Public Prosecutor to arrest more people and widen investigations is best understood
in the context of a prison system which was already overflowing with urgent cases.
Thus, the case of Udine only confirms the picture given by other historians like
Palmer Domenico that the purge in Italy was incomplete and ineffectual.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has dealt with aspects of the Italian home front during World War
Two. It has tried to show just how different the early part of Italy's war was from the
later period in terms of the demands made on the home front. As I have
demonstrated, the attitudes of local government officials and other authorities need to
be seen in the context of the time line of the military events. In the summer of 1940,
the first reports of Allied air attacks seemed to confirm that the conflict was on a
relatively small scale in comparison to the First World War, and this was therefore
not a cause for concern for local authorities. In Udine, one of the consequences of
having had only a few air raids in 1940-41 was that most people believed they were
quite safe from the dramatic effects of the war. Although it is true that Italy's
military weakness was quickly exposed in Greece and North Africa in 1940, it is
worthwhile remembering that the position of Hitler's armed forces in Europe was
extremely strong in the early part of the war and that, as an ally, Italy was associated
with that strength. In many ways, the war of 1940-1941 was just the sort of war the
Fascists had expected to fight — a European conflict of limited scope. Certainly, in
1940-1941 the war did not seem to be a conflict that was destined to stretch out into
the indefinite future.
The case of Udine demonstrates the importance of the army in the
organisation of civil defence. Here the army was largely responsible for air raid
precautions and the PNF had at best a very minor role. That said, in the local
territorial army, attitudes towards air defence precautions were shaped by the
perceived course of the war. This leads to the conclusion that army officers
themselves did not consider civil defence a priority in 1940-1941 and therefore made
no serious effort to protect non-combatants at home. Similarly, many local
government officials did not take air precautions seriously. At the same time, air raid
precautions in rural areas were naturally limited because their inhabitants had little
training or technology, and although UNPA was a national organisation, its influence
within rural communities was nominal. In this respect, MacGregor Knox is correct in
stating that national poverty played an important part in limiting the extent of war
preparations in Italy.
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Fascists at local level were expected to obey orders from Rome but, as I have
shown, the regime sent very few Air Defence Inspectors into rural areas to see for
themselves whether or not the general population was adequately prepared for air
attacks. This thesis has argued that localism was a dominant feature on the home
front. As I have shown, some of the people who did not comply with the new
wartime regulations were in fact part of the system itself; for example, the Podestas,
UNPA officials, and army officers. This demonstrates the view that while Nazi
Germany was victorious, there was little, if any, need for a war effort on the home
front.
This local case study has also shown that the lack of bomb shelters was not
simply due to organisational incapacity or insulated parochialism, but rather to a
widely held belief that the war would be short and victorious and that shelters were
consequently not an outright priority. In actual fact, as I have demonstrated, local air
defence precautions proved more than adequate for the actual bombing that did take
place in the early part of the war, although this was less true in 1943.
From the start of the war, the rural commissions formed within farming
communities to report infringements and protect the nation's food supply had an
ambivalent attitude towards war economy regulations: the laws were circumvented
or bent according to the extent to which local government officials needed to
implement them. The natural bias of Podestas was to favour their local farming
community and local interests usually took precedence over national orders. Rural
communities particularly resented Fascist attempts to take over the distribution of
food and consequently there was much resistance to the ammassi campaign. This
resistance was not documented by peasants themselves, but by the police and the
local Podestas, usually in remarkably sympathetic terms. Some peasant-farmers were
sullenly resentful of increased state intervention, while others sought to undermine
the ammassi laws, but few were punished for the abuses. The overwhelming majority
of peasant-farmers clung to their practices of the past, despite the propaganda and
pressure from the PNF and other authorities. Knox has described this as a crippling
parochialism of outlook.1 This thesis suggests that one of the main reasons for
1
Knox, Hitler's Italian Allies, 28.
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Fascism's dismal war effort was the ability of Italians to manipulate the war
economy regulations and demands of the home front.
This thesis has also examined the Repubblica sociale italiana under German
occupation. Recently, some historians and memoirists have offered a more charitable
version of the RSI as a sort of 'stabilizing influence' in this period. De Felice has
argued that the RSI was necessary and that the men and women who supported it did
so out of a desire to protect Italians from the staggering brutality that the Germans
had employed in Poland, for example.2 However, this thesis has presented a very
different picture. De Felice has also maintained that within the RSI there was a sharp
divide between 'extremists' and 'moderates',3 but as Chapter Six has shown, in the
case of Udine, the demarcation lines were not as clear as he had claimed. Although
the violence was often perpetrated by paramilitary thugs, many RSI officials were
involved in the organisation of the rastrellamenti. In De Felice's view, the atrocities
can be blamed on a 'climate of civil war' created by partisans and Republicans
alike.4 However, the evidence that I have presented demonstrates that Republicans
did perpetrate violence against innocent civilians that was quite clearly designed to
terrorize rural communities as part of the coercion and repression intrinsic to German
occupation. Thus, the idea that the Repubblica sociale italiana somehow shielded
Italians from the worst excesses of German occupation is misplaced or even some
kind of special pleading.
As Klinkhammer has shown, much of the violence in this period was
organised by German soldiers, in particular the SS divisions, especially in the border
provinces. Without denying that the German armed forces organised and led the vast
majority of attacks against rural communities, this thesis has discussed trial evidence
that suggests Italians themselves were responsible for much of the violence, and that
their extraordinary brutality was a vital component of the terror unleashed by
German occupation. My research does support Klinkhammer's conclusion that the
Nazis ruthlessly exploited the Italian people for labour as part of the German war
effort. However, it also demonstrates that Italians had a much greater role in the
violence and exploitation than his account of German occupation suggests.




It is worthwhile noting that Klinkhammer's study of the German occupation
of Italy deliberately avoids dealing with the province of Udine because it was under
direct German rule, with its own Gauleiter, Friedrich Rainer, and, in Klinkhammer's
view, therefore represents a very different case.5 My case study of Udine fills this
gap. More to the point, my thesis shows that, even in a directly-ruled border province
like this, Republicans had a particularly important role in the German occupation. In
Udine things were no different from the rest of occupied Italy in terms of RSI's
involvement in war atrocities.
Instead of confirming existing stereotypes of Italy's war, this thesis has
demonstrated that officials and functionaries at local level either did not fully
comprehend or were not fully committed to national policies. This meant that there
were limits to how useful local PNF leaders and other authorities could be in the war
effort at provincial level. This case study suggests that Fascism decided to work
with, rather than try to override, these local attitudes, but the result was that the state
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